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SUMMARY 
This dissertation focused on the nature of political control over the bureaucracy 
with reference to the Northern Province (1994 - 1998). Bureaucracies are 
controlled in various ways. Mechanisms aimed at ensuring public accountability 
towards ministers, national assemblies, the courts or ombudsmen may be 
instituted. The civil service may become politicised, so that it shares the 
ideological enthusiasm of the government of the day. Counter-bureaucracies 
may be formed to create an alternative advisory service and to strengthen the 
hand of elected politicians. Should the bureaucracy be subjected to political 
control? The reality of 'government by officials' may function behind the fa9ade of 
representative and democratic accountability, which is the precise reason why 
control over bureaucratic power is one of the most urgent problems in modern 
politics and public administration and why no political/administrative system has 
found an easy solution to this problem yet. 
It is against this background that answers can be found to the question of 
whether the bureaucracy should be subject to political control and how such 
control should be exercised. Research questions which could herald possible 
solutions to the problem, were pursued. The study describes, analyses, and 
evaluates political control over the bureaucracy as an integral part of public 
administration and an essential ingredient of representative democracy. 
The dissertation also investigated the difference between the variables of the 
political and the administrative systems State-related structures and institutions 
and the ideological grounding of Sate-related concepts that influence the milieu 
of political control over the bureaucracy. Among others, the study determined the 
nature of the bureaucracy, provided a picture of how bureaucracies function, and 
described the factors and institutions that influence the interaction between the 
political and the administrative systems in terms of political control. 
KEY TERMS 
Control; accountability; political office-bearer; bureaucracy; organisational 
structure; organisation; representative bureaucracy; hierarchy; democracy; state; 
government; public administration; administration; governance; legislative 
authority; executive authority; administrative state. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
1.2 Background and Rationale 
1.3 Demarcation of the Study 
1.4 Statement of the Problem 
1.5 Research Problems 
1.6 Objectives of the Study 
1.7 Approach to the Study 
1.8 Method of Investigation 
1.9 Terminology 
1.9.1 Public Official 
1.9.2 Political Office-Bearer 
1.9.3 Control 
1.9.4 Governance 
1.9.5 Government 
1.9.6 Administration 
1.9.7 Bureaucracy 
1.10 Overview of Chapters 
CHAPTER2 LITERATURE STUDY 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 State-related Concepts that Influence Control Over 
the Bureaucracy 
2.2.1 Authority in a State 
2.2.2 Form of Authority 
2.2.3 Constitutionalism and the Constitution of a State 
2.2.3.1 South African Case 
2.2.4 Separation of Powers 
PAGE 
NUMBER 
1 
1 
1 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
11 
11 
11 
12 
12 
12 
12 
13 
15 
15 
16 
17 
19 
21 
25 
26 
ii 
CHAPTER2 
2.2.4.1 
2.2.5 
2.2.6 
2.2.6.1 
2.2.6.2 
2.3 
2.3.1 
2.3.2 
2.3.2.1 
2.3.2.2 
2.3.3 
2.3.3.1 
2.3.3.2 
2.4 
2.4.1 
2.4.2 
2.4.3 
2.4.4 
2.4.5 
2.4.6 
2.5 
2.5.1 
CONTINUED PAGE 
NUMBER 
Government Hierarchy 28 
Checks and Balances 32 
~~ ~ 
Objectives of the State 36 
Functions of the State and Public Administration 38 
Government and State Structure-related Concepts 40 
that Influence Control over the Bureaucracy 
Executive Authority 
Government 
Government as an Institution 
Government as a Function 
Forms of the Executive Authority 
Executive Institutions in Non-Democratic Political 
Systems 
Executive Institutions in Democratic Political 
Systems 
Public Administration-related Concepts that 
Influence Control over the Bureaucracy 
Public Administration 
Administration 
Civil Service 
Public Sector 
Structure 
Policy 
Factors and Institutions that Influence the Interaction 
between the Political and the Administrative 
Systems 
Institutional Factors Influencing the Bureaucracy 
41 
43 
44 
46 
50 
50 
51 
51 
52 
52 
53 
53 
54 
54 
56 
57 
iii 
CHAPTER 2 CONTINUED 
2.5.2 Constitution of the Republic of South African 1996 
2.5.3 Parliament 
2.5.4 Cabinet 
2.5.5 President 
2.5.6 Auditor-General 
2.5.7 Treasury (Departments of State Expenditure and 
Finance) 
2.5.8 Minister of Finance 
2.5.9 Financial and Fiscal Commission 
2.5.10 Commission on the Remuneration of 
Representatives 
2.5.11 Public Service Commission 
2.5.12 Public Protector 
2.5.12.1 Constitutional Provision for the Public Protector 
2.5.12.2 Jurisdiction of the Public Protector 
2.5.13 Human Rights Commission 
2.5.14 Code of Conduct for the Public Service 
2.6 Conclusion 
CHAPTER3 THE MILIEU OF BUREAUCRACY AS AN 
EXTERNAL VARIABLE INFLUENCING 
POLITICAL CONTROL 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Bureaucracy in Public Administration 
3.2.1 Bureaucracy 
3.2.1.1 Max Weber's Use of the Term "Bureaucracy" 
3.2.1.2 Alb row's Use of the Term "Bureaucracy" 
3.2.2 Definition of the Concept "Bureaucracy" 
PAGE 
NUMBER 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
62 
63 
64 
64 
65 
65 
67 
69 
71 
71 
73 
73 
74 
75 
77 
77 
80 
iv 
CHAPTER 3 CONTINUED 
3.3 
3.3.1 
3.3.2 
3.3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
3.5.1 
3.5.2 
3.5.3 
3.5.4 
3.6 
3.6.1 
3.6.2 
3.6.3 
3.6.4 
3.7 
3.7.1 
3.7.2 
3.8 
Distinctive Characteristics of a Bureaucracy in 
Public Administration 
The Typifying Characteristics of a Public 
Bureaucracy 
An Organisation Regarded as a Bureaucracy 
The Implications of Bureaucracy of Weber's and 
Albrow's Views 
Characteristics and Prerequisites of Weber's "Ideal 
Bureaucracy" in the Context of the Civil Service 
The Sources of Bureaucratic Power 
Decline of Parliamentary Power 
The Concept "Administrative State" 
Bureaucrats Gain Power Implementing Political 
Decisions 
Other Factors that Lead to an Increase in Political 
Influence Exerted by Top Level Civil Servants 
Function of Bureaucracies 
Bureaucracy's Administrative Function 
Role of the Bureaucrats as Policy Advisers 
Role of Bureaucracy in the Expression of Interests 
Role of Bureaucracies in Maintaining Political 
Stability and Progress 
Organisation of Bureaucracies 
Principles on which Bureaucracies are Organised 
The Organisation of Government Departments 
Provincial Sphere of Government 
PAGE 
NUMBER 
81 
82 
84 
84 
87 
89 
91 
93 
96 
99 
100 
101 
101 
102 
103 
105 
105 
107 
109 
v 
CHAPTER 3 CONTINUED PAGE 
NUMBER 
3.8.1 
3.8.2 
3.8.3 
Provincial Legislative Authority 
Provincial Executive Authority 
Nature and Size of the Northern Province 
Bureaucracy 
110 
112 
114 
3.8.4 Factors that Lead to an Increase in Political 120 
Influence Exerted by Top-Level Civil Servants 
(Northern Province) 
3.9 Functions of the Bureaucracy in the Northern 123 
Province 
3.9.1 Public Management 123 
3.9.2 Promotion of Interaction and Good Governance in a 126 
Political Milieu 
3.9.2.1 Executive Authority 126 
3.9.2.2 Administrative Authority 127 
3.10 Conclusion 130 
CHAPTER 4 CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY AS 132 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.3.1 
4.3.1.1 
4.3.1.2 
4.3.1.3 
4.3.1.3.1 
4.3.1.3.2 
4.3.1.3.3 
EXTERNAL VARIABLES AFFECTING THE 
CONTROL OVER THE BUREAUCRACY 
Introduction 
Meaning of Control 
Classification of Control 
Internal Control 
Formal Control 
Informal Control 
External Control 
Legislative Control over the Bureaucracy 
Control by Cabinet 
Control by the Minister of Finance 
132 
133 
135 
135 
136 
139 
139 
141 
142 
143 
vi 
CHAPTER 4 CONTINUED 
4.3.1.4 
4.3.1.5 
4.4 
4.4.1 
4.4.2 
4.4.3 
4.4.4 
4.5 
4.5.1 
4.5.2 
4.6 
4.6.1 
4.6.1.1 
4.6.1.2 
4.6.1.3 
4.6.1.4 
4.6.1.5 
4.6.2 
4.7 
CHAPTERS 
5.1 
5.2 
5.2.1 
5.2.2 
Audit Controls and the Establishment of the Office of 
the Auditor- General 
Control by Voters 
Normative Requirements for Control over the 
Bureaucracy 
Deference to Supremacy of the Constitution 
Promotion of Efficiency 
Requirements of Administrative Law 
Respect for Community Values 
Accountability 
Public Accountability 
Administrative Accountability 
Control as a Function of Management 
Types of Control 
Control to Promote Responsibility 
Control to Promote Regularity 
Control to Promote Effectiveness 
Control to Promote Efficiency 
Control to Promote Economy 
Control and Supervision in the Hierarchy 
Conclusion 
POLITICAL CONTROL OVER BUREAUCRACIES 
Introduction 
The Difference between Elected and Appointed 
Officials 
Elected Political Office-Bearers 
Appointed Officials 
PAGE 
NUMBER 
145 
148 
149 
149 
149 
150 
151 
152 
154 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
163 
164 
165 
165 
168 
168 
169 
170 
171 
Vll 
CHAPTER 5 CONTINUED 
5.3 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
5.7 
5.8 
5.9 
5.10 
5.11 
5.11.1 
5.11.2 
5.11.3 
5.12 
5.13 
5.14 
5.14.1 
5.14.1.1 
5.14.1.2 
5.14.1.3 
The Relationship between the Government and the 
Bureaucracy 
The Minister's Role in a Democratic System 
The Various Ministerial Styles 
The Influence of Bureaucrats on Political Decision-
making 
Should Bureaucrats be Politically Neutral? 
The Political Role of the Bureaucracy 
The Balance in Relations Between Ministers and 
High Ranking Officials 
Why can Ministers' Power Leak to Bureaucrats? 
How do Ministers Exercise Control the 
Bureaucracy? 
The Scope of Political Appointments 
Norms of Ministerial Accountability 
Making use of Political Advisers 
Other Ways of Exercising Control over 
Bureaucracies 
Objectives of and Necessity for Political Control 
Appropriateness of the Control Measures 
Implementation of Political Control Measures 
Adequacy of Mechanisms Employed to Exercise 
Control 
Efficiency of Political Control in the Northern 
Province 
Impediments to Political Control over the 
Bureaucracy in the Province 
PAGE 
NUMBER 
172 
176 
178 
181 
183 
183 
184 
187 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
197 
200 
201 
201 
202 
204 
viii 
CHAPTER 5 CONTINUED 
5.14.1.4 
5.14.1.5 
5.14.1.6 
5.15 
5.15.1 
5.15.2 
5.15.3 
5.15.4 
5.15.5 
5.16 
5.16.1 
5.16.2 
5.16.3 
5.17 
CHAPTERS 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.4 
6.5 
Political Interference 
Inadequate Knowledge of Public Service 
Divergent Perceptions 
Executive Control over the Bureaucracies 
Accessibility of Bureaucrats 
Political Advisory System 
Accountability and Responsibility as a Control 
Measure 
Politicisation of the Civil Service 
Construction of the Counter-Bureaucracy 
How Public Officials Evoke Compliance 
Control Criteria 
Qualitative Control 
Contingency Systems 
Conclusion 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
Synthesis 
Observations 
The State of Political Control in the Northern 
Province 
In Conclusion 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
DIAGRAMS 
DIAGRAM 1: Spectrum of Forms of Authority 
DIAGRAM 2: Hierarchy of Government 
PAGE 
NUMBER 
204 
206 
207 
209 
210 
211 
211 
213 
214 
215 
219 
220 
220 
220 
222 
222 
222 
230 
233 
235 
237 
20 
29 
ix 
DIAGRAMS CONTINUED 
DIAGRAM 3: Matrix of Separation of Powers and 32 
Spheres of Governance 
DIAGRAM 4: The Organisation of Government 108 
Departments, Divisions and Agencies 
DIAGRAM 5: The Size of the Northern Province 120 
Provincial Bureaucracy 
DIAGRAM 6: Distribution of Management Posts 121 
DIAGRAM 7: The Organisational Structure of the 122 
Northern Province 
DIAGRAM 8: Departments of the Northern Province 125 
DIAGRAM 9: Modes of Control over Bureaucracies 190 
X 
CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This study will focus on the nature of political control over the bureaucracy with 
reference to the Northern Province. The introductory chapter will provide a 
background and rationale to put the problem into context. 
The demarcation of the study will be set out briefly. The statement of the problem 
that arises, the research problems and objectives and the approach to the study 
are also provided. The research approach in this study is descriptive and 
analytical, though sometimes interpretive. To clarify this approach, it has also 
been necessary to explain the manner in which information was gathered as a 
method of investigation. A concise description of terms frequently used in this 
dissertation is given to avoid misinterpretation. This chapter concludes with an 
overview of the chapters contained in the thesis. 
1.2 Background and Rationale 
In a democratic state the authority of politics is a basic guideline for public 
administration. Historically there are three main factors that gave rise to political 
authority (Viljoen 1987:87). 
• Functions are divided. Political office-bearers are mainly charged with 
government functions while the administrative functions are entrusted to 
officials. 
• Politicians are almost exclusively elected to office by popular vote while 
officials are appointed. 
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• Political office-bearers are directly responsible to legislative authority and 
therefore accountable to the electorate, while officials are directly 
responsible to the political-office bearer (Viljoen 1987:87). 
The absolute nature of government is the main difference between government 
and other organised enterprises. Similarly, the main difference between the 
public bureaucracy and other bureaucracies lies in the political nature of public 
administration. Policymaking in private business can take place in relative safety 
at various levels because it is determined by demand and supply, competition, 
and an intra-organisational interplay of divergent interests. Policymaking can take 
place in relative safety at different levels of the executive authority of government 
because the demand for any decision making is always subject to political 
determinations and is formulated in a political environment (Appleby 1949: 12). 
In the current context of a new political dispensation the administrations in all the 
new provinces are faced with a variety of issues, including the execution of 
government policy, the establishment of political guidance and ideology for the 
improvement of the overall welfare of the public, nation-building, stability, and 
respect for democratic values. Public administration in South Africa also has to 
overcome numerous difficulties caused largely by four factors: the burden of 
history; unethical and corruptive constraints; affirmative action, and the 
legitimisation of the transitional process. Faced with such difficulties, as a 
prerequisite for strengthening the political control over the bureaucracy to 
strengthen the credibility of the State, both internally and externally, is the setting 
up of 'an efficient administration at the service of citizens which is sound, 
responsible and accountable and served by honest officials.' 
South Africa, like many other countries in the southern hemisphere, made its 
historic transition from authoritarian rule to democracy with the founding elections 
in 1994, when a democratic constitutional dispensation replaced the previous 
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selective and undemocratic government. Consequently, it opened up new 
opportunities for accountability over government activities. Political control and 
accountability can be regarded as one of the cornerstones of democratic 
government. Public calls by political office-bearers, the media and the public for 
greater accountability in matters of governance and politics currently reinforce the 
need for political control to a significant degree. 
Underlying the constitutional transition is the sound principle that political office-
bearers may not promote party-political interests and that they must be regarded 
as officials carrying out the policy of the government of the day within the clearly 
demarcated conventions of constitutional provisions. 
In an unstable political environment it is of the utmost importance that aspects 
regarding morality, equality, fairness and the rights and freedom of individuals be 
taken into account when policy decisions are made and executed. Politicians and 
civil servants should be seen as supporters of the transition to a fairer system. If 
the majority of the population does not have this perception, there will be a 
significant potential for conflict between on the one hand, the values of the 
majority and, o.n the other hand, the values of the bureaucracy. To avoid conflict 
and serve the community, it is necessary for political office-bearers to be aware 
of what the public regards as fair. This sense of fairness must be everyone's goal 
and must ensure a stable society. 
Although it seems that there may be measures for the execution of political 
control, little research has been undertaken to discover how effective such 
measures have been, especially when viewed against the ongoing presence of 
corruption in the public service in South Africa. 
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1.3 Demarcation of the Study 
This study focwses mainly on the variables that influence the milieu of political 
control over the bureaucracy. Although the investigation is not aimed at a 
specified state-bureaucracy, selected aspects of the Northern Province Provincial 
Government have been researched, within the boundaries of the effect of the 
new Constitution of 1993. 
The selection of the topic of this dissertation was prompted by the need to 
explore whether the transformation challenge could be met during the period 
under study from June 1994 to June 1999, specifically in terms of exercising 
control over a bureaucracy imbued with apartheid values and practices. The 
scope of this dissertation is focused on the control aspect in order to provide 
room for the description and analysis of the nature of political control, as well as 
to determine whether control was adequate or not. 
Research and sources regarding political control in the public sector in South 
Africa are relatively rare compared to sources regarding the accountability 
dimension of control. Sources regarding bureaucracy, control, supervision and 
other state related concepts and institutions were used to obtain as much 
information as possible about the phenomenon of political control. 
Though the requirements of the degree required a dissertation of limited scope, 
the process of documentation of a field of study with so many variables 
influencing the actual process of control over the bureaucracy resulted in a full 
dissertation. 
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1.4 Statement of the Problem 
The contemporary call for fundamental reappraisal of ethical conduct, legislative 
direction, public accountability and democratic principles in governmental 
institutions is a worldwide phenomenon as is evidenced by current literature as 
well as by the agendas of inter alia national and international conferences on the 
administrative sciences. The current emphasis on the need for accountable, 
efficient and democratic governance may be attributed to the problems arising 
from the detrimental effect of corruption and undemocratic and unethical conduct 
and practices, and also through the added process of current political and 
constitutional reform towards the establishment of post-apartheid democracy in 
South Africa. 
The phenomenon of political control over bureaucracies cannot be quantified. 
Naturally, the phenomenon can only be discussed in relative terms, and not in 
absolute ones. Thus, where reference is made to the scope (quantity) of 
variables within bureaucratic control, this must be interpreted relative to certain 
circumstances. 
This is all the more essential in South Africa's case, as the country emerges from 
apartheid rule during which the majority of South Africans were, in the process of 
governing, actively turned away from and denied the right of a democratic 
governmental system. The legacy of apartheid rule continues to haunt the 
implementation of democratic and open practices in the civil service. Often, the 
democratic institutions of Government, as well as their concomitant processes 
and rules, of which the aim is to bring them closer to the public, appear to be 
distant, alien and perplexing. No reminder is needed of the inherent danger this 
poses for a healthy system of democracy. The public will not support democratic 
institutions that appear unethical, corrupt and incomprehensible to them. 
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However, popular support for democracy and its institutions is not, as is 
commonly assumed, expressed solely via the ballot box during elections, but is 
also dependent upon political control over bureaucracies to ensure sound public 
administration. 
Within the context of the strategies and legislation adopted to set up an efficient 
administration and the political desire for accountability and service by honest 
officials, there is little doubt that this subject is both important and topical. 
In view of the background provided above, the main problem to be addressed by 
this dissertation will, therefore, be: 
What is the nature of political control over the bureaucracy and what 
practical actions could be taken at an institutional level to enable the South 
African government to promote political control over the management of 
public assets, policies and services? 
1.5 Research Problems 
The need for such reflection as stated in the problem statement is important, 
because the necessary measures for ensuring political control within democratic 
institutions can form a useful benchmark against which the progress of 
democratisation in South Africa and the consolidation of our democratic gains 
can be assessed. 
Through the application of primary and secondary source research methods, the 
following research questions, which could herald possible solutions to the 
problem, were pursued: 
• What is the nature of the interaction between the variables of the political 
and the administrative system, state-related structures and institutions, 
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and the ideological grounding of state-related concepts that influence the 
milieu of political control over the bureaucracy and how can this interaction 
be strengthened and made more fluid by democratic governance and 
public administration? 
• What determines the nature of the bureaucracy and how can a clear and 
meaningful basis for interpretation and utilisation by both political as well 
as administrative aims and functions be established with regard to the role 
of political control? 
• What is the nature of the interaction of control and accountability as 
external variables influencing control over the bureaucracy and how can 
this interaction be strengthened and made more fluid in the Northern 
Provincial Government? 
• How can political control be effectively and efficiently integrated and 
encouraged in the process of legislative measures in the South African 
and Northern Provincial Governments? 
1.6 Objectives of the Study 
Given the absence of a known and proven system of norms for definitively setting 
the guidelines for political control over the bureaucracy in the State, the need 
exists for the establishment of an appropriate corpus of criteria which would be 
comprehensive enough to cover the entire field of political control over the 
bureaucracy. These criteria should be as scientifically accountable in theory as it 
should be workable in practice, and should be of enduring validity by being 
rooted in the fundamentals of the administrative sciences. To meet these 
requirements, it is also a purpose of the dissertation to investigate the level of 
political control prevalent in the Northern Provincial Government. Control 
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manifests itself in many different ways and should not be considered as having a 
single form. 
In order to achieve the aim of the study, the objectives of the study are as 
follows: 
• to analyse and define state, government and public administration-related 
concepts and institutions that influence control over the bureaucracy 
• to find out what factors and institutions influence the interaction between 
the political and the administrative system 
• to get a clear picture of how a bureaucracy functions 
• to analyse and define control and accountability and to find out what 
political control entails 
• to evaluate the efficiency of existing measures in promoting political 
control in the Northern Provincial Government 
1. 7 Approach to the Study 
Once the questions and uncertainties regarding political control over the 
bureaucracy had been integrated with each other, the research problem for the 
purposes of this study manifested in the selection of a framework in accordance 
with which the nature, role and functioning of political control over the 
bureaucracy could be set out and evaluated. 
The most useful theoretic approach to understanding and explaining the role of 
political control over the bureaucracy, was to isolate and consider the variables 
that affect it - namely the political and administrative system, bureaucracy, 
control and accountability - and to test such variables by analysing the specific 
relationship between them. These variables, which form the greater part of the 
dissertation, helped define the parameters and limitations within which political 
control function, and from this developed the basic framework for the dissertation, 
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which forms the necessary theoretic basis for the study. However, it obviously 
remains a mere framework and the influence of these respective variables varies 
all the time, as the variables react to each other or are modified by the course of 
events. 
The concluding part of the dissertation evaluates the role of political control in 
view of these variables. The purpose of the dissertation was not to become 
drawn into the fine details of the historic record, but to investigate the application 
of certain variables to sound and good governance. It was also neither the 
purpose to make a value judgment regarding political control. However, an effort 
is made to generate generalisations regarding political control over the 
bureaucracy, and the emphasis is placed on the relevance of studying the 
political and administrative dimensions in order to understand the role of this 
phenomenon. 
This dissertation is primarily intended to be an exploratory study on political 
control. This is the reason why the dissertation is essentially descriptive in nature. 
1.8 Method of Investigation 
As may be expected, the research methods to be adopted for the collection and 
interpretation of the data required for the study will be determined by the nature 
of the study. In the absence of a documented system of norms to guide the 
investigation, the principal means employed to do the research for this 
dissertation was available literature and the questions posed during informal 
interviews. Seeing that the activities of Government to achieve sound public 
administration today are concerned with many aspects of Public Administration, 
the comprehensive literature consulted covered a wide spectrum of themes -
state, government and public administration related concepts, control, 
responsibility, accountability, organisational structure, bureaucracy and case 
studies and factual information regarding political control. 
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When the final choice had to be made, the author was concerned mainly with the 
offering of representative examples, rather than merely including a variety of 
similar examples in historic-chronological order. This led to the regular inclusion 
of older sources, as well as sources in other fields of study, which gave greater 
insight than the most recent literature would have into the actions taken within 
specific situations and the reasons specific customs originated. 
The most important sources of literature on the field of control and bureaucracy in 
public administration as an aid to gaining a better understanding of political 
control over the bureaucracy include: 
• relevant books on public administration 
• unpublished dissertations and theses 
• the South African Constitution and other relevant legislation, White Papers 
and Statutes of the Republic of South Africa 
• official and unofficial documents, commissions of inquiry reports and 
annual and other reports of the Northern Provincial Government and 
Public Service Commission 
• research reports 
• political speeches 
• articles from journals and newspaper reports 
The deductive nature of the study, its largely uncharted terrain, and the definitive 
role that particular points of departure played in the development of the various 
measures or guidelines and criteria called for conducting selective informal 
interviews as a supplementary and hence, secondary means towards that end. 
Discussions with senior officials, specialists and experts from the Northern 
Provincial bureaucracy and other State institutions, academics, as well as with 
persons and associations of persons from other sectors verified, interpreted and 
clarified supplementary data or tested certain hypotheses or criteria. 
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1.9 Terminology 
Comprehensive conceptual clarification of terms pertinent to the research occurs 
particularly in the appropriate chapters. The definitions and concepts in this 
dissertation are of interest only in relation to their political and administrative 
relevance. In other words, they interest us only in so far as they apply to the 
interaction between politics and public administration. The terms utilised 
throughout the thesis are concisely defined below: 
1.9.1 Public Official 
The term 'public official' will be used interchangeably with bureaucrat, civil 
servant, and state official and would be referring to a person who is permanently 
employed by the government in one capacity or another in accordance with 
professional requirements. 
1.9.2 Political Office-bearer 
In this dissertation the term 'political office-bearer' will be used inter-changeably 
with minister, member of the executive council, and executive office. 
1.9.3 Control 
In general it refers to the authority to give orders to be executed or to put a 
restraint on actions, and to set standards of comparison for checking the results 
or organisational activities. 
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1.9.4 Governance 
Governance refers to the function, action, process or qualities of Government. It 
does not refer to Government structures such as a cabinet or a local council, but 
to the policies made and the efficacy with which these policies are implemented. 
1.9.5 Government 
Government can be defined as the institutions responsible for making and 
carrying out the laws of a polity and for adjudicating disputes that arise under 
those laws. 
1.9.6 Administration 
It can refer collectively to top-level officials in the executive branch or to the 
coordination and implementation of policy. 
1.9.7 Bureaucracy 
In this dissertation, the term 'bureaucracy' has a broad as well as a stricter 
meaning. In the broad sense the concept termed 'public bureaucracy' is used in 
its simplest form, namely to refer to formal institutions that act with the consent of 
the state. In the narrow sense 'bureaucracy' is conceptualised as a kind of 
organisation with special characteristics common to present-day organisational 
structures. 
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1.10 Overview of Chapters 
After completion of the research, the collected material was integrated and 
coordinated so that the facts and observations could speak for themselves. The 
results were divided into the following chapters, forming a logical continuous unit: 
Chapter One of the thesis provides a general introduction to the entire study. 
In order to gain a better understanding of political control Chapter Two gives a 
literature study on state, governance, and public administration-related concepts 
as well as external variables, state-related structures and institutions that 
influence control over the bureaucracy. 
In Chapter Three, various definitions of bureaucracy will be provided and 
analysed. Once a definition of bureaucracy has been established, the various 
characteristics, prerequisites and sources that allow for the occurrence of political 
control will be dealt with. Finally an explanation of the organisation of 
bureaucracies and spectrum of the provincial sphere with reference to the 
Northern Province will be provided. 
In Chapter Four attention will be given to the concepts and types of control and 
accountability as external variables influencing control over the bureaucracy as 
well as possible objectives of public institutions in exercising control. The chapter 
will also focus on normative requirements for control over the bureaucracy. 
In Chapter Five attention is given to the various facets of political control over 
the bureaucracy. The difference between elected and appointed officials, the 
relationship between the government and the bureaucracy, the role and style of 
ministers in a democratic system, the influence of bureaucrats on decision 
making as well as the neutrality of public officials came to the fore. The 
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discussion also centered on various aspects of ministers' control over the 
bureaucracy. 
In Chapter Six a synthesis is given and conclusions are drawn, based on the 
findings of the study. Possible recommendations are also made, which may 
encourage the support and practice of control over the bureaucracy. 
Finally, the sou,rces consulted are listed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE STUDY 
2.1 Introduction 
To provide background for later chapters, this chapter reviews the variables 
that influence the milieu of political control over the bureaucracy. The chapter 
elaborates on State, governance and public administration-related concepts 
as well as external variables, State-related structures and institutions that 
influence control over the bureaucracy. 
It is also a purpose of this chapter to interpret some central concepts in the 
milieu of political control over the bureaucracy. The selection of a method for 
researching the role of political control over the bureaucracy is also beset with 
problems of an interpretative nature, and to facilitate understanding of this 
difficulty some background is required on the nature of the interaction 
between politics and the bureaucracy. This is achieved by surveying local and 
international literature for research done in the study of bureaucracy and the 
accountability and responsibility of political office-bearers and public officials. 
The chapter also explores the ideological grounding of State-related concepts 
such as authority in a State, form of authority, constitutionalism and the 
constitution, the separation of powers, government hierarchy, checks and 
balances, as well as the objectives and functions of the State in public 
administration. 
Other areas of enquiry that will be helpful in understanding the milieu of the 
subject field lie in the broad area of governance and State structures such as 
the executive authority, the government as a concept as well as an institution, 
and forms of executive authority by outlining executive institutions in non-
democratic and democratic political systems. 
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In this chapter a general overview is also given of concepts relating to public 
administration such as the field public administration, administration, civil 
service, public sector, structure and policy as a precursor to the following 
chapters, which focus on bureaucracy and political control. 
Factors and institutions that influence the interaction between the political and 
the administrative systems are also described. In this regard, the institutional 
factors influencing the bureaucracy, the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, the Parliament, the cabinet, the President, the Auditor-General, 
the Treasury, the Minister of Finance, the Financial and Fiscal Commission, 
the Commission on the Remuneration of Representatives, the Public Service 
Commission, the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission and a code 
of conduct for the Public Service are identified. 
Consequently each phenomenon is treated as a concept that is defined, and 
of which the relevance to control over the bureaucracy is important. The 
purpose is to identify the thread running through the fields mentioned below, 
where the important concept of political control is situated. 
2.2 State-related Concepts that Influence Control over the 
Bureaucracy 
It stands to reason that none of the concepts that relate to the State and 
influence public administration can be applied in an absolute sense in a single 
dissertation, because the field of State-related factors that influence the 
control over the bureaucracy is extensive and also because theories, 
processes and institutions in politics and public administration interact 
constantly. Although the discussion here is limited to a specific area in view of 
the extensive nature of this field of study, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
continually relate the various chapters and sections to each other. 
The approach is also broadly generalised, particularly with a view to 
familiarising the reader with certain related concepts that influence the course 
of interaction between political control and public administration. Factors that 
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influence this interaction are discussed in this section and include the 
authority in a state, the concept form of authority, constitutionalism and the 
constitution of a state with specific reference to the South African case, the 
separation of powers, checks and balances, the concept state with reference 
to the objectives and functions of a state and public administration. 
2.2.1. Authority in a State 
The modern state consists of a variety of structures, forms and institutions, 
each with unique characteristics, advantages and disadvantages. States are 
also structured according to different ordering principles that are usually 
aimed at effective functioning and achievement of objectives. The concepts 
"form of authority", "form of state" and "form of government" are used to 
analyse and understand this ordering (Bekker 1994:65). The concept "form of 
authority" encapsulates the concepts "form of state" and "form of government". 
Before the concept "form of authority," will be introduced it is important at the 
outset that the concept "form of state" is briefly discussed so that the following 
discussions can be placed in a specific perspective. 
The term "form of state" refers to how governmental authority is distributed 
through a state. The degree of integration between units of the same society 
(e.g. provinces) or between societies (e.g. different states) is reflected in 
forms of state. These degrees of integration are spread over a spectrum 
ranging from the greatest possible degree of integration on the one hand, to 
full integration on the other hand. Absolutely independent states represent 
one pole while centralised unitary states, represent the opposite pole (Kriek in 
Van Vuuren 1982:167). 
Matters of importance here are firstly the concept of "union" or "unitary state", 
which refers to a state in which the powers of the governmental authority are 
concentrated in the central or national authority rather than being divided, as 
in a federal state. 
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A federation is a state that consists of a variety of regional authorities and a 
central authority, and in which both the regional and the central authorities 
have powers over specific matters (Gey van Pittius 1997:194-195). In this 
context, therefore, it involves the centralisation, rather than the 
decentralisation, of state authority. 
The concept "form of state" is specifically concerned with the analysis of the 
formal ordering principles occurring in a modern state. The study of forms of 
state therefore directly concerns the geographic and hierarchical ordering 
arrangements found in modern states. It is therefore indicative of definite 
structures and institutions that function in specific relations to each other. 
There is no fixed relation between forms of authority and forms of state, 
however, because the form of state does not indicate the existence of a 
specific form of authority. Both unitary and federal states can be democratic. It 
is also true, however, that unitary states, given their centralised nature, tend to 
be a form of state associated with non-democratic forms of authority. It is also 
possible, however, that an undemocratic state can be ordered in accordance 
with federal principles (Bekker 1994:77). 
The ultimate geographic and hierarchic ordering of the State, whether unitary 
or federal, remains effective functioning and achievement of objectives. The 
approach adopted in this dissertation focuses on the nature of interaction 
between politics and public administration and the context of the interaction, 
and is not influenced to any significant extent by the nature of a specific form 
of state. 
An authority consists of the sum total of institutions and persons responsible 
for authoritative decision making as well as the implementation of decisions 
thus made and the handling of juridical matters arising from them. It therefore 
subsists in the institution or group of institutions that perform the legislative, 
executive and judicial functions on behalf of society with a view to optimal 
promotion of the welfare of the public at large. It is clear from the above that in 
a society that is organised politically an authority engages in the following 
three basic activities: 
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The legislative authority is empowered to pass laws (initiate rules), the 
executive authority is empowered to implement or administer laws (apply 
rules), and the judicial authority is empowered to resolve disputes 
(adjudication of rules). The threefold division of government authority is also a 
basic principle of the democratic political system. 
Depending on prevailing circumstances in a society, it may happen that the 
same persons and institutions carry out all three kinds of activity. In order to 
divide power and prevent the abuse of power, constitutions make a distinction 
between the· legislative authority, the executive authority and the judicial 
authority, which have to function independently of each other. These three 
forms of authority must therefore be exercised by different institutions. 
2.2.2. Form of Authority 
Like the concept "state", the concept "form of authority/regime" represents a 
high level of abstraction. It refers to the totality of principles, constitutional 
rules and regulations, techniques, processes, institutions, institutional norms 
and basic values embodied in the formal structures and functions of a state. 
Kotze and VanWyk (1980:148) note that somehow these factors regulate the 
operation of the political system. In other words, the rules of the political 
system in a particular society. Consequently it could also refer to a regime. 
Various forms of authority are distinguished, but all of them can be classified 
among either the democratic or the dictatorial variants. Diagram 1 shows the 
various forms of authority in which power and authority manifest in the 
different forms of political organisation. 
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DIAGRAM 1: Spectrum of Forms of Authority 
Democratic form of authority Non-democratic form of authority 
Ideal democracy Limited democracy Totalitarianism 
Democracy 
(As in Bekker 1994:66) 
Oligarchy/normal 
dictatorship 
Perfect 
totalitarianism 
The basic difference between the two groups of forms of authority indicated 
above is situated in the perception of the State. The democratic form of 
authority is based on the atomistic perception of the State, whereby the State 
is seen as no more than a means to an end. The non-democratic forms of 
authority are based on the organic perception of the State, whereby the State 
is seen as an end in itself (Bekker 1994:66). 
It can be seen from the above that the distinction between forms of authority is 
derived from the centuries-old conflict between freedom and authority, with 
freedom being emphasised by the democratic forms of authority while the 
case of oligarchic forms of authority the emphasis is on authority (Bekker 
1994:66). 
The South African constitution provides for a democratic system and that 
certain democratic principles are entrenched in the constitution. The 
Constitution embodies many ideals and envisages the passing of numerous 
laws towards the realisation of these ideals. In particular the Constitution 
bestows universal suffrage on all South Africans, thus extending the principle 
of representation constitutionally to every citizen. Everybody is therefore 
entitled to participate on an equal footing by way of elections in appointing the 
government institutions that exercise authority over them. Through the 
electoral system of proportional representation seats in Parliament and 
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provincial legislators are allocated to political parties exactly in accordance 
with the total numbers of votes brought out in favour of each of them in an 
election. A direct correlation between their percentage of support and the 
number of seats they hold is therefore assured (Rautenbach & Malherbe 
1998:4). 
2.2.3. Constitutionalism and the Constitution of a State 
The term constitution has two meanings: first it means the whole corpus of 
rules (written and unwritten) whereby the authority of the State is divided. 
Here the whole matter of constitutionalism and the constitution as a means of 
expressing the will of the people is at issue. Secondly it means the 
constitution, which is a written document embodying some or most of the 
constitutional rules. For example, Britain has a constitution but not a (written) 
constitution (Carpenter & Viljoen 1992:10). 
Because government proceeds to perform its task from a power base it can 
wield its power by means of persuasion, authority or even coercion. Since the 
government is also capable of making certain things accessible to certain 
people while withholding such things from others, an urgent need arises to 
write the gov~rnment relations arranged into a constitution (Adlem 1982:17). 
Constitutionalism, which refers to the values, needs and demands of a 
particular society, is embodied in a constitution and comprises those laws, 
institutions and usage within a society on the grounds of which such society 
will be governed and its affairs administered (Sinclair 1982:28). 
Constitutionalism is closely related to such concepts as the social contract 
and the separation of governmental powers. A constitution is the most visible 
form of such a social contract between the population of the State and the 
governmental authority. 
Constitutionalism is the framework within which a political community is 
ordered by law and where permanent institutions with specific predetermined 
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functions and rights are allocated by law (Strong 1972: 126). This definition of 
constitutionalism indicates important differences in the application and use of 
constitutions in non-democratic political systems. 
The chief characteristics of constitutionalism can be seen as the existence of 
(written or unwritten) rules in society according to which political power and 
authority are exercised, provided that those in power submit to the rules and 
the rules impose limitations on the abuse of power. 
Kotze (1997:92) maintains that the following are among the most important 
limitations imposed on the exercise of political power: 
• It must be difficult to amend constitutions. 
• A human rights manifesto must be enforced. 
• The division of governmental powers must be observed. 
• Legal ~ecisions and review must be applicable. 
According to Kotze (1997:102) "A constitution embodies the written or 
unwritten rules forming the highest authority in the land, and it determines the 
form of the State as well as the distribution of powers among authorities." 
(own translation) 
(Rautenbach & Malherbe 1998:4-5) notes the following characteristics of a 
constitution: 
• It is a set of basic rules, that is, rules with a higher status than any 
other rules (or legislation) in society. 
• These rules determine how a government and other authorities must 
function and how powers must be distributed in society. 
• It determines the form of the State (federal, unitary or otherwise) by 
creating permanent governmental institutions and it is the function of 
these institutions to resolve conflict and enforce compliance with 
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popula.tion's obligations towards the authorities (see Rautenbach & 
Malherbe 1998:4-5). 
The supreme authority of the entrenched constitution is probably the most 
conspicuous characteristic of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa because 
the sovereignty of Parliament which used to dominate our politics before was 
abolished by it. The principle that Parliament is the highest authority in the 
country and is not subordinate to anything or anybody therefore no longer 
applies. The Constitution is the highest law in the Republic, and therefore 
Parliament and all other legal institutions are subject to the Constitution, and 
all laws and actions are invalid if they clash with the Constitution (see 
Rautenbach & Malherbe 1998:4-5). 
According to Roskin (Roskin in Bekker 1994:91) the important functions of a 
constitution are the following: 
• The constitution is a declaration of national objectives. 
• The constitution formalises the structure of the State and the 
government. 
• The constitution establishes the legitimacy of the government. 
Constitutionalism relates to constitutions in the sense that constitutions can be 
used in any form of government - from the most democratic to the most 
authoritarian. Consequently it cannot be argued that there is no constitution if 
it is a weak or undemocratic constitution. 
On the other hand constitutionalism does not only consist in theories of 
constitutions. It is rather a specific set of ideas about the kinds of 
constitutional rules that should apply in a state. From this you can deduce that 
not all constitutions conform to the principles of constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalism therefore consists in the normative guidelines that a 
democratic constitution should adhere to. 
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A flexible constitution has the same status as other laws of the land and no 
special procedure is required for their amendment. An inflexible (entrenched) 
constitution usually has a higher status than the normal laws of a country and 
a special procedure is required for its amendment, for example a two-thirds 
majority of votes. 
It is for this reason that the Constitution is much more difficult to change than 
any other law. Parliament can usually change if more than 50 percent of the 
members of Parliament who are present support such a change. This is also 
commonly referred to as simple majority. The Constitution, however, needs a 
much higher percentage vote in order to change its stipulations and content. 
To do so, at least two thirds (66 percent) of the members of Parliament must 
agree to changes to the Constitution. This implies that the rules by which 
government's function stay the same, even if government changes. In this 
way the Constitution helps to ensure that there will always be a democracy in 
South Africa. 
In other words, the constitution as a whole is entrenched, which means that it 
is more difficult to amend the constitution than it is to amend other laws. This 
is not to say that an inflexible constitution is seldom changed. If it is amended 
it must merely be ensured that the prescribed requirements are met (see 
Carpenter & Viljoen 1992: 11-12). 
The following principles can be deduced from the above explanation of 
constitutionalism and the functions of the constitution: 
• In the first place the constitution determines both the powers and the 
duties bf a government as well as the rights and liberties of individuals. 
• Secondly a constitution determines the limits of what an individual may 
or may not do. 
• Thirdly a constitution provides security because clear guidelines for 
action within the State are laid down. 
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• Fourthly the constitution determines exactly what procedures have to 
be followed so that the State will function to the benefit of society 
(Bekker1994:91 ). 
In the democratic state constitutionalism therefore means much more than a 
determination of institutions and their sphere of competence. It also literally 
represents the essence of democracy because the constitution also stipulates 
and limits rights and liberties. 
2.2.3.1 South African Case 
The road to the new democratic constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
began in the mid 1980s. Kotze (in Faure and Lane, 1996:253) explains that 
the implementation of the tricameral Parliament in 1984 (separate assemblies 
for whites, coloureds, and Indians) forced apartheid South Africa into a new 
direction of government. Internal instability and socio-economic challenges 
compelled the De Klerk government to open the way in 1990 for a democratic 
settlement in South Africa after forty-two years of the oppressive apartheid 
regime. The release of Nelson Mandela from prison in this year and the un 
banning of black political parties and resistance movements foreshadowed the 
coming of a free South Africa. 
The following· four years saw many political leaders negotiating together in a 
multiparty forum to establish an interim constitution for South Africa. The 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought together 
twenty-six political parties, with the ANC (African National Congress) and the 
NP (National Party) as the main parties. In this process the ANC proclaimed 
that normal democratic procedures should be followed, in other words, that 
the majority (50 per + 1) should have the right to make decisions. The NP 
pressed for a constitutional state in which the rights of minorities would be 
protected. A compromise was reached and the NP accepted the principle of 
an elected constituent assembly which, as an interim Parliament, would draft 
the final constitution (Kotze in Faure and Lane, 1996:253). 
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History shows that an astonishing compromise was reached whereby South 
Africa would be governed by a "Government of National Unity" (GNU) for the 
first five years. The development of the GNU took place after the collapse of 
CODESA II (May 1992), which resulted in the signing of the Record of 
Understanding between the ANC and the NP on 26 September 1992. 
Multiparty negotiations started in March 1993 and the interim Constitution (Act 
200 of 1993) was adopted in December 1993. 
South Africa's constitution is a written one, spelling out the roles and functions 
of the different spheres and tiers of government. The South African form of 
government is not a purely federal or unitary state, but has elements of both. 
The Constitution spells out the functions of all three levels of government 
(national, provincial, and local). Some powers are also delegated to each of 
these spheres. The South African Constitution is also a rigid constitution. 
Amendments to the Constitution can only be made by a two-thirds majority 
agreement in Parliament. The ruling party, obtaining a two-thirds majority in a 
general election, has the right to amend the Constitution without the 
processes as. described by it. In the 1999 general election the ANC obtained a 
66.58 per cent majority, not enough to obtain the right to unilaterally amend 
the Constitution. A coalition with the Minority Front, however, gave the ANC its 
sought-after two-thirds majority. 
The South African Constitution has been described by many as the most 
liberal constitution in the world. This could only be done through the thorough 
consultative process and the involvement of all stakeholders in the drafting 
process. 
2.2.4. Separation of Powers 
The principle of separation of powers is referred to as trias po/itica in 
academic terms. In simple terms and in a practical way the trias politica 
means that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government 
should be divided or split apart from each other. According to Craythorne 
(1997:5) the most compelling reason for this form of separation is that it 
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prevents autocratic or dictatorial government. The separation of powers 
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government 
provides for. appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness, and openness in the manner in which government executes 
its activities. 
In practice, however, such a separation is often difficult to achieve. The 
reason for this is that the executive and legislative functions tend to overlap, 
causing a certain amount of confusion in terms of the principle of separation of 
powers. It is for this reason that in most Western constitutional states the 
judiciary is kept separate and independent from the legislative and executive 
functions. Each of these branches does, however, have a very specific 
primary responsibility. These responsibilities can be summarised as follows. 
• Legislative authority: Its primary responsibility is to formulate and adopt 
policy which is expressed in legislation and which needs to be 
implemented by the executive authority. This legislation can take the 
form of acts (national), ordinances (provincial), or by- laws (local), 
which form the essence of the legislative authority within each sphere 
of government. It is also the responsibility of the legislative authority 
within each sphere of government to ensure that laws are made, 
changed, or repealed to meet the continuously changing requirements 
in terms of the circumstances that apply to each sphere of government. 
• Executive authority: This branch of authority should execute the 
policies adopted by the legislative authority. This is embodied in 
legislation (acts, ordinances, by-laws) to serve as a framework for 
implementing policy decisions. The executive is compelled to follow the 
laws formulated by the legislature and has to account for the manner in 
which its activities are executed. It is, therefore, in essence, controlled 
by the policies established by the legislative authority. 
• Judicial authority: This branch of authority serves the purpose of 
passing judgement in all cases before the courts of law in South Africa. 
These courts include the Constitutional Court, established in terms of 
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Section 98(1) of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, established 
in terms of Section 101 (1) of the Constitution. The judicial authority is 
instrumental in determining the interpretation of laws when and if 
disputes arise. It is also independent of the legislative and executive 
branches of government, which ensures that the laws of the country 
followed by everyone, including the government. 
It is clear, therefore, that the separation of powers in terms of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial authorities in South Africa contributes towards ensuring 
and upholding the tenets of democracy and ensuring sound governance in the 
manner prescribed in the Constitution. The independence of the judiciary, in 
particular, ensures that all disputes arising from the principle of separation of 
powers can be dealt with by courts of law, which are empowered to pass 
judgements on their own interpretation of any dispute that arises. Each 
branch, in turn, is organised in a particular way and consists of people and 
institutions that have jurisdiction over certain matters and are responsible for 
carrying out certain processes and function. 
2.2.4.1 Gov~rnment Hierarchy 
The magnitude of functions that need to be performed within a state 
necessitates the division of the country into smaller geographical units to 
ensure that functions can be formed efficiently and effectively. This has 
resulted in the development of three levels of public institutions which together 
aim at promoting the general welfare of the public at large. These levels of 
government are referred to as spheres of government in the Constitution. 
Within the South African context, government functions are organised into 
three different spheres or levels, namely, national government level, provincial 
government level, and local government level. This hierarchy is illustrated in 
Diagram 2. · 
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DIAGRAM 2: Hierarchy of Government 
PROVINCIAL 
• 9 Provinces 
LOCAL 
• Municipalities 
COURTS OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
(as in Van Niekerk, Van der Waldt and Jonker 2001 :67) 
• National government level 
This level of government makes decisions and has legislative power 
concerning matters of national interest. These include aspects such as foreign 
affairs, internal (home) affairs, education, health, and defence. The examples 
mentioned clearly indicate that the matters dealt with at national government 
level affect the nation as a whole. Every state also needs to have a supreme 
legislature. The national sphere of government is often referred to as the 
sovereign or central legislative authority. 
• Provincial government level 
This level of government makes decisions and has legislative power on the 
matters that are dealt with in the provincial context. Examples of functions 
performed at provincial government level include community development, 
nature conservation, roads, hospitals, and provincial health issues. This 
sphere of government, therefore, deals with matters that affect people in a 
specific province. 
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• Local government level 
This sphere of government makes decisions and has legislative powers over 
those issues that are dealt with by local governments, also referred to as 
municipalities. The local sphere of government is often referred to as grass-
roots government, because of its direct association with communities at a 
local level. Matters commonly dealt with by municipalities, or the local sphere 
of government, include refuse, sewerage, electricity, water, and sanitation. 
These examples reveal the intimacy of this sphere of government in relation to 
the people it serves. 
There are nine provinces in South Africa. These are the Eastern Cape, 
Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Northern Province, North West Province, 
Western Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and Free State. There are 
approximately 850 local authorities (municipalities), which serve local 
communities. It is expected that by early in the year 2001 there will be 
approximately 450 local authorities after the demarcation process has been 
completed and adopted. In terms of the Constitution and other legislation, 
provision is made for the establishment of: 
• Functional units into which each territory must be divided for performing 
public functions, with specific reference to the legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers. 
• A legislature and other institutions that need to be established in each 
unit to ensure the performance of its functions. 
• The powers and authority entrusted to each institution within a unit to 
be able to execute its functions. 
• The relations that need to exist between the central legislature and the 
legislative institutions of the other spheres of government need to co-
operate with each other to maximise output and prevent duplication in 
an attempt to co-ordinate the activities that need to be rendered to the 
communities. 
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Du Toit and Van der Waldt (1999:186) identify the characteristics of the 
hierarchical structure of government in South Africa as follows: 
It is in the shape of a pyramid. 
There is a single body, the central government, at the top, which has all 
the necessary authority to devolve legislative powers to other levels 
and to give instructions to governments, lower in the hierarchy. 
The central government also has the power to control governments 
lower in the pyramid. 
Towards the base of the pyramid the number of governments increases 
and their powers subsequently decrease. 
The central government, at the top of the pyramid, has the most status 
and the governments at the base of the pyramid have the least, notably 
provincial and local. 
Authority and control are exercised downwards from the top of the 
pyramid to the base within the confines and stipulations of the 
Constitution and other legislation applicable to provinces and local 
authorities. 
Accountability takes place upwards from the base to the top of the 
pyramid. 
The judicial authority is totally independent. 
Numerous factors have led to the establishment of the three spheres of 
government, which are generally referred to as the government hierarchy. 
These factors include: 
• Geographical realities. 
• Political factors. 
• Client base, race, and ethnicity. 
• The nature and extent of government services that need to be 
delivered to communities. 
• Historical factors. 
• Cultural factors. 
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The factors above have had a significant impact on the way in which 
provinces have been demarcated and the manner in which local authorities 
have been established within each province. The municipal structures, which 
exceed 850 local authorities, are currently being reviewed in an attempt to 
demarcate areas in a manner that will be more cost effective and efficient in 
rendering services to people at local level. 
Diagram 2 provides a graphic illustration of the separation of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers of government, as well as the organisation of 
government functions into three different spheres of government. 
DIAGRAM 3: Matrix of Separation of Powers and Spheres of Governance 
SEPARATION SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT/ GOVERNMENT HIERARCHY 
OF POWERS NATIONAL PROVINCIAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT 
LEGISLATIVE • PARLIAMENT • PROVINCIAL • COUNCIL 
AUTHORITY 
- National Assembly LEGISLATURE 
- National Council of 
Provinces 
(CABINET MINISTERS) (EXECUTIVE COUNCIL) 
EXECUTIVE • CABINET MINISTERS • EXECUTIVE • CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
AUTHORITY AND BUREAUCRACY COUNCIL AND OFFICER (CEO) 
BUREAUCRACY 
- Departments (MECs) - Departments 
(Administrations) - Departments (Administrations) 
- Director General (Administrations) - Strategic Executives 
- Public Officials - Director General (Heads of Departments) 
- Public Officials - Public Officials 
JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT_. SUPREME COURT __.HIGH __. MAGISTRATES 
AUTHORITY AND OF APPEAL COURT OTHER COURTS 
(as in Van Niekerk, Van der Waldt and Jonker 2001 :70) 
2.2.5. Checks and Balances 
According to Kotze (1997:121) one of the most important differences between 
constitutions ,in democratic forms of government and constitutions in author-
itarian forms of government are the effective use of checks and balances. This 
concept refers to the need for a counterweight that can limit the exercise of 
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the government's power (i.e. the essence of constitutionalism). Kotze goes on 
to note (1997:121-122) the following familiar mechanisms that serve as 
checks and balances often embodied in constitutions: 
• Public "watchdogs" that are independent of the executive 
authority and have to report directly to Parliament 
Examples of these are the Auditor-General and an ombudsman (e.g. the 
Public Protector in South Africa) who is authorised to investigate any financial 
mismanagement or reports of corruption or maladministration in any of the 
authorities. In the case of an ombudsman members of the public are usually 
also entitled to lodge complaints. 
• The role of the opposition in Parliament 
A constitutio!J must make provision for opposition parties to act effectively, 
particularly in Parliament. There must be opportunities for the ruling party to 
account for its actions, for example by answering questions put by the 
opposition in Parliament. 
• Effective division of powers 
Examples of this are the right of the courts to test the constitutionality of 
legislation; the right of Parliament (where such a right exists) to amend or 
reject the proposals made by the executive authority on legislation; the right of 
Parliament (which exists in a parliamentary government system, but not in a 
presidential system) to propose a motion of no confidence in government; and 
the right of the President (where it exists) to veto legislation proposed by 
Parliament (as in the USA). 
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• The possibility for civil society to develop independently 
Civil society (particularly the media, unions, professional institutions, 
churches, social organisations and political organisations) can only be 
effective if human rights (e.g. freedom of speech or association) are 
entrenched. These institutions can play an important role in revealing the 
abuse of power or can help to moderate the abuse of power or influence 
decisions. 
2.2.6 State 
The central authority and the State are not synonymous. As explained above, 
the central authority is a structure with procedures and processes whereby 
authoritative decisions are taken in the State. A state cannot exist without an 
authority. Although the form of the authority does not influence the status of 
the State as an entity, the form of authority can influence society, the political 
process and public administration. Unlike the State which is a more 
permanent association, both the form of authority and the Government can 
change more frequently. Von Glahn (1986:90) notes, however, that change in 
the form of authority, its representatives and even the constitution cannot 
affect the status of a state. 
The concept "state" is an abstract concept to which different meanings are 
attached. According to Skinner (1989:90 and 112) the concept "state" is not 
only abstract but has different meanings and definitions. As a concept relating 
to constitutional law and the law of nations the State refers to an entity with a 
particular legal status (as actor). As a philosophical concept the State can 
refer, amongst others, to achievement of the "good life" and the ordering of 
society. As a sociological concept the State may refer to the individual's 
interaction with other individuals, in groups on an organised and regulated 
basis. At present, though, the State is the highest human association in which 
the national authority can take authoritative decisions. 
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Every state therefore has its own authority with decision-making procedures, 
power and legitimacy that differ from other states. Authoritative decisions 
include two political groupings, namely the authority or government and the 
governed (population or subjects) (Bekker 1994:49). The population in a state 
possesses, or has a claim to certain rights and liberties and have to meet 
certain obligations, for example paying taxes. An entity must meet certain 
requirements.to be able to function as a state. (Bekker 1994:49). 
In the simplest terms one could say that a state is the organisational form of a 
political community. The commonest political organisational form of our time, 
however, is that of nation states or a community that is composed and 
organised according to nationality. We are already approaching the end of the 
nation state period, however, and the beginning of the supranational or 
regional community, that is to say where the factors of nationality, language, 
culture or religious affiliation are no longer a qualification for membership of 
the organisational entity, but where geographic proximity and economic 
factors are the qualification for membership, for example the European Union 
which is the most successful of these new organisational entities to date. 
(Europeans who work in the European Union's headquarters in Brussels are 
therefore no longer civil servants or government employees, but still in the 
service of the European Union's administration) (Mulder 197 4:21 ). 
In the preceding discussion it was indicated that an entity has to meet certain 
requirements in order to function as a state. One can speak of a state in the 
sense of constitutional law when the State has at least the following 
characteristics: 
• a community of people (population) that; 
• lives in a particular demarcated territory; 
• is subject to the authority enforced in terms of (legal) rules by a 
particular authority; and 
• The State must also have a certain degree of political sovereignty 
(Carpenter & Viljoen 1992:10). 
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Although these requirements are stipulated in terms of the law of nations, 
political, economic and other factors, such as the role of the State in the 
international community, can influence the status and recognition of an entity 
(Bekker 1994:21). 
During the history of humanity the State has passed through a number of 
phases, for example city states, empires and national states. It is expected 
that the present state will also undergo changes in the future. Factors that can 
play a particularly important role in this regard are the increased 
interdependence of states in all respects. States are increasingly unable to 
provide the needs of their populations. Regional co-operation will therefore 
increase in the future. A further question confronting states is the gap arising 
between so-called affluent (industrialised) states and poor states (third world 
and developing states) (Bekker 1994:62). 
2.2.6.1 Objectives of the State 
Quite a number of objectives are usually ascribed to the State. Pride of place 
is usually given to the judicial objective, that is the right to protect, create new 
legislation and amend or even replace existing legislation. In other words the 
objective is effective maintenance of judicial order in the State. Second is 
peacekeeping or the maintenance of public safety and security, third is 
protection, for example against enemies from outside, and fourth is the 
promotion of material welfare. However, all these are material objectives. 
Dante holds that culture and knowledge are the primary and overriding 
objective of the State, which includes information, keeping abreast of 
developments in the community, tolerance as a basic orientation, and 
decency as a basic predisposition in human interaction (Mulder 1974:21). 
In 1822 James Madison made the following statement about democracy and 
the individual's role in the State: 
"A popular government, without popular information or the means of acquiring 
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will 
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forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, 
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives" (Theunissen 
1998:110). 
The individual therefore has the capacity to secure his or her future in a 
democracy by acquiring and using knowledge. In many respects this 
responsibility is incumbent on every citizen of a state. Individuals and private 
institutions in ·a state should therefore be aware that, although they have many 
rights, these rights were obtained at a price, namely in return for assuming 
responsibilities. Claims for public services, such as protection, are paid from 
public funds obtained from tax revenues. Although tax payment is a tangible 
responsibility, there are other, less visible responsibilities that are equally 
important, for example to vote regularly and be actively involved with 
important social issues, such as environmental protection. 
The matter of information is not only based on the individual in the State. The 
State also requires information for the following two reasons: to determine 
whether the !aw has been transgressed and to take public policy decisions 
that are rational and based on factual evidence. All modern states, for 
example, investigate human rights and the exact dimensions of air and water 
pollution, before they can issue instructions relating to violations. In South 
Africa the constitutional court hears citizens' complaints about the violation of 
human rights. In France the government undertook an extensive study of the 
public's energy needs before it embarked on a large-scale nuclear energy 
programme (Roskin in Gey van Pittius 1997:227). 
Sometimes the problem of invasion of privacy arises when institutions, such 
as the South African national intelligence agency, investigates the activities of 
people who are alleged to have subverted the State and in the process their 
family members, friends and neighbours are questioned. The boundary 
between investigations that are necessary to protect the public and invasion of 
privacy is very vague, and it is often difficult to say where the one begins and 
the other ends (Gey van Pittius 1997:227). 
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Today people are lost without information, just as social welfare is impossible 
without education. Information, today mostly second-hand in the sense of 
having been -reproduced, and education are prerequisites for taking part in 
state functions and giving shape and substance to the democratic way of life. 
In order to participate effectively in the complex processes of contemporary 
society, education with a view to responsibility is necessary. Education and 
teaching are consequently again today, as in the days of ancient Greece, 
important state functions in order to give meaningful substance to the State 
(Mulder 1974:21). 
To summarise the State can be seen from the viewpoint of its functions: as a 
judicial state, as a social state and as a cultural state. The sense and activities 
of the State, extensive and profound they may be, are always limited by law. 
No state objective is a priori boundless and omnipresent. Like law, the State 
cannot presume to intrude upon the inviolable core of human existence, the 
human spirit, if it does this it will miss its purpose and become a state in name 
only (Mulder 1974:21). 
There are rights and responsibilities that have to be mutually recognised and 
upheld by the State and the individual (political obligation), the State and the 
private sector, and among individuals themselves. It is the balance between 
rights and responsibilities that results in a successful democratic society - a 
society with government and civil institutions that collaborate for the common 
good and welfare of all the people residing within the geographic confines of 
the State. 
2.2.6.2 Functions of the State and Public Administration 
With the above-mentioned objectives of the State as background all state 
interventions can be divided into four main categories or collective functions: 
power functions, safety and protection functions, economic functions and 
redistribution functions. These functions are not limited to the national 
government, but can also manifest at provincial and local government levels. 
They are visi~le in the form of public goods and services provided by the State 
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to create a suitable environment in which individuals, groups and society in 
general could strive to maintain and improve their quality of life. The purpose 
of this dissertation is not to discuss these functions. The idea is to place the 
objectives of the State in the context of the functions of public administration. 
For the purposes of this dissertation a distinction can be made between the 
interventionist state and the non-interventionist state. In this context the State 
refers to both the Government and the whole public administrative machinery 
of a country. Interventionist and non-interventionist refer to the extent to which 
the State intervenes in the society falling under its sphere of influence. 
The nature of the State intervention is also applicable since some States do 
not permit complete democratic freedom (for example by means of such 
interventions as restrictions imposed on opposition parties), although they 
may allow freedom of economic activity by restricting interventions in this area 
to a minimum. Totalitarian states, for example, must not necessarily be 
classified as interventionist in view of political repression. Democratic states 
must also not be seen as non-interventionist merely on the grounds of the 
principle of political freedom. There are a number of other considerations to 
take into account, such as the extent of economic freedom, the role of the 
State in the economy, and so on (Theunissen 1998:115). 
The variety of modern political and economic systems and the multitude of 
possible and actual combinations defy all efforts to simplifying classification. 
Accordingly references to state intervention must always be qualified 
(Theunissen 1998:115). 
With respect to South Africa it is interesting to note that before the1994 
election the State and its policies tended to be both politically and 
economically interventionistic there were political interventions in the form of 
restrictions imposed on political freedom, and economic interventions in the 
form of over regulation of the economy and its various sectors (e.g. agriculture 
by means of agricultural control boards). Since the 1994 election, however, a 
change has taken place and state interventions have specifically lessened 
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with respect to political freedom and, to a lesser extent, economic freedom. 
Certain interventionist actions are still in evidence, for example the 
Department of Health's proposals to force medical practitioners to agree to a 
kind of comp.ulsory "medical service" in areas specified by the government. 
The future of political and economic interventions by the State is debatable, 
however, and there are no clear indications in this regard at the present time 
(Theunissen 1998:116). 
2.3 Government and State Structure-related Concepts that Influence 
Control over the Bureaucracy 
The discussion of factors that relate to government and state structures that 
influence control over the bureaucracy provided in this section clarify the 
meaning of terms and concepts that are important in understanding the 
purpose and functions of government. 
Governance, therefore, implies the establishment of government structures 
within the context of a state, to ensure that services are rendered to 
communities to ensure that their general welfare and quality of life are 
promoted. Individuals on their own are unable to provide the quantity and 
quality of services that a government representing the people can provide 
collectively to the community. 
In order for government to comply with its purposes and objectives, it is 
essential that structures be created to give effect to the needs, wants, and 
desires of the people. It is for this purpose that the Constitution was 
established in South Africa. The Constitution serves as the supreme or 
highest law of the country. It must, therefore be adhered to by the President, 
government, and all the people of South Africa. A constitution establishes 
structures of government and specifies the powers the government has in the 
process of executing its activities. It further ensures that the rights of 
individuals are protected and that institutions are established to ensure that 
government does not abuse its power. This in turn protects the rights of each 
individual. 
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This section focuses on the executive authority, the concepts governments, 
government as an institution and function, forms of the executive authority in 
non-demographic and democratic political systems. 
2.3.1 Executive Authority 
The executive authority is the irreducible core of government. Political 
systems can function without constitutions, Parliaments, a judiciary, and even 
without political parties, but they cannot survive without an executive arm to 
formulate government policy and ensure its implementation. The potential 
power of the executive authority is such that political development usually 
takes the form of endeavours to check or control it by either forcing it to 
function within a constitutional framework or to be responsible to a popular or 
national assembly or to a democratic electorate. Members of the political 
executive authority are most definitely the faces of politics that is most familiar 
to the public at large. Reasons for this are that leadership emanates from the 
executive authority, and that this role is raised to particular eminence by the 
increasing responsibilities of the State on both national and international 
levels. Naturally the media tend to portray politics in terms of the personalities 
involved in it- however the hope and expectations centred on the executive 
authority may also be its downfall. In many political systems leaders are 
finding it increasingly difficult to deliver on their promises. This problem is 
bound up with the increasing disaffection with politics in general and with 
politicians in particular. 
Decisions must take account of people and the necessary funds must be 
available to implement decisions. It is mainly incumbent on the executive 
authority to carry out decisions affecting matters of national import. Like so 
many other so-called political terms "executive authority" is also used in both a 
broader and a narrower sense. In its narrower sense it mainly refers to 
government, while in its broader sense it refers to government together with 
the bureaucracy (officialdom). For the purposes of this dissertation both these 
meanings are investigated. 
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The executive authority is the branch of government that has the authority by 
virtue of the Constitution to implement the policies and legislation enacted by 
the legislature, and also to ensure that such implementation takes place. It is 
a confusing concept because it is so closely related to other concepts, such 
as those of government and public service. The confusion is worsened by its 
inclusion of two fields of endeavour that have uniquely distinct institutions 
designed to accomplish the specific goals pursued by each of these two fields 
of endeavour. This is where the concept is used in both a narrow and a 
broader sense. Both meanings relate to the field of study of public 
administration. 
As indicated, the term "executive authority" has a broader as well as a narrow 
meaning. In the broad sense it comprises the public service as a whole, that is 
to say all officials charged with the administration of government service, 
ranging from. the President, king/queen or governor-general to the lowliest 
official, constable or soldier. Sometimes, in the broad sense of executive 
authority, reference is also made to the State bureaucracy. All officials in the 
public service are not involved in the highest level of decision making, 
however top-level public officials are civil servants at the highest level of the 
civil service. It is these officials who take decisions at the level where the 
separation between politics and administration becomes artificial or, put 
differently, where political authority and administrative action flow together. 
The focus of this dissertation is on the first-mentioned group of officials, which 
is why the term "bureaucracy" is used instead of "civil service". A more 
comprehensive analysis of civil servants' activities in the context of the highest 
decisions in executive management will only be broached in the next chapter 
because we first have to establish clarity about where public administration fits 
in as a field of study as well as of activity. 
In the narrow sense the concept refers only to the head of the executive 
authority and his immediate subordinates (usually cabinet ministers). This 
implies that the cabinet alone represents this branch of executive authority 
and that the civil service assists the cabinet in the implementation of policy 
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decisions. There is a distinct difference between the concepts of civil service, 
government and cabinet. The reason why all these are so confusingly 
classified together under the umbrella term "executive authority" is attributable 
to the fact that these concepts form the field of study of public administration, 
together with the concept "public sector" which has a wider meaning than "civil 
service" and also falls within the field of study of public administration. 
A matter that should be taken into account here is the tendency that the 
executive authority overshadows the legislative authority. The executive 
authority no longer concerns only the implementation of legislation, but given 
the complexity of modern life is the main formulator and determiner of the 
policy adopted by the legislative authority. The executive authority's sphere of 
influence is therefore growing. 
2.3.2 Government 
Large groups develop specific institutions to take and enforce collective 
decisions. The Government is technically the structure within which political 
activities take place; it provides a framework for politics, by which we mean 
the head of the executive authority (in its narrow sense), together with his/her 
ministers, that is to say the institution charged under the constitution with the 
performance of the executive task of the State. According to popular usage 
"government" refers precisely to the highest level of political appointments: in 
other words, presidents and prime ministers, heads of departments and 
members of cabinet. But in a broader sense the Government comprises all the 
institutions that have been charged with the task to take decisions on behalf of 
the community at large. The Government is therefore responsible for the 
execution of instructions given to it by the legislative authority in the form of 
the laws of the State. The conception of government is therefore closely 
related to "authority". 
Nowadays the general idea is that government is the primary policy maker 
and comprises the foremost institutions of executive authority. It has therefore 
gained a dominant political connotation. Although it is not a juridical entity 
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(particular legal status as actor), one finds nevertheless that the courts regard 
government as an entity that is empowered to act on behalf of the State in 
legal proceedings (Carpenter & Viljoen 1992: 12). 
2.3.2.1 Government as an Institution 
As with "state" there is a good deal of uncertainty in the case of "government" 
about who or what government is. Accordingly there are such definitions as 
"second authority" in the State (besides legislative authority) or the executive 
authority that has to implement laws. The government is referred to as the 
institution that is responsible for national government and administration, or 
the institution that is responsible for the execution of political policy and 
administration, in other words the principal institution of national administra-
tion. Government is also equated to the cabinet, at least in South Africa. 
According to Strong (1972:7) government is the institution in which the right of 
sovereign decision making is vested. The Government's functions are those of 
peacekeeping and maintaining order, passing laws and levying taxes with a 
view to performing said functions. According to Strong (1972:7) government 
needs legislative, executive and juridical powers in order to perform these 
functions successfully. Reference to a government means, amongst others, 
that the concept of "government" includes more than just a few individuals 
who form the cabinet, or a president and his advisers. It also subsumes the 
bureaucracy (which for the purposes of this dissertation does not include the 
public sector as a whole), political institutions and any other structures that 
enable the functioning of the government concerned. 
In contrast with "government" which is a much more wide-ranging concept, the 
term "form of government" is indicative of the nature of the executive 
authority, which is a much more restricted concept. Strong (1972:9) describes 
the executive authority as the head of government together with his/her 
cabinet. This implies that the executive authority that developed from the 
doctrine of the tripartite division of power and authority presupposes a 
particular form of government as the ideal "model" for the administration of its 
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laws, for example the cabinet system which has a cabinet as institution to give 
practical effect to its governance function. In turn the cabinet has a civil 
service comprising government departments staffed by civil servants to assist 
it in giving further practical effect to its governance function. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, however, it would seem that the 
following distinction could be significant, namely that between government as 
institution on the one hand and as a function on the other. By making this 
distinction the matter becomes clearer. The Government in a state with the 
cabinet as the form of government (i.e. the President together with all the 
other ministe~s. or alternatively a prime minister together with his/her ministers 
as appointed by the head of state at the recommendation of the prime 
minister) has a cabinet as the institution with primary political responsibility 
based on the authority bestowed by an electoral majority. Government as a 
function to be explained in the next section is mainly an executive or 
administrative function based on authority lent by the constitution of the State. 
The concepts of "public service" and "public sector" to be explained later are 
more readily comprehensible than the confusing concept of "government". 
Reference is often made to officials in the civil service as forming part of 
government, but this is not strictly correct. It would be more correct to say that 
persons in the public sector work for government, without being part of it. 
Government refers to the institution or institutions that are responsible for 
governing the State. In South Africa these institutions mainly include the 
President at national level, the premiers and executive councils at provincial 
level and the municipal councils at local level - the political executive group. It 
differs from the administrative executive group that is identifiable with civil 
service. In everyday parlance the term "government" often refers to any part of 
the State and the system of public administration. A case in point would be 
any reference to the legislative, executive and juridical branches of 
"government". plus their respective components. 
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Two aspects of the executive authority in South Africa are important, however: 
its composition and powers. As with the legislative authority the executive 
authority in South Africa is found at all three tiers of government. Whereas at 
the national and provincial levels the executive authority is separate from the 
legislative authority, at the local level both the executive and the legislative 
authority are vested in the municipal council. 
It transpires too, that at both national and provincial levels in South Africa the 
legislator is entitled to force the executive authority to resign by virtue of 
adopting a motion of no confidence in the President or premier. Accordingly, 
and considering the overlap in membership between legislative and executive 
authority at the various levels of authority, it can be concluded that South 
Africa has a parliamentary democracy, rather than a presidential democracy. 
2.3.2.2 Government as a Function 
According to. Finer (1974) "government is institutionalised politics". The 
government comprises institutions that are responsible for collective decision 
making on behalf of society. In a narrower sense government refers to the top 
political level in such institutions - that is to say, presidents, prime ministers 
and ministers. By contrast government as the function of governance or 
government administration refers to the process of collective decision-making, 
a task in which the government does not necessarily assume a leading role or 
any role at all. As regards international relations, for example, no world 
government sets itself the goal of solving problems, but numerous issues are 
resolved by way of negotiation. It is therefore a case of governance without 
government. 
A distinction must be made between government and governance. 
Governance refers to the function, action, process or qualities of government. 
It does not refer to government structures such as a cabinet or a municipal 
council, but to the policies made and the efficacy with which they are 
implemented. A constant theme in this dissertation is that government gives 
rise to governance, at least in consolidated democracies. This means that 
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collective decisions are no longer made by a single leader (e.g. the President) 
or by a single group (say the cabinet). Instead policy is formulated after 
consultation with and among a variety of concerned interest groups. Policies 
are often adjusted in the process of being implemented: those who carry out 
and implement policy participate in governance, if not also in the action of 
governing. Governance- the task of managing complex societies- entails the 
co-ordination of a variety of institutions in the public and the private sector 
(Rhodes 1996:652-67). Government is only one actor, and not necessarily the 
most prominent one, in governance. The phenomenon of governance is not 
only common to developed countries. Many international agencies have 
already asserted that effective governance is indispensable for development. 
In an influent.ial report the World Bank (1997:1) contended that "the State is 
central to economic and social development, not as a direct provider of 
growth, but as a partner, catalyst and facilitator". 
It is precisely the area of international relations that offer the best examples of 
governance. The reason for this is simple: there is no world government or 
institution that takes enforceable decisions for the world as a whole. Yet many 
aspects of global relations are regulated by agreements. The Internet is an 
example: a massive network of linked computers that are beyond the control 
of any one government or person. But standards that regulate the linking of 
computers and information fed into the Internet have been adopted; we can 
therefore refer to the governance of cyberspace, but not to the government of 
it (Loader 1997). 
International institutions have been established to formulate rules for different 
areas of interest: the World Trade Organisation, for example, focuses on the 
dismantling of trade barriers. Such organisations are not governments, they 
have limited powers, specifically with respect to enforceability, and they have 
no police force to enforce compliance with their wishes. The emerging pattern 
in international and possibly also national politics is one of rules without 
regulators, government without government, in a word: governance (Rosenau 
1992:3-6). 
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According to Van Niekerk, Van der Waldt and Jonker (2001 :65-66) numerous 
characteristics can be identified that contribute towards achieving a system of 
good governance in all spheres of government in South Africa. These include, 
amongst others: 
• Openness and transparency: This refers specifically to community 
involvement and consultation as to the manner in which the people will 
be governed. 
• Adherence to the principles contained in the Bill of Rights: This 
specifically refers to the principles contained in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution. 
• Deliberation and consultation: The foundations of a democracy are 
based on the ability of politically elected office-bearers to deliberate 
and consult with the electorate on the issues that affect their daily lives. 
The need exists to continuously review the manner in which 
government executes its activities in the best interest of the 
communities it serves. Deliberation and consultation can assist in 
ensuring that the true needs, wants, and desires of the people are 
identified and correctly prioritised. 
• Capacity to act and deliver: It is imperative that the structures of 
government are established to ensure that it is able to deliver services 
in terms of the expectations of the people. Its capacity to act will 
depend on the structures created to ensure that such delivery takes 
place. There is a need, therefore, to ensure that all government 
structures are geared towards achieving the efficient and effective 
rendering of public services. 
• Efficiency and effectiveness: Limited resources dictate that government 
needs to identify, as accurately as possible, the needs of people and 
deliver services in an efficient and effective manner in relation to the 
numerous needs that exist. Continuous review of the manner in which 
government renders its services is necessary to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
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• Answerability and accountability: There is a definite need to ensure that 
answerability and accountability structures are created in terms of the 
Constitution. These will ensure that communities are able to call upon 
their elected representatives to answer and account for the manner in 
which they perform their duties. 
• Co-operative government: Chapter 3 of the Constitution states that the 
national, provincial, and local spheres of government are distinctive, 
interdependent, and interrelated. Co-operative government ensures 
that duplication is avoided and that co-ordination between the various 
spheres of government takes place to ensure the optimal use of 
resources. 
• Distribution of State authority and autonomy: The devolution of power 
and a1,.1thority to the lowest spheres of government in ensuring the 
execution of activities and implementation of policies is essential. It is 
for this reason that each sphere of government should be in a position 
to pass legislation that will best serve the interests of the communities it 
represents. In turn, the various organs of civil society have an 
obligation to identify problems common to the community and to 
mobilise the community around these issues. 
• Respond constructively to the resolution of these problems by 
engaging the government and business through various forms of 
action: Communities need to be capacitated to embark on a process of 
reconstruction. This will ensure that relationships are mutually 
supportive in achieving the common objective of promoting the quality 
of life of the citizens. 
• Influence the manner in which politicians address their basic needs: 
This can be achieved through interest groups, pressure groups, non-
governmental organisations, and community-based organisations. 
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• Monitor government activities in ensuring continuous answerability and 
accountability: Numerous independent statutory institutions have been 
created in terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution to assist in ensuring 
answerability and accountability. 
2.3.3 Forms of the Executive Authority 
The concept "form of authority" was introduced in the first section. Although 
the form of government is specifically a matter of the various executive 
institutions that exist, it is important to bear in mind that there are other related 
institutions, such as the legislative authority, in addition to which there are 
supporting principles that concern the executive authority and play a role in 
public administration. It is also important to distinguish between the executive 
institutions in democratic and non-democratic political systems. 
The executive authority of a state can assume a variety of forms known as the 
form of government. Forms of government cannot be discussed in isolation 
because they relate directly to the constitution and the legislative and juridical 
authority. Because the nature and functioning of forms of government are 
influenced by these factors, it is also necessary to draw a distinction between 
the executive institutions in democratic and non-democratic systems. 
2.3.3.1 Executive Institutions in Non-Democratic Political Systems 
In most non-democratic political systems, particularly those of the totalitarian 
variety, the composition and functioning of political institutions are ordered 
constitutionally (Macridis in Bekker 1994:90). The same institutions as those 
in democratic political systems are usually found in non-democratic political 
system largely conforms to the democratic system. Usually the existence of a 
constitution and concomitant political institutions is where the resemblance 
begins and ends. Because non-democratic political systems are highly 
centralised, all institutions are subject to the decisions of a relatively small 
political elite. The existence of a legislative and juridical authority is therefore 
a reality. The functions of these institutions are restricted, however, to what is 
50 
allowed by the ruling elite (executive authority). The difference between the 
democratic and non-democratic political systems does not reside in the 
existence of corresponding institutions, therefore, but in the functions and 
powers of the·se institutions (Bekker 1994:90). 
Usually the legislative authority's influence is limited to the approval of 
decisions taken by the ruling elite and by the judiciary to legitimise the 
objectives of the ruling elite by enforcing obedience and subservience (Venter 
& Johnston 1991 :87). Sometimes limited autonomy is accorded to the 
judiciary to protect certain legislation and rights. According to Macridis (in 
Bekker 1994:91) the semblance of democracy in these institutions and 
processes is totally overshadowed by the centralised and undemocratic 
functioning of these institutions. 
2.3.3.2 Executive Institutions in Democratic Political Systems 
Despite superficial similarities the nature and functioning of executive institu-
tions in democratic political systems differ drastically from those in non 
democratic political systems. The differences are particularly noticeable in the 
application of two basic principles of democracy, namely that of constitution-
alism and that of the division of powers (trias politica doctrine). In essence this 
means that the executive institutions are limited constitutionally in the 
democracy, and also that power is not absolutely centralised, but it is divided 
between different institutions and persons (Bekker 1994:91 ). 
2.4 Public Administration-related Concepts that Influence Control 
Over the Bureaucracy 
It is necessary to briefly describe the concepts and terms public 
administration, administration, civil service, public sector and structure 
because these concepts can easily cause major confusion. The meaning of 
these terms is often relative since they may have different meanings or 
nuances for people in different parts of the world. 
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In an attempt to contextualise matters, relating to political control over the 
bureaucracy, this section also focused on policy, accountability and control. 
These activities ultimately pave the way for political office-bearers and 
executive functionaries to perform their activities in the best interest of the 
communities being served. 
2.4.1 Public Administration 
It has become common practice to refer to Public Administration (capital P 
and capital A) as the discipline in which the phenomenon of public 
administration is studied. The phenomenon of public administration relates to 
the process whereby all state institutions are organised, managed, 
administered and controlled. Put simply, public administration concerns itself 
with the nature and practice of the Government and the public sector (the 
functioning of the state institutions). It entails, among other things, the 
management and administration of and interaction between public institutions 
and other role players and stakeholders, as well as the associated dynamic 
processes. 
Other components of public administration include the organisation and 
personnel functions, financing and control of the public sector, as well as the 
formulation, implementation and revision of policy. All state interventions in 
the country that influence the individual's and society's standard of living are 
attributable to the activities of the State's public administration under the 
political control and leadership of the current government (Theunissen 
1998:115). 
2.4.2 Administration 
Administration for the purposes of this dissertation quite simply subsists in the 
collective activities of the State, with authoritative institutions orientated 
towards the achievement of public objectives. This explanation serves to give 
substance to the prevailing conception of the State and its political objectives, 
and as a result to promote the mental and physical welfare of the population 
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at large. The administration derives its function and authority from the 
executive function of government, and all administrative activities of the State 
are subject to the political office of the minister as member of both the 
executive and the legislative authority. 
2.4.3 Civil Service 
The term "civil service" mainly denotes the civil component of the State's 
management and public administration system, often referred to as the 
"bureaucracy". 
In South Africa the civil service comprises all persons employed by 
government departments and the nine provincial administrations in pursuance 
of the Public Service Act of 1994, and remunerated by the Treasury for their 
services. The current civil service resulted from the amalgamation of the 
different civil services that existed in the country until recently, including those 
of the TBVC countries (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei) and the 
former self-governing areas. 
This consolidation not only involved structures and personnel, but often also a 
miscellany of legislation, codes, management practices, rules and regulations 
(Theunissen 1998:113). 
2.4.4 Public Sector 
According to Theunissen (1998: 113}, in South Africa the term "public sector" 
refers to the general assets and public administrative systems of the State; 
has a wider meaning than "civil service" and subsumes the following 
components: 
• the civil service 
• the National Botanical Institute 
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• personnel employed by parastatal institutions such as scientific 
councils, performing arts councils and cultural institutions forming part 
of the Department of Arts, culture, Science and Technology 
• personnel employed by public corporations, such as Eskom, Denel, 
Transnet, SABC, SA Post Office Ltd and Telkom SA Ltd 
• personnel employed by local authorities and agricultural control boards 
(currently being phased out) 
2.4.5 Structure 
The hierarchical pattern of authority, responsibility, and accountability 
relationships designed to provide co-ordination of the work of the organisation 
and the vertical arrangements of jobs in that organisation, is commonly 
understood to mean the structure by which government executes its activities 
(Fox & Meyer, 1996:124). 
2.4.6 Policy 
Since the concept of policy will be topical throughout this dissertation the 
following brief discussion of it will be included here. 
Policy is the product of policymaking and it can be seen as a plan of action 
aimed at achieving an outcome that enjoys preference in terms of the 
overarching objectives of government. It also provides parameters within 
which government actions can take place. Policy and policymaking of all kinds 
take place at all levels of government and its associated public administration. 
National or political policy differs from departmental or administrative policy 
with respect to scope and implications. Administrative policy is necessary as a 
means of achieving more specific objectives at which the daily functioning of 
the department is directed. On the whole effective policy is the central 
collection of resources, but the implementation of policy takes place at the 
lowest possible functional level. In South Africa no policy may deviate from the 
conditions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act no 108 of 
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1996), which is the highest law and therefore the supreme policy document in 
the country (Theunissen 1998:124). 
Policy is usually a response to a real or perceived need, and it originates from 
society as a whole. When needs are expressed by society individuals and 
groups, the government is obliged to react if at all possible. It must be 
indicated, however, those needs are unlimited and infinite, while government 
resources are limited. Once the government has identified a need, a policy 
must be formulated with a view to serving the need. This is done by the 
government in co-operation with the public administration. A policy must be 
seen as a framework or guideline for the achievement of a specific objective 
or outcome. Once a policy has been approved by the cabinet it is often 
subject to approval by Parliament in which case it becomes an act of 
Parliament (or part thereof) (Theunissen 1998:124 ). 
The political importance of the bureaucracy is largely attributable to its role as 
the chief source of policy information and advice available to the Government. 
This policy role separates top-level civil servants, who are in daily contact with 
politicians and have to act as policy advisers, from middle level and junior civil 
servants, who are more concerned with routine administration. The debate 
about the political significance of bureaucracies therefore tends to be more 
focused on the elite group of senior civil servants. In theory a clear distinction 
can be drawn between the policy responsibilities of bureaucrats and 
politicians (Heywood 1997:346). Policy is (apparently) made by the political 
decision-makers (politicians): bureaucrats merely offer advice. The policy role 
of civil servants therefore amounts to two functions: the description of policy 
options available to the minister, and the consideration of policy proposals 
with a view to their possible impact and consequences. The influence that 
high-ranking officials can influence on policy is further limited by the fact that 
they are either expected to be political neutral as in Britain, Japan and 
Australia, or that they must be subject to a system of political appointments, 
as in France and America (Heywood 1997:346). 
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There is sufficient reason to accept, however, that the policy role of civil 
servants is politically more important than is indicated above. For example, no 
clear distinction is made between policymaking and policy advice. Decisions 
are based on available information, which means that the content of decisions 
depends on the advice offered. As the main source of advice available to 
politicians, bureaucrats actually control the flow of information: politicians only 
know what the officials tell them. Information can therefore be disguised or at 
least "shaped" to reflect the preferences e.g. the civil service. The main 
source of bureaucratic power is nevertheless the expertise and specialised 
knowledge accumulated in a bureaucracy. If the responsibilities of 
government increase and policy becomes complex, "amateur" politicians will 
unavoidably become more dependent on their "professional" bureaucratic 
advisers. 
2.5 Factors and Institutions that Influence the Interaction between the 
Political and the Administrative Systems. 
There are numerous factors that affect the political and administrative 
systems. Public administration, and more specifically the bureaucracy, must 
come to terms with, accept or resist these influences. Together the political 
and administrative systems form a highly complex system that does not exist 
for the sole purpose of delivering services. 
Although the public sector is influenced by a variety of factors, these 
influences are not passively absorbed. The public bureaucracy makes 
adjustments under the pressure of certain influences, but it may also offer 
resistance against influence. Service delivery by the bureaucracy affects the 
personal life of every citizen in one way or another, as shown in the preface to 
this dissertation already. 
The civil service comprises that portion of the government system that is in 
direct contac~ with the public. Teachers, nurses, judicial officers, as well as 
state officials or departments are all examples. Put differently, for the public 
the civil service (bureaucracy) is the main point of access to or contact with 
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the government system. This is precisely the reason why liaison between the 
public and the public officials is the interface where the results of mutual 
influence will become evident. 
2.5.1 Institutional Factors Influencing the Bureaucracy 
A number of the factors that may influence the nature of the bureaucracy will 
now be indicated. These factors can be classified in different ways. A 
distinction can be made between factors arising respectively outside and 
inside the bureaucracy or between so-called institutional factors and political-
ideological factors (Marais in Adlem eta/. 1997:71-90). 
The minister as head of a government department and his or her chief 
executive officer, as well as the relations between them, will be discussed in 
the following chapters. The place in the hierarchic chain where the minister 
and his or her top official relate to each other is the interface where politics 
and administration interact. The influence exerted by politics on the 
administration causes politicisation of the administration, while the influence of 
administration on politics causes bureaucratisation of politics (cfViljoen 1987). 
Certain institutional factors that influence the bureaucracy to a greater or 
lesser degree will now be discussed. 
2.5.2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
Metaphorically speaking a constitution forms part of the machinery in the 
reality of politics that is designed to achieve the orderly functioning of a 
society. It limits the exercise of political power and institutes rules to protect 
the rights of citizens and control the authority of authorities (Venter 1998:2-
3). A constitution, as indicated in previous section, is a statute according to 
which the form of a state, the form of government and the form of authority of 
a country are determined. Such a statute is naturally based on the prevailing 
political ideology of the country. In South Africa the highest authority vests in 
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the Constitution and the legislative authority is subordinate to it. Without a 
constitution there would have been no state institutions in South Africa with 
which to govern the country. The original 1909-Constitution, as well as later 
constitutions of South Africa determine both the structuring and the nature of 
service delivery by the civil service. The Constitution of 1996 made 
fundamental changes that have become clearly visible in both constitutional 
and socio-economic terms. 
Besides the devolution of power that brought administration closer to politics, 
the coming into effect of the Constitution of 1996 also helped to bring these 
two components of government closer together. The procedure followed by 
Parliamentary committees in considering draft bills or other matters and in 
obtaining factual information from high-ranking state officials and other 
specialists, has the result that the bureaucracy is more than ever involved in 
the legislative process. 
2.5.3 Parliament 
Constitutionally Parliament has wide powers. It is the legislative institution in 
and for the Republic of South Africa. In the main the influence of Parliament 
arises from its authority to pass laws that can influence the bureaucracy - a 
good case in point is the way in which the civil service is handled in the new 
constitution. In this dissertation the proceedings of Parliament are merely 
mentioned where the context requires an explanation. 
As indicated in the following chapter a tendency that is becoming noticeable 
throughout the world is the "relinquishment" of power by Parliaments. This will 
be discussed in the next chapter. South Africa has followed the trend in most 
Western states of increasingly leaving power to the discretion of the executive 
authority. 
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2.5.4 Cabinet 
The concept of "government" refers to a specific institution in the political 
system, namely the cabinet. It is the task of government to create policy for 
the country. 
Both the function of policy determination, which is the purpose of government, 
and the implementation of policy form part of the political process (Santos 
1969:214). The strongest political party acquires the right to govern because it 
appoints the cabinet. The strongest political party also has majority support in 
Parliament, which has the result that the cabinet overrules Parliament as the 
actual governing body. The cabinet as the seat of government therefore has 
the right to make use of both Parliament and the civil service to implement 
policy determined by the cabinet. The cabinet cannot become involved with 
detailed decision making and does not have the time to pay attention to the 
finer detail of government. Consequently individual ministers are expected to 
take all decisions of minor political significance. 
It is a principle of democracy that voters elect representatives to make laws on 
their behalf in the legislative institution. Theoretically the legislative authority 
should therefore control the executive authority, but in practice it usually works 
the other way round. The cabinet not only has decisive influence over the 
national assembly, but also over the civil service. It is important to remember 
that the cabinet builds its policy goals into the draft bills which are then 
enacted into law by Parliament on the grounds of the cabinet's influence over 
the national assembly. 
Changes of government naturally result in the operationalisation of new 
ideologies that are decisive for the functioning of the civil service. They 
influence both the structure of the civil service and its functioning. The 
influence of the cabinet on the civil service can be monitored continuously to 
best advantage in the creation or abolition of departments, or the 
reassignment of functions among departments. These changes are merely the 
result of executive decisions and not of decisions of Parliament. 
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2.5.5 President 
The influence potentially exercised by the South African president on the 
bureaucracy is twofold. On the one hand it comprises the influence deriving 
from his post or office while on the other hand his influence derives from his 
person or his personality. The influence exercised by the President in virtue of 
his institutional position is clear from the Constitution of 1996. The President is 
not a nominal or ceremonial head of state, but the executive head of state in 
virtue of his position as head of the national executive authority. He is directly 
responsible to Parliament for the implementation of acts of Parliament. To 
assist him in bearing this responsibility he appoints ministers in the cabinet 
which is under his control. There is no formal restriction on whom he may 
appoint and he can dismiss any minister at his discretion. He assigns duties to 
ministers and can assign the implementation of any law to a particular 
minister. He ratifies and signs draft bills and can refer a bill back to the 
national assembly for reconsideration of its constitutionality. He can also refer 
bills to the constitutional court for a decision about its constitutionality. Besides 
appointments other than in his capacity as head of the executive authority, 
which the Constitution demands of him, he also appoints commissions of 
inquiry. 
In the normal course of his activities, the President also acts as a critical link 
between inter:est groups and the bureaucracy. Interest groups regularly confer 
with the president about matters that have to be handled by the bureaucracy. 
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2.5.6 Auditor-General 
The Auditor-General must audit and report on the accounts, financial 
statements, and financial management of: 
• All national and provincial state departments and administrations. 
• All municipalities. 
• Any other institution or accounting entity required by national or 
provinCial legislation to be audited by the Auditor-General (Section 
188). 
In addition to the duties prescribed above, and subject to any legislation, the 
Auditor-General may audit and report on the accounts, financial Statements, 
and financial management of: 
• Any institutions funded from the national revenue fund or a provincial 
revenue fund or by a municipality. 
• Any institution that is authorised in terms of any law to receive money 
for a public purpose. 
The Auditor-General must submit audit reports to any legislature that has a 
direct interest in the audit and to any other authority prescribed by national 
legislation. All reports must be made public. The Auditor-General has the 
additional powers and functions prescribed by national legislation. The 
Auditor-General must be appointed for a fixed, non-renewable term of 
between five and ten years. 
This official therefore has an auditing function and is therefore involved with 
the closing of the yearly financial cycle. The Auditor-General may seize all 
documents, Statements, accounts and other relevant information that may 
shed light on the audit of any state institution that controls state funds. 
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The Auditor-General therefore plays an important role in the sense that he or 
she must ensure that State institutions make proper use of public funds. 
Waste and corruption are considerably curtailed in this way so that effective 
government .is promoted. The effectiveness of the Auditor-General in 
eliminating injudicious spending is restricted to some extent because his/her 
audits are conducted after corruption and misspending have taken place, or 
when it is suspected that misspending and/or corruption is taking place. 
2.5.7 Treasury (Departments of State Expenditure and Finance) 
The Treasury is involved with the full cycle of the State's annual financial 
management. The treasury is responsible for the gathering of each 
department's budget requests, and for the receipt, safekeeping, allocation and 
disbursement of public funds. This takes place with the co-operation of a 
variety of stakeholders and role players, such as the departments of Finance 
and State Expenditure, the Receiver of Revenue, the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, the Budget Council and the South African Reserve Bank. The 
Treasury does not report on the activities of the Auditor-General), but he does 
report to the Auditor-General on how the State's finances are being managed. 
2.5.8 Minister of Finance 
The Minister of Finance is traditionally the one who, together with his or her 
department, effectively holds the purse strings. The Minister of Finance is also 
a member of.the cabinet, however, and his/her colleagues in the cabinet are 
the political heads of other departments. They will try to influence the Minister 
of Finance to give precedence to their interests. It is therefore important that a 
Minister of Finance have a strong personality and is capable of saying "no". It 
is also very important that such a minister enjoy strong support from the 
President in carrying out his task (Theunissen in Venter 1998: 130). 
It is the responsibility of the Minister of Finance to receive budget applications 
from each State department and to strike a satisfactory balance between the 
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competing interests of the various departments (Theunissen in Venter 
1998:130). 
2.5.9 Financial and Fiscal Commission 
Section 220 (Chapter Thirteen) of the Constitution established a Financial and 
Fiscal Commission for the Republic. The Commission is an independent body, 
subject only to the Constitution and the law, and must be impartial. 
The Financial and Fiscal Commission is a statutory institution. It is a 
permanent, expert commission with a constitutionally defined structure, set of 
generic responsibilities, and institutional processes, and deals with inter-
governmental fiscal relations in South Africa. 
The Financial and Fiscal Commission has the responsibility to make 
recommendations to all relevant legislative authorities regarding the financial 
and fiscal requirements of all three spheres of government. The 
recommendations, which it is constitutionally required to make, or may make 
of its own volition within its generic responsibilities, concern such matters as: 
• Revenue sharing 
• Financial allocations. 
• Taxation. 
• Borrowing. 
• Criteria used in the determination of matters of general financial and 
fiscal policies of government. 
The commission's role is to ensure the creation and maintenance of an 
effective, equitable, and sustainable system of inter-governmental fiscal 
relations. The advice of and recommendations made by the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission concern issues such as: 
• Fiscal policies of all spheres of government. 
63 
• The fiscal allocations to governments. 
• Taxes which provinces intend to impose. 
• Borrowing by local and provincial governments. 
• Criteria to be considered in determining fiscal allocations. 
The first point of contact with the legislatures will generally appear to be 
standing committees on finance, at both provincial and national levels. 
2.5.1 0 Commission on the Remuneration of Representatives 
This Commission has been established in terms of the Commission on the 
Remuneration of Representatives Act 37 of 1994. In terms of Section 2(2) of 
this act its objects are to make recommendations regarding the remuneration, 
allowances, and other benefits, including pension and medical aid benefits, of 
representatives. A representative includes a member of any elected local 
government body or municipality. An act of Parliament must, in terms of 
Section 219 of the Constitution, establish a framework for determining: 
• The salaries, allowances, and benefits of members of the National 
Assembly, permanent delegates to the National Council of Provinces, 
members of the cabinet, deputy ministers, traditional leaders, and 
members of any councils of traditional leaders. 
• The upper limit of salaries, allowances, and benefits of, amongst 
others, members of municipal councils of different categories. 
The framework for establishing remuneration structures can be achieved by 
means of an independent commission to make recommendations concerning 
such salaries, allowances, and benefits. 
2.5.11 Public Service Commission 
The Public Service Commission is the central personnel institution for the 
public service and is responsible for such matters as making and presenting 
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proposals on aspects of the organisation and administration of state 
departments. This commission is also responsible for personnel matters in the 
public service, for example conditions of service, promotion of efficiency and 
the compilation of a code of conduct for civil servants. The Public Service 
Commission therefore plays an important role in the pursuit of cost-effective 
service delivery to the public. 
2.5.12 Public Protector 
The Public Protector is authorised to investigate state affairs or conduct in the 
public administration that may be improper (excluding court decisions), report 
on these matters and take corrective measures. Anyone can lodge complaints 
with the Public Protector. The public has access to the reports of the Public 
Protector, unless extraordinary circumstances as determined in national 
legislation require that a report be treated as confidential. Other powers and 
functions can be arranged in terms of national legislation (Rautenbach & 
Malherbe 1998:58). 
The Public Protector, or Ombudsman, as this institution is known 
internationally, is a highly respected functionary who functions independently 
of the government or any political party, and who is appointed by Parliament 
in terms of the Constitution and who receives complaints from aggrieved 
persons against government institutions or who acts on own initiative and has 
the authority to: 
• launch an investigation 
• recommend corrective action 
• issue reports. 
2.5.12.1 Constitutional Provision for the Public Protector 
The 1996 Co"nstitution provides in Chapter 9 for the establishment of several 
State institutions supporting constitutional democracy. The office of Public 
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Protector is identified as one of these institutions. The constitutional provisions 
relating to the office read as follows: 
181(1)The following state institutions strengthen constitutional democracy in 
the Republic: 
(a) The Public Protector 
(b) ..... 
(2) These institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution 
and the law, and they must be impartial and must exercise their powers 
and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice. 
(3) Other organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must 
assist and protect these institutions to ensure the independence, 
impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these institutions. 
(4) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of these 
institutions. 
(5) These institutions are accountable to the National Assembly, and must 
report on their activities and the performance of their functions to the 
Assembly at least once a year. 
182(1 )The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national 
legislation-
(a) to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public 
administration in any sphere of government, that is alleged or 
suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or 
prejudice; 
(b) to report on that conduct; and 
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(c) to take appropriate remedial action. 
(2) The Public Protector has the additional powers and functions 
prescribed by national legislation. 
(3) The Public Protector may not investigate court decisions. 
(4) The Public Protector must be accessible to all persons and 
communities. 
(5) Any report issued by the Public Protector must be open to the public 
unless· exceptional circumstances, to be determined in terms of 
national legislation, required that a report be kept confidential. 
2.5.12.2 Jurisdiction of the Public Protector 
The word "jurisdiction" refers to the legal authority of a person or institution to 
act. The scope of action of the Public Protector is accordingly determined by 
his or her jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Public Protector is spelled out in 
broad terms in the 1996 constitution and in the 1994 Act. 
The constitution provides that the Public Protector has the power to 
investigate any conduct in state affairs or in the public administration in any 
level or sphere of government that is improper or could result in any 
impropriety or prejudice (section 182(1 )(a). Court decisions are specifically 
excluded. Examples of improper conduct or improper prejudice, which 
probably fall within the bounds of the above constitutional jurisdiction, are 
mentioned in the 1994 Act and comprise the following: 
• maladministration 
• abuse of power 
• unfair, capricious, impolite or other improper conduct 
• inexcusable delay 
67 
• improper or unlawful enrichment 
• receipt of any improper benefit 
• unlawful or improper prejudice suffered by a complainant as the result 
of a decision by the authorities (section 6(4)). 
It is clear from the above definition that the jurisdiction is particularly wide and 
includes virtually any imaginable subject in the broad spectrum of public 
administration and state affairs. In addition the Public Protector, like any 
ombudsman, has a considerable discretion in determining the extent of his 
authority within the broad context of his jurisdiction. The 1994 Act also gives 
the Public Protector the authority to investigate any matter falling within 
his/her jurisdiction on his own initiative (mero motu) (section 6(4)-(5)). This 
authority to investigate a matter mero motu, without the bringing of a formal 
charge, represents one of the most positive characteristics of the system. 
In terms of the 1994 Act the procedure followed in holding an investigation is 
determined ~y the Public Protector with reference to the circumstances of 
each case (section 7(1 )). It is clear that the Public Protector prefers an 
informal investigative method because it has the advantage of investigations 
conducted on a basis that may be described as rapid, smooth and non-
adversarial. The Public Protector has free access to information required for 
an investigation. (Section? (4)). 
The 1996 constitution provides that the Public Protector has the authority to 
investigate any improper or prejudicial conduct in the public administration 
and to recommend appropriate corrective steps (section 182(1)(a)&(c)). The 
Public Protector regards this institution as a last resort for complaints of 
improper prejudice by the authorities. This implies that the complainant first 
has to obtain a final reaction from the relevant institution before the Public 
Protector is approached. 
68 
2.5.13 Human Rights Commission 
The functions of this commission are to promote respect for human rights and 
the development, protection and upholding of human rights, and to monitor 
the maintenance of human rights in the Republic and determine the status of 
human rights. State institutions report annually to this Commission on what 
they have done to give effect to the Manifesto with respect to housing, health 
care, nutrition, water, social security, education and the environment 
(Rautenbach & Malherbe 1998:59). 
In terms of Section 184 the functions of the Human Rights Commission 
include: 
• Promoting respect for human rights and a culture of human rights. 
• Promoting the protection, development, and attainment of human 
rights. 
• Monitoring and assessing the observance of human rights in the 
Republic. 
The Human Rights Commission also has the powers, as regulated by national 
legislation, necessary to perform it functions, including the power: 
• To investigate and report on the observance of human rights. 
• To take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have 
been violated. 
• To carry out research. 
• To educate. 
Each year the Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of 
state to provide the Commission with information on the measures that they 
have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning 
housing, health care, food, water, social security, education, and the 
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environment. The Human Rights Commission has the additional powers and 
functions prescribed by national legislation. 
The fundamental task of the South African Human Rights Commission is to 
promote the observance of human rights as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. All 
South Africans need to be informed of their human rights and those rights 
must be protected. The Commission seeks to build a culture of human rights 
through public awareness and training programmes, special projects, 
inquiries, hearings, and legal interventions. The chief executive officer and the 
Commission are assisted by officers in five departments. 
These are: 
• Legal services. 
• Education, training and information. 
• Research and documentation. 
• Media and public relations. 
• Finance and administration. 
The Commission has established seven standing committees, each of which 
has a commissioner as convenor. The following are the designated 
committees: 
• The Policy and Planning Committee. 
• The Government and Parliamentary Liaison Committee. 
• The Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. 
• The Non-governmental Organisation and Community-based 
Organisation and Statutory Bodies Liaison Committee. 
• International Co-ordination Committee. 
• Committee on the Rights of People with Disabilities. 
• Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
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2.5.14 Code of Conduct for the Public Service 
The code of conduct is mainly concerned with three relationships that affect 
civil servants: the relationship between public officials and the legislative and 
executive authorities and the public; and among public officials themselves. 
The code of conduct provides clear guidelines on how civil servants should 
carry out their duties and on personal conduct which should be 
unimpeachable, particularly as regards misconduct in the form of abusing 
official positions to promote private interests. 
As regards the relationship between public officials and the legislative and 
executive authority, the official must act within the provisions of the 
Constitution and must implement the policy of the day to the best of his or her 
ability. The official must also put public interest first at all times, and must 
obey all laws, rules and regulations that regulate his or her conduct. 
As regards the second matter, there is a strong movement to promote the 
ideal of respect for the dignity, rights and welfare of the public. This includes 
unbiased and impartial conduct towards members of the public, and the 
rendering of service of a high standard in a polite, professional manner. It is 
specifically important that no public official abuse his or her position or 
discriminate against any individual. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In order to provide background for the following chapters, this chapter has 
reviewed a range of concepts, core practice fields and institutions in which 
political control over the bureaucracy is situated. Attention was given to the 
conceptual clarification of concepts related to the State, including concepts 
related to government and governance. 
The field of state-related concepts are extensive, and theories, processes and 
institutions in politics and public administration interact constantly. Factors that 
influence this interaction include variables such as the authority in a state, the 
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form of authority, constitutionalism and the constitution of a state (including 
the case of South Africa), the separation of powers, checks and balances and 
the objectives and functions of a state and public administration. 
This chapter has also looked at concepts related to government and public 
administration from a conceptual angle. It focused on the executive authority, 
the concept government (including government as an institution and 
government as a function) and dealt with the variables influencing forms of the 
executive authority in non-democratic and democratic political systems. 
In an attempt to co.ntextualise the matters relating to the bureaucracy, this 
chapter focused on the concepts and terms "public administration", 
"administration", "the civil service", the "public sector", "structure" and "policy". 
These concepts ultimately pave the way for political office-bearers and 
executive functionaries to perform their activities in the best interest of the 
communities being served. Attention is paid in the theoretical literature 
overview to identifying, defining and describing the core concepts and 
indicating their relevance in political control over the bureaucracy. 
There are numerous factors that affect the political and administrative 
systems. Public administration, and more specifically the bureaucracy, must 
come to terms with, accept or resist these influences. Together the political 
and administrative systems form a highly complex system that does not exist 
for the sole purpose of delivering services. To provide background for the 
chapter on political control over the bureaucracy, an overview of the nature of 
the interaction between the political and the administrative systems was also 
provided. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MILIEU OF BUREAUCRACY AS AN EXTERNAL 
VARIABLE INFLUENCING POLITICAL CONTROL 
3.1 Introduction 
It is a vexing problem to try and define bureaucracies. In the widest possible 
sense the concept "bureaucracy" in this dissertation refers to the formal 
institutions staffed by salary earners who conduct the detailed "business" of 
government, and who offer advice on and implement decisions. Unlike the 
personal advisors who support a reigning monarch, a modern bureaucracy is 
a public institution and recruits employees on merit and concentrates 
specifically on consistent adherence to rules in the performance of their 
duties. 
Although the word "bureaucracy" is often used descriptively as a synonym for 
public administration, it is also used in a narrow and more abstract sense to 
denote a model according to which public administration is organised. The 
analysis of German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) is important here and 
is central to the rest of this chapter. 
The organisational structure of government is influenced by political as well as 
administrative aims and functions. It must therefore satisfy and fulfil the 
objectives of both institutions as far as possible, that is, the political office-
bearers must be satisfied with the efficient execution of their policies, while on 
the other hand the aims of bureaucracy (which is to promote the general 
welfare of the society in other words to ensure the greatest measure of 
spiritual and material well-being for the citizens) are effectively met (Cioete 
1986:55). 
Organisational structure is a result of well-defined aims and functions of 
government institutions. Botes et a/ (1992:233) define the organisational 
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structure as the logical arrangement and sequence of homogenous functions 
with underlying relationships grouped together to form sections or 
subsections. The organisational structure must, therefore, have a meaningful 
balance and logical sequence of activities. 
In the introductory chapter, the question "What is the nature of political control 
over the bureaucracy?" was posed as part of the problem that has to be 
addressed. This chapter sets out to clarify the concept 'bureaucracy', in order 
to establish a clear and meaningful basis for its interpretation and utilisation in 
the role of political control, in the context of this dissertation. The purpose is to 
eliminate the confusion that could flow from the variety of dimensions of a 
public bureaucracy. In this regard, attention is paid to the meaning of the 
concept 'bureaucracy' and the distinctive characteristics and prerequisites of a 
bureaucracy in public administration. Consequently the provincial sphere of 
government, (including the provincial legislative and executive authority) as 
well as the nature, size and structural aspects of the Northern Province, will 
be briefly considered. The sources of bureaucratic power are also presented. 
Finally the functions and organisation of bureaucracies in South Africa and 
elsewhere are explained. 
Consequently the provincial sphere of government (including the provincial 
legislative and executive authority) as well as the nature, size and structural 
aspects of the Northern Province, will be briefly considered. Attention is paid 
to the functions of the bureaucracy in the Northern Province in particular. 
3.2 Bureaucracy in Public Administration 
For many people the term "bureaucracy" means ineffectiveness and 
senseless, time-consuming formalities and furthermore is used in common 
parlance as a derogatory reference to meaningless administrative routine or, 
in short, red tape. In its political sense the term "bureaucracy" refers to the 
"administrative machinery" of the State, in other words, the body of public 
officials tasked with the implementation of government decisions. Others 
endorse Max Weber's view that bureaucracy is a recognisable organisational 
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structure that not only constitutes the executive branch of government, but 
forms part of all spheres of modern society. What is beyond dispute, however, 
is that as governments and the extent of their responsibilities have grown, 
bureaucracies have begun to assume an increasingly important position in 
politics. Public officials can no longer be defined dismissively as mere 
administrators or implementers of policy. They are key figures in the process 
of policymaking, and in some instances they even govern their countries. 
Bureaucracy has strong overtones and misleading connotations. People at all 
levels of society use the word with amazing self-assurance to express 
divergent opinions and pronounce on government institutions and officialdom. 
In most cases the opinions and pronouncements are negative and officials are 
cast in a poor light. 
This is paradoxical because public administration is actually intended to 
achieve the highest degree of social and economic justice in the delivery of 
public services. But what does the word "bureaucracy" mean and why is it so 
widely used in a negative sense? 
By drawing on the pronouncements of Max Weber one could easily make a 
list of a number of concepts relating to the term "bureaucracy". In this chapter 
it is intended to interpret some of the central concepts of bureaucracy. It is 
fitting, therefore, to consider the meaning of the term, particularly since it has 
such a dominant influence on public administration aspects. To develop an 
understanding of bureaucracy, this section reviews the definition and meaning 
of the concept bureaucracy. 
3.2.1 Bureaucracy 
The concept "bureaucracy" refers to the body of public officials as a whole 
who are responsible for the administrative activities required to implement 
government decisions. It is characteristic of these actions that they have to be 
performed in compliance with certain instructions and procedures. 
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The term "bureaucracy" is frequently used incorrectly in common parlance - as 
indicated it is commonly used in a negative context as an unflattering 
reference to an administrative system that is ineffective or unpraiseworthy in 
other respects. It refers to public servants with such typifying characteristics 
as excessive formality and verbosity and who tend to communicate in 
specialised technical jargon, follow prescribed procedures inflexibly and place 
abnormal emphasis on the powers and limitations of their office. In short, it 
refers to red tape (Roberts 1971 :22). 
This popular use of the term must not be confused with another use of it in a 
somewhat different context. Some important writers on the subject of social 
organisation have used the term in a positive and more technical sense, 
particularly the German economist and social philosopher Max Weber (Weber 
1966), who used the term mainly to denote a rational system of general 
administration based on the underlying supposition that organisations serving 
the purpose of implementing government decisions had to be structured to be 
as effective as possible, and that this could be best achieved by instituting a 
hierarchical decision-making process that eliminated arbitrary or personal 
factors as far as possible (Jackson 1995:276 & 309). 
Max Weber's elementary theory of an "ideal type" of bureaucracy, together 
with his view that a bureaucracy is a complex and hierarchically organised 
institution, had a particularly pronounced influence on American writing on the 
subject. A number of other writers therefore accepted his terminology, often 
with confusing results (see Auria com be 1999: 112). 
Bureaucracies stir up profound political feelings. Nowadays these feelings are 
often negative. Liberals criticise the bureaucracy for its lack of openness and 
accountability. The socialists, more specifically the Marxists, condemn it as an 
instrument for class subordination, while the New Right portrays bureaucrats 
as selfish and inherently ineffectual. Underlying these divergent sentiments is 
a profound lack of agreement about the nature of bureaucracy. Put simply, the 
term "bureaucracy" has been used in so many different ways that by now the 
76 
effort to find an overarching definition of it has probably been abandoned 
(Heywood 1997:340). 
Before the concept of bureaucracy is defined for the purposes of this 
dissertation however, the different meanings of which there are many are 
discussed by the researcher. When the literature is examined it becomes 
clear that the different practitioners of bureaucracy as an aspect of public 
administration, use different explanations and definitions to shed light on the 
essential characteristics of the relationship between bureaucracy and politics. 
It appears from the relevant literature that there is simply no all-encompassing 
definition of the meaning of "bureaucracy". Two researchers' contributions in 
this connection are briefly touched on, namely those of Weber and Albrow. 
3.2.1.1 Max Weber's use of the term "Bureaucracy" 
In his comprehensive work on sociological phenomena Weber (1966), the 
well-known German sociologist, developed a mainly organisational definition 
of bureaucracy in which he describes two facets of this concept: 
• the social mechanism that enhances efficiency in administration 
• a form of social organisation with specific characteristics 
3.2.1.2 AI brow's Use of the term "Bureaucracy" 
Albrow (1970:84-1 05) also endeavoured to give definitions of different 
meanings of the word "bureaucracy". Based on original pronouncements by 
Max Weber, he identifies no less than seven concepts that are denoted by the 
term "bureaucracy": 
• Bureaucracy as rational organisation 
• Bureaucracy as organisational inefficiency 
• Bureaucracy as rule by officials 
• Bureaucracy as public administration 
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• Bureaucracy as administration by officials 
• Bureaucracy as the organisation 
• Bureaucracy as modern society 
These contradictory concepts and usage reflect to an extent the fact that 
bureaucracy is defined differently by different academic disciplines. Students 
who study different forms of government, for example, have traditionally 
regarded bureaucracy in the literal sense as "government by appointed 
officials"(Auriacombe 1999:113). In Considerations on Representative 
Government, which appeared for the first time in 1861 (Mill 1951 :44 ), 
bureaucracy was juxtaposed with representative forms of government - in 
other words, government by elected and accountable politicians. In Sociology 
bureaucracy is typically seen as a specific type of organisation, and as an 
administrative system rather than a system of government. In this sense 
bureaucracy exists not only in democratic and authoritarian states, but also in 
corporate enterprises in the business world, in trade unions, in political parties 
and so on. Economists sometimes see bureaucracies specifically as "public" 
organisations in the sense that they are funded through the tax system and 
are therefore not burdened with the obligation of serving the profit motive or 
responding to market pressures (Auriacombe 1999: 113). 
In the above context, and with a view to understanding the concept, the main 
focus is on the meaning of bureaucracy as government by officials, the civil 
service and red tape. The problem of clearing up the confusion is not as 
simple as might be deduced from the above two meanings, however. To gain 
some clarity and formulate a definition of bureaucracy presupposes the 
removal of certain derogatory and emotive descriptions (Barber 1975:96 & 
97). The meanings given above for the concept include the following: 
• Bureaucracy as an institutional concept 
Many politicologists use the term "bureaucracy" as a synonym for "administra-
tion" and the "civil service". The term "bureaucracy" can refer to government 
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by appointed officials, as opposed to government by elected representatives. 
It can also be used to indicate that, although there is a representative 
government, officials play a dominant role. These definitions are inadequate, 
however, because they exclude situations where the government consists of a 
combination of elected and non-elected members and officials. 
• Activities of officials 
In contrast to the above definitions, there are others that are based on 
officials' tasks or how they act. In this regard the following interpretations are 
relevant: 
(a) Derogatory 
For many people the term "bureaucracy means a kind of government malaise 
of which the main symptoms are the following, as indicated above: officials' 
addiction to circuitous procedures (red tape), senseless and inflexible rules, 
evasion of responsibility (buck passing) and uncouthness towards the public. 
The above perception of bureaucracy arose as a result of actual or perceived 
problems in interaction with the official environment, including the misuse of 
power and authority by public officials. 
The scathing use of the word exemplifies the increasing alienation of the 
community supposedly served by the official from, and its lack of confidence 
in, Western democracies. In the condemnation of bureaucracy by the 
attachment of one or other of the above meanings to it, however, the focus is 
directed at symptoms rather than the cause of the community's disaffection 
(Dyman 1982:9). 
(b) Regulated system 
The above use is indicative of a regulated administrative system that functions 
by way of complex and interdependent institutions. In this sense the concept 
means that government has a precisely demarcated area in which its officials 
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function, a system of central authority, a central system of information and 
officialdom with professional training who follow fixed rules and procedures. 
The rules applied by officials and the exercise of authority by professional 
administrators are included here. 
(c) Methodological 
A study of methods based on a and b above 
3.2.2 Definition of the Concept "Bureaucracy" 
In a purely literal sense it simply means "government by officials", but what is 
really meant by it is less clear. The literal meaning of "bureaucracy" comes 
from the old French term bure/, which meant the fabric with which a desktop 
was covered-hence possibly the literal meaning of "desktop" government 
(Hague et a/1998:219). 
In the social sciences the term "bureaucracy" is used specifically in a neutral 
sense although it refers to divergent phenomena such as government by non-
elected officials, the "administrative machinery" of government, and a rational 
type of organisation. Despite disagreements about its nature and place, it is 
generally accepted that abstract organisation and rule-bound administrative 
officials are standard features of a bureaucracy (Auriacombe 1999: 115). 
In view of its objective and analytical formulation the definition of a regulated 
system as explained above is adopted for the purposes of this dissertation. All 
the other definitions have subjective and derogatory connotations. In this 
dissertation therefore, the term "bureaucracy" has a broad as well as a stricter 
meaning. In the broad sense the concept termed "public bureaucracy" is used 
in its simplest form, namely to refer to formal institutions that act with the 
consent of the State. In the narrow sense "bureaucracy" is conceptualised as 
a kind of organisation with special characteristics common to present-day 
organisational structures. 
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Where comparative government studies are concerned, the term 
"bureaucracy" presents fewer problems because the approach adopted in 
examining the activities of bureaucracies is to focus on the "administrative 
machinery" of the State, which comprises professional bureaucrats who are 
non-elected officials and who advise the political executive authority and apply 
policy decisions. 
3.3 Distinctive Characteristics of a Bureaucracy in Public 
Administration 
In the previous section different conceptions of the meaning of "bureaucracy", 
which originally meant" government by officials", as opposed to government 
by elected politicians. In the social sciences it usually referred to an 
organisational form. However, modern political analysts engaged in 
comparative government studies use the term "bureaucracy" to refer to the 
"administrative machinery" of the State, with professional bureaucrats as non-
elected state officials, who are either subject to political control, or not. 
Simply put, bureaucracy and everything associated with it is the outcome of a 
socialisation process in which the community has entrusted certain functions 
to a central authority as it has become more and better organised. The 
conferral of such functions was of necessity accompanied by a directly 
proportional relinquishment of authority by the community (Dyman 1982:9). 
This socialisation of communities, even in capitalist countries, drew the 
observation from Max Weber (Weber 1966:11 0) that sustained progress is 
only possible if the Westerner, who is the bearer of democratic values, is 
prepared to relinquish some of his liberties to large-scale organisation and 
specialisation according to functions. Weber maintained that the development 
of the bureaucracy did exactly the same for social organisation that the 
introduction of mechanical energy did for economic production-it made the 
administration process more efficient and faster (Hague eta/. 1998:343). 
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Morstein Marx (in La Palombara 1963:83-84) endorses this view by saying: 
"To an increasing degree, Western man is being accompanied by a condition 
relatively new to him-the condition of being administered", and further " ... 
administered man benefits from public provision for his likely needs almost 
from the cradle to the grave, though mainly without having such care forced 
upon when there is no necessity". 
A controversy arose from the expectation on the one hand that government 
should intervene increasingly in the affairs of society by delivering services 
while on the other hand the pronouncement made by the liberal economist 
Adam Smith in 1776 that "good government (is) limited government, and the 
best government (is) the government that governs least because government 
(is) an evil" was endorsed at the same time (Greene 1967:64). 
The theme value for money rose to specific prominence in the nineties with an 
increasingly sharp focus o a "lean government". There is more at stake here 
than merely accepting that public services should be delivered to society. 
These services are rendered to society by permanent salaried staff (the 
bureaucracy) employed by the State and whose salaries are directly or 
indirectly drawn from public funds. What is less obvious is how the 
bureaucracy can be indispensable to government without the sanction of 
elections. Central to this debate is the contradiction that the bureaucracy must 
be geared to needs fulfilment and efficiency. This is a viewpoint from which to 
consider the requirement of a public bureaucracy in the context of public 
administration with a view to gaining answers to key questions about the 
nature of this contradiction. A review of the question follows as a precursor to 
the application of characteristics and prerequisites of Weber's ideal 
bureaucracy to the South African civil services. 
3.3.1 The Typifying Characteristics of a Public Bureaucracy 
Although the word "bureaucracy" is sometimes used in a negative sense that 
evokes images of inefficiency and red tape, it is explained in this section in the 
more technical sense developed by Weber (Gerth & Mills, 1948). 
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In contrast to the perception of bureaucracy as government by officials, Weber 
compiled a list of characteristics that, when combined, define bureaucracy 
(Aibrow 1970:84-105). In his compendious work on sociological phenomena 
Weber points out that the institutionalisation of rational-legal authority, which 
is the source from which community development proceeds, is characterised 
by the following, among others: 
• A sustained organisation with a specific function or functions where 
rules are applied to determine the functioning of the organisation. 
Decisions are taken by the methodical application of rules to specific 
cases and are not dependent on any private initiative. Continuity and 
consistency in the organisation is assured by the use of written 
documents to record actions, decisions and rules. 
• Offices are hierarchically structured. The extent of authority in the 
hierarchy is clearly defined. Each office has its own area of 
competence and the rights and duties of personnel on every level are 
specified. 
• Personnel members do not hold office in their own right, nor do they 
own the means of administration or production. They have personal 
freedom and are only subject to authority where the rules applying to 
their impersonal, official obligations are concerned. 
• Personnel are appointed, and not elected, on the grounds of 
impersonal technical qualifications as determined in virtue of diplomas 
and certificates or examinations which testify to technical skill, and they 
are promoted on merit. Personnel are paid fixed salaries and are 
subject to fixed terms of service. The salary scales are usually graded 
according to ranks (or grades) in the hierarchy. 
• The post is an occupation and the only, or at least the primary 
employment provided to the public servant. An appointment is usually 
permanent with some certainty that it will continue until retirement, and 
pensions are usually paid to officials after their retirement. 
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3.3.2 An Organisation Regarded as a Bureaucracy 
In addition to the above characteristics of an organisation, Weber (Aibrow 
1970: 84-1 05) specified the following characteristics or conditions to which an 
organisation must conform in order to be recognised as a bureaucracy: 
• The regular activities that are essential for the purposes of the structure 
are allocated in prescribed ways as official duties. This entails a 
carefully defined division of labour and a clearly delineated sphere of 
authority. Specific areas of expertise are singled out as part of a 
systematic division of labour. Expertise and sustained training are a 
prerequisite for post occupancy. 
• The official is subject to strict, systematic discipline and control in the 
execution of his/her office and must defer to the authority of the 
hierarchical superior. 
• All enterprises are controlled by a coherent system of abstract rules. 
• There is consistent application of predetermined, formalised rules, work 
procedures and methods to ensure consistent action. 
• The organisation of offices is based on hierarchic principles, in other 
words every lower office is under the control and supervision of a 
higher office. 
• People are recruited to serve in the bureaucracy, based on proven or at 
least potential competence. 
• Being a bureaucratic official is regarded as a profession and there is a 
system for the promotion of officials on seniority or merit, or on both, as 
judged by superiors. 
• Officials who perform their duty competently are sure of their posts and 
salaries. 
3.3.3 The Implications of Bureaucracy of Weber's and AI brow's Views 
In the previous section Weber's and Albrow's views on bureaucracy are 
explained. Although there has been much criticism of Weber's perception of 
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bureaucracy it remains a fact that bureaucracy is indispensable for the orderly 
functioning of a modern state. Many people see bureaucracy as a kind of sin, 
but bureaucrats who do their work conscientiously and responsibly are among 
the good and faithful. In spite of the fact that bureaucracy is a means of doing 
business without which we could not cope in the complex world of today, there 
are problems associated with bureaucracy. 
There are two main problems with the application of Weber's "ideal type" of 
bureaucracy. First it could mean that the differences between the bureaucratic 
styles of different countries are under emphasised. 
For example, Heady (1979:170-194, 198-212) draws a distinction between 
classical and political bureaucracies. Classical bureaucracies arose from the 
administrative instruments that were created by absolute rulers in Europe. As 
in France and Germany, many bureaucracies are professional and efficient 
although they tend to be rigid and to adopt a condescending, even mistrustful, 
attitude towards party politics. Political bureaucracies, like those in Britain and 
the United States, are more receptive to political control and accept their 
constitutional role of executing the will of elected governments (Hague et a/ 
1993:343). 
Secondly Weber's "ideal type" distinguishes too categorically between politics 
and administration. This implies that politicians make policy which is 
administered by civil servants; that politicians make choices while civil 
servants offer choices. At the higher level of a bureaucracy this distinction is 
not valid-particularly not in the communist world, but also not in the First 
World. It would be more accurate to say that state officials are just as involved 
in politics as politicians themselves, only in different ways. State officials work 
silently behind the scenes; for example, they also negotiate with relevant 
interest groups. Elected politicians, however, have to visibly promote 
themselves and their party's image with the general populace. But there is no 
doubt that both have political tasks in the sense that they shape collective 
decisions (see Auriacombe 1999:120). 
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When one thinks of the bureaucracy it is important to distinguish between the 
small number of civil servants at the highest level and the swarms of routine 
personnel at the bottom of the pyramid. State officials in the upper echelons 
work in the middle, have to advise on policy and are in daily contact with 
politicians. In Europe they are frequently recruited from the "fast lane", which 
guarantees rapid promotion to influential positions (Hague et a/. 1993:343). 
Because they live in a political world in the broadest sense, the discussion is 
mostly centred on the power of bureaucrats in this theme that is on the elite 
group. 
The vast majority of civil servants do not work on this exalted level, however. 
They carry out routine tasks, removed from the high level where decisions are 
taken. Although the discussion is largely concerned with the power of officials 
in high places, this chapter also concerns the organisation as a whole, 
including personnel in the lower echelons. 
This distinction between higher and lower levels, or between policy advisers, 
managers and other administrative personnel, is becoming more important 
now because the governments of some countries want to delegate the 
management and implementation tasks to at least semi-independent 
agencies. It is a well-known phenomenon in Sweden, for example, that the 
majority of state officials do not work for government departments, which 
usually consist only of small planning groups of civil servants. On the other 
hand councils and agencies handle most of the daily work and enjoy 
considerable autonomy. Although the councils and agencies (running into 
several dozen) have standardised salary scales and regulations, they mostly 
recruit their own personnel (Roskin et a/1991 :31). 
As indicated, Weber's central standpoint was that the bureaucracy makes 
administration more efficient and rational. He believed that this was the best 
way to apply modern industrial efficiency to the affairs of public administration. 
In his view the fully developed bureaucratic apparatus could be compared to 
other organisations just as the machine can be compared to non-mechanical 
means of production. Precision, speed, clarity, knowledge of files, continuity, 
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discretion, unity, strict obedience, reduced friction as well as material and 
personal costs-these hallmarks are taken to the highest level in the strictly 
bureaucratic administration. For Weber the ideal bureaucracy was not a 
refined piece of "administrative machinery" but, like any other machine, it had 
to be subjected to human control. 
In his analysis of the crisis of confidence between the public official and the 
public Albrow identifies three symptoms to which he then offers solutions. In 
his own words: "The first is that officials have acquired too much power and 
need to be brought back to their proper functions. The second is that officials 
necessarily have ever-growing power and the task is to see that this is 
exercised wisely. The third is that power necessarily accrues to officials and 
the quest should be for methods whereby their services might be dispensed 
with altogether" (Alb row 1970:11 0). 
The common denominator in these symptoms and the apparent cause of the 
public's dissatisfaction with, and, in some instances, even its downright 
revulsion against the bureaucracy, is the power of the official. Albrow and his 
colleagues fail to indicate, however, why officials are gaining more and more 
power and how in fact this power is gained. Understanding this process can 
go a long way towards bridging the gap between the officialdom (bureaucracy) 
and the community it is intended to serve (Auriacombe 1999:121). 
3.4 Characteristics and Prerequisites of Weber's "Ideal Bureaucracy" 
in the Context of the Civil Service 
There is a relationship between Weber's distinctive characteristics of the 
bureaucratic institution and the criteria of validity for administrative action 
(Wiechers 1973: 192-248) as applied to the South African civil service. These 
criteria of validity are calculated to curtail the abuse of power by officials about 
which Albrow (Aibrow 1970:110) is so concerned. The criteria of validity are 
listed below with a few comments. 
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Criteria of validity for: 
• the author of the administrative action 
• the form of the administrative action 
• the purpose of the administrative action 
• the consequences of the administrative action. 
The practice in the civil service of clearly demarcating tasks and authority 
must be seen as a measure to protect the official and the community in certain 
situations. It is particularly the community that should be confident that 
unauthorised action or transgression of the limits of power could be remedied 
by the judicial process. 
The purpose of separating official from nonofficial work is to promote 
objectivity in public administration. In his/her official capacity the official may 
not favour one individual over another. The upholding of community values 
such as impartiality, fairness and reasonableness, and honesty must be the 
dominant behaviour pattern in the workplace. Just as all citizens are equal 
before the law in Western democratic states, citizens must also be equal in 
the administration of legislation. This approach is naturally not always readily 
acceptable to pressure groups. Max Weber noted this problem in public 
administration at an early stage when he observed that: "One of the obstacles 
to the development and maintenance of rational-legal authority is the extent to 
which this legal formulism offends the sentiments of substantive justice in a 
population." (Weber 1966:64). And further: " ... the development of rational-
legal authority with bureaucratic administration, is both dependent on the 
breakdown of traditional particularistic groups and in turn has a levelling 
influence, in that it treats social class by birth or other privileged statuses as to 
a large degree irrelevant to status in the system of authority" (Weber 
1966:74). 
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The practice of dismissively characterising official action as bureaucratic when 
the matter in question is not given special or favourable attention is where the 
rift between the official and the community starts. 
Formalised work procedures and methods are regarded in South African 
government circles as critically important because they have to serve as a 
yardstick by which to determine whether the legislature's objectives in 
enacting the legislation have been achieved effectively and economically. 
Here too, the community is protected against arbitrary behaviour and 
consistency is assured. Where improper action is suspected, the member is at 
liberty to appeal to the courts of law. The popular observation that civil 
servants have unlimited and indiscriminate power, and that the community is 
at the mercy of arbitrary behaviour on the part of the bureaucracy, is at odds 
with reality. 
3.5 The Sources of Bureaucratic Power 
The organisation and administration of modern states is a complicated 
process that requires skill, experience and expertise. Bureaucracies have 
been playing an important role in the political and administrative system for 
centuries and rulers are constantly struggling with the problem of exercising 
effective control over their civil servants. The impact of the bureaucracy on 
policy making has increased over time, however, as the role of government 
has expanded (Auriacombe 1999:125). 
A modern state department is a large, multifaceted organisation that 
embodies a vast store of knowledge and experience of its area of 
specialisation. Departments, like all other organisations, develop their own 
procedures, their own set of priorities, and their own unique approach. They 
maintain a network of ties with other departments and interest groups with 
whom they are connected by way of tradition, agreements and personal 
relationships. All these things complicate the control task, which means that to 
steer a department in a new direction is a slow, complicated process requiring 
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sustained effort from the minister concerned. Without such effort the 
departments tend to revert to their previous state. 
Since politicians as well as government officials are involved in governing and 
managing the country, one of the main issues in studying the bureaucracy is 
whether these two roles are related and reconcilable. In many respects 
politicians and civil servants perform the same· kind of functions, but there are 
three important differences between the executive authority's political role and 
civil servants' administrative functions. 
• First there is a difference in the sense of the partisanship between the 
members of the executive authority and the supposed neutrality of the 
civil service. 
• Secondly their terms of service are different. On the whole political 
leaders' term of service is generally determined by elections, which 
makes their term of service relatively short, while civil servants 
traditionally have permanent appointments. 
• Thirdly civil servants are only expected to administer the execution of 
government policy, and not to determine such policy. The political 
masters are supposed to determine public policy and advise officialdom 
on its implementation. The civil servant's task is to find ways of making 
politicians' plans feasible and to implement them (Jackson & Jackson 
1997:278). 
The tripartite division of state authority subscribed to in Western countries 
contrasts starkly with the realities of modern public administration. Multiple 
and complex functions that have to be performed by ministers on national and 
international levels have made it imperative to confer their administrative task 
almost, if not actually, as a whole on the bureaucracy. This evolution of public 
administration whereby an "administrative authority" has arisen, is also helped 
along by the actions of Parliament and the development of the administrative 
state (Dyman 1982:9). 
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In the first chapter the point was that political control has a role to play in the 
process of public administration due to increasing political influence exercised 
by civil servants in the upper echelons, particularly in Western democracies. 
In order to explain this phenomenon this section deals with the aspects 
related to the gaining of power by bureaucrats. 
Consequently, the decline of parliamentary power will briefly be discussed. 
Attention is paid to the rise of the administrative state and other factors that 
lead to an increase in the political, influence of top government officials. 
3.5.1 Decline of Parliamentary Power 
Parliamentary power is on the wane in most European countries. Legislative 
functions are partially conferred on the executive authority, as we can see 
from the importance of the delegated powers that enable the public 
administration system to promulgate regulations. These regulations enable 
the implementation of laws in matters that by rights should be the domain of 
parliament. Laws passed as guidelines, or regulations made by the executive 
authority, are also indicative of this delegation of authority by the legislative 
authority. Even bills passed by Parliament are generally prepared and 
launched through Parliament by government - actually by top administrative 
officials. Parliament also has less initiative than government, not only where 
the number of bills introduced to Parliament is concerned, but also with 
respect to the probability that a bill will be passed if it is introduced by 
government rather than by parliament. As Alfred Grosser (Grosser in 
Graubard 1964:228 in Auriacombe 1999: 127) puts it: "Everywhere the 
legislative initiative has passed into the hands of the administrations. The 
legislatures sometimes amend, rarely reject, usually ratify. The members 
continue, indeed to call themselves collectively 'the legislative power on the 
law books', but in most cases they merely participate in a procedure of 
registration." 
A number of writers emphasise this transfer of power. Christoff (in Dogan 
1975:7 in Auriacombe 1999:127) writes the following about England: 
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"Parliament lays down a framework of policy and statutorily empowers the 
minister to work out the details. 
The delegated legislative power is in turn sub delegated by the minister to his 
top civil servants. Sub delegation takes place because members of Parliament 
- except in special cases - have no direct ties with top-level civil servants. 
"With neither direct access to civil servants nor their own expert staffs, MPs 
can serve only fitfully as informed critics of policy and administration." 
(Christoff in Dogan 1975:7 in Auriacombe 1999: 127) Roland Ruffieux 
(Ruffieux in Dogan 1975:7 in Auriacombe 1999:127) notes that "the civil 
service's role in ordinary legislative processes is longstanding .... Every year 
the Swiss Federal Administration prepares legislative texts, the budget and 
the management report; and high officials can amply exercise their powers of 
initiative, arbitration and even decision making." In Austria: "More than 90% of 
all draft bills are introduced by the cabinet.. .. The bureaucracy is indeed in 
charge of legislative work in the ministries .... It is often the bureaucracy itself 
which takes the first steps to draft the bills and to start a legislative process" 
(Kneucker in Dogan 1975:7 in Auriacombe 1999:127). 
In France the National Assembly no longer takes part in drawing up its own 
agenda. Moreover the 1958 Constitution restricts Parliament to meeting for 
only a few months of the year. The Constitution also reduced the amendment 
powers that parliamentary committees and even the National Assembly used 
to have. A government bill can even become law without a formal vote by 
Parliament! To do this, the government can literally wager its future on the 
proposed bill, and if it is not defeated by a motion of no confidence, the bill will 
be passed! (For an evaluation of this read Auriacombe 1996). 
Traditionally the main task of the legislative institution was to pass the budget, 
but this prerogative was gradually relinquished. Nowadays it is the task of the 
executive authority to draw up the budget, and in turn it relies on the 
bureaucrats for the performance of this task, more particularly on Treasury 
officials. The practice that the minister of finance informs other cabinet 
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members of the main features of the budget shortly before his speech in 
Parliament is common in Europe (Dogan 1975:8 in Auria com be 1996: 129). 
The present French constitution restricts parliament's participation in drawing 
up the budget. Delegates have no right to propose amendments that would 
increase public spending or reduce income. "Parliament is now only a registry 
office in financial matters .... After several weeks of discussion, less than one 
thousandth of the proposed budget is changed .... A simple fact: What can 
Parliament do when facing the budget? Nothing. What can the government 
do? Everything!" (Cotteret & Emeri in Dogan 1975:8 in Auriacombe 1996:127). 
From the Statement above it is deduced that an essential legislative 
prerogative - control over the budget - has been transferred to the executive 
authority and ultimately to the higher levels of the bureaucracy. 
Economic planning also does not fit in well with parliamentary procedure. The 
rigidity of law contrasts unfavourably with the flexibility required for this kind of 
planning. Parliaments do not have the technical means to control a national 
economic plan effectively. Even if the government gives Parliament a range of 
choices, members of Parliament cannot propose another overall plan as 
alternative. They can do no more than adopt a position with respect to a 
general choice. 
Once again the transfer of power is ultimately more in favour of top level civil 
servants than of ministers. Cabinet ministers naturally play an important role 
in the initial and final stages, but the planners themselves write alternatives 
and determine the criteria for the most rational choice. 
3.5.2 The Concept "Administrative State" 
What is the administrative state? This is the question that has to be answered 
at the outset. Observers of this phenomenon often attach different meanings 
to it. The real meaning of the phenomenon is that it emphasise the increasing 
significance of the executive branch (of which the administrative branch is a 
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component) of government, relative to the legislative and judicial branches 
(Brynard 1997:3). 
In practice it implies on the one hand that a good number of legislative 
functions of government are carried out by administrative officials and 
institutions rather than by Parliament, and one the other hand that a good 
number of juridical functions that would otherwise have been fulfilled by the 
law courts are now being carried out by administrative officers at tribunals. 
Another meaning attached to the phenomenon of the administrative sate is 
that it continues the regulation of the economy by government or public 
administration. This is always referred to as government intervention in the 
economy. The existence of the administrative state is not unique to South 
Africa, but is in fact a world-wide phenomenon (Brynard 1997:3). 
Critics charge that true rulers of the modern state are not the elected 
legislators and executive officials, but the "faceless bureaucrats" who work 
behind the scenes. This problem is described in general terms as "the 
administrative state", a system in which politicians, in a sense, give a display 
of shadow boxing, whereas the real decisions are taken elsewhere. The 
administrative state may not have replaced "politics" with "administration", as 
the old basic rule had it, but it may rather have shifted both politics and policy 
away from the domain of the legislative authority, the prime ministers and the 
presidents to the officials in public administration. 
Even if this last conclusion were somewhat far-fetched, it remains a fact that 
the problem of the administrative state affects all modern constitutional 
governments. No-one doubts the growing impact of the official bureaucrats on 
the content and execution of public policy. However, this calls for a closer 
investigation of the problem of decision making and policy formulation in terms 
of the administrative state. In the first place we have to form a better 
understanding of the kinds of public policy and the various problems attending 
each of them. The alternative modes of decision making have to be 
investigated since different administrators act in different ways and because 
using the "wrong" mode of decision making may be responsible for the 
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disappointing results of foreign and internal policy decisions in many 
countries. Finally if it is accepted that even if the role of the administrative 
state as a villain is exaggerated, there are many and widely varied 
relationships between bureaucrats and elected or appointed "political" 
officials. 
A characteristic of the administrative state is that it creates a public 
administration that keeps on growing in terms of size, powers and penetration 
of every facet of public life. As regards size there is an extension of 
government functions and an increasing allocation of public functions to the 
administrative structures of government (Brynard 1997:4). 
The above has the inevitable implication for the administrative state as 
phenomenon that public institutions begin to influence and penetrate every 
aspect of the lives of citizens, particularly in the economic and social spheres. 
In practical terms this means that public officials are increasingly involved in 
the management of public affairs in society in the sense of taking the initiative, 
providing financial support and developing technical skills. This implies that 
the public are now simultaneously served and controlled by public 
administration (Brynard 1997:4). 
A variety of factors exert pressure on government to extend the administrative 
branch can be mentioned (Brynard 1975:5-6): 
• Population growth imposes demands on government in terms of the 
extent of public services that have to be provided. The fact that 
population growth promotes urbanisation - clustering together of 
people in restricted areas - further increases pressure on government 
to make public services available. 
• Complexity of society: public administration grows as government tries 
to protect people against each other, alleviate misery and arbitrate 
conflict. In brief it amounts to the obligation of government to maintain 
order in society. 
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• Regulation of the economy. 
• Implementing a new constitutional dispensation. 
Certain internal factors also expedite the emergence of the administrative 
state: 
• Organisational characteristics of the bureaucracy. 
• Influence of public officials on the process of policymaking and policy 
itself. 
• Mobilisation of administrative experience and technical skills 
It is important to realise that the official is thoroughly embroiled in this 
controversy about the phenomenon of the administrative state. On the one 
hand the charge is often levelled at the official that he/she is failing in the 
discharge of his/her duties and plods along without initiative, while on the 
other hand the official is sometimes reproached with the charge of exceeding 
his/her powers by encroaching on the domain of the legislative and judicial 
authorities (Brynard 1997:4). 
3.5.3 Bureaucrats Gain Power Implementing Political Decisions. 
Ministers cannot be everywhere at the same time because the extent of their 
control is limited. Civil servants must have discretionary power in any case if 
they are to implement policy effectively. This means that in their 
implementation of policy civil servants cannot "bend" such policy merely to suit 
the circumstances in which it has to be operationalised or even to serve their 
concerns and interests. Control over implementation [of policy] is one of the 
main sources of bureaucratic power. According to Auriacombe (1999:131): 
• The balance of power also tends to tilt towards the bureaucracy if there 
is a vacuum somewhere else in the political system. This is a 
particularly important phenomenon in a large part of the Third World. If 
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the politicians will not or cannot govern, then the civil servants want to 
and can in their stead. 
• Another source of bureaucratic power is to be found in a comparison 
between the career structures of civil servants, and in those of elected 
politicians. Civil servants hold their positions much more securely than 
politicians who are the heads of divisions and government 
departments. Particularly in parliamentary governments, ministers are 
reshuffled, promoted, downgraded and dismissed if the balance of 
power changes within the leadership. This encourages bureaucrats to 
resist change -they merely have to dig in their heels until the minister 
is transferred. 
• Politicians have less technical knowledge of the portfolios under their 
control than do civil servants. Civil servants at the highest level of the 
bureaucracy have decades of experience of the area concerned by the 
time they reach such top positions, compared to cabinet ministers who 
are still relative newcomers. Ministers therefore become dependent on 
the advice and information conveyed to them by their civil servants. 
The bureaucracy therefore has considerable potential power in that it 
decides what information is disclosed to politicians and what is 
withheld. This power can affect the functions of decision making in two 
ways: 
First, civil servants and advisers may decide to withhold information that 
according to their knowledge would not impress decision makers favourably. 
Secondly, bureaucrats influence decisions through the realities of 
bureaucratic politics. The future of civil servants depends on what happens to 
their departments. They would like to see their departments (and therefore 
their posts) grow in size and stature. Bureaucrats tend to act with a view to 
defending their particular organisation when resources are allocated or 
fundamental reforms are considered. As Dunleavy (1991 :147) notes in his 
discussion of the literature on the bureaucracy: officials and public servants 
are mainly portrayed as people who want to maximise their budgets within 
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external political limits. Bureaucracies are often characterised as expansionist 
organisations with a desire to increase their size, staff, financing and the 
scope of their activities. 
Communist-party states used to abound with examples of bureaucratic 
politics. For example: in the late seventies China took important decisions 
about its future economic policy. One possibility was to decentralise power 
from central departments to provinces, and to place greater emphasis on 
small industries. The bureaucracies that advocated large industries and 
central planning were against this step since it would mean a loss of both 
political power and the financial resources allocated to their departments. 
Bureaucratic resistance to economic reforms in the Soviet Union was an 
important factor in the failure of Gorbachev's Perestroika, which also 
contributed significantly to the eventual collapse of the entire system (Hague 
et a/1993:345). 
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3.5.4 Other Factors that Lead to an Increase in Political Influence 
Exerted by Top-Level Civil Servants 
Besides the above-mentioned general factors there are others that work 
towards an increase in the political influence of top-level civil servants. These 
factors are active in some countries and not in others. The influence of the 
bureaucracy also varies from one country to another, depending on the nature 
of the political and economic system concerned. According to Auriacombe 
(1999:131) there are specific factors that lead to and increase in political 
influence exerted by top level civil servants, such as: 
• Administrative centralisation - naturally strengthens the positions of top-
level officials. France is the most typical example. 
• Ministerial instability - A high turnover in the cabinet strengthens the 
position of civil servants who remain in office to the disadvantage of 
politicians who occupy their positions temporarily. This is what 
happened in France during the Third and Fourth French Republics, and 
from 1946 onwards in Italy and Finland. The following statement of a 
top-level bureaucrat in France illustrates the case "In thirteen years I 
was personally compelled to be involved with twenty-six different 
governments. This means that the same government was not in power 
at the drafting and detailing of the plan, the subsequent parliamentary 
debate, and the eventual implementation of the plan. Much of the time 
was spent on explaining to some minister or other who was facing the 
prospect of a parliamentary debate or experiencing a crisis what a 
good plan for the next four years would be. I often got the feeling that 
the minister is wondering whether I really have an inkling of the position 
in which he found himself." (Hirsch in Memdes-France 1962:40 in 
Auriacombe 1999:131). 
• Irreconcilability between ministerial posts and parliamentary seats -
The French and Dutch constitutions forbid the same person from 
occupying a post in Parliament as well as in government. These 
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stipulations lead to the election of more top-level civil servants as 
ministers. 
• Personal staff of ministers - The institutionalisation of the so-called 
ministerial cabinets in France, Belgium and other countries places 
some civil servants in quasi-political positions. When a top-level official 
of the Treasury or some other service in a state department is 
transferred to a minister's cabinet, his role changes so frequently that 
even his outlook on the political decision-making process changes (see 
Auriacombe 1996 for an evaluation). 
3.6 Functions of Bureaucracies 
Ostensibly bureaucracies perform a single, but an indispensable, function. As 
indicated earlier, their main task is to administer and uphold the legislation 
enacted by the legislature, as well as the policies on which the executive 
authority has decided. While other government functions (e.g. representation, 
policymaking and the expression of interests) are carried out by a variety of 
institutions, the implementation of policy is the responsibility of public officials 
working under the supervision of their political masters. 
It is clear from the preceding sections that top-level bureaucrats are important 
role players in the process of determining policy. This power derives from their 
ties with other state departments and interest groups, from their permanence, 
from their involvement with the implementation of policy and, above all, from 
their close association with ministers. 
Before the functions of bureaucrats are considered in further depth the author 
needs to refer back to Weber's perception of bureaucracy. Weber's model, 
whereby bureaucracies are perceived as rational and objective "machinery", 
clearly separates the administrative from the political world. In this context 
bureaucrats are regarded as mere "cogs in a big wheel", as reliable and 
effective administrators who function within a fixed hierarchy and according to 
clearly defined rules. The real state of affairs looks completely different, 
however. In spite of their formally subordinate and impartial status, 
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bureaucrats exercise considerable influence over the process of policy 
determination, thus fulfilling a number of key functions in any political system. 
The most important functions among these for the purposes of this 
dissertation are to: 
• perform the administrative function 
• offer policy advice 
• express interests and bring them together 
• maintain political stability and progress 
3.6.1 Bureaucracy's Administrative Function 
In the preceding sections it was shown that the key functions of the 
bureaucracy are those of implementing legislation and policy. The administra-
tion of government's decisions is therefore assigned to the bureaucracy. 
The object of this section is to gain more clarity about the functions of the 
bureaucracy in the context of public administration as treated in the preceding 
chapter. It is clear, however, that there is more to the functions of 
bureaucracies than administration pure and simple. It has also been shown 
that the public service cannot be separated from political issues of a more 
general nature. 
3.6.2 Role of the Bureaucrats as Policy Advisers 
The political significance of the bureaucracy largely emanates from its role as 
the main source of policy information and advice that is made available to 
government. This policy role distinguishes top-level civil servants, who are in 
daily contact with politicians and have to act as policy advisers, from middle-
level and junior civil servants, who are more concerned with routine 
administration. The debate on the political significance of bureaucracies 
therefore tends to focus more sharply on this elite group of top-level officials. 
In theory a clear distinction can be drawn between the policy responsibilities 
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of bureaucrats and politicians respectively. Policy is (apparently) made by 
politicians; bureaucrats merely act in an advisory capacity. The policy role of 
civil servants therefore amounts to two functions: the description of policy 
options available to the minister, and the consideration of policy proposals in 
terms of their possible impact and consequences. The influence that top-level 
officials can exert is further curtailed by the fact that they are expected to be 
either politically neutral, as in Britain, Japan and Australia, or to be subject to 
a system of political appointments, as in America (Heywood 1997:346). 
There is sufficient reason, however, to accept that the policy role of civil 
servants is more important politically than has been indicated above. For 
example, no clear distinction is made between policy determination and policy 
advice. Decisions are based on available information, which means that the 
content of decisions is determined by the advice offered. As the main source 
of advice available to politicians, bureaucrats actually control the flow of 
information, while politicians merely know what officials tell them. Information 
can therefore be disguised or at least "massaged" to reflect the preferences of 
the civil service. The main source of bureaucratic power is nevertheless the 
expertise and specialised knowledge centred in the bureaucracy. If the 
responsibilities of government increase and policy becomes complicated, 
"amateur" politicians will inevitably become more dependent on their 
"professional" bureaucratic advisers (see Heywood 1997:346). 
3.6.3 Role of Bureaucracy in the Expression of Interests 
Although it is not one of their formal functions, bureaucracies often help to 
express interests and, in some instances, to bring interests together. 
Bureaucracies are in touch with interest groups as a result of their obligation 
to implement policy and their involvement in policy formulation and advice. 
This contact has increased as a result of corporatist tendencies that have 
blurred the boundaries between organised interests and government 
agencies. Groupings such as doctors, teachers, farmers and businesses thus 
become "client groups", which are served by their respective agencies, but 
which are naturally also an extremely valuable source of information and 
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advice. This clientelism can benefit the political system if it maintains 
consensus. When client groups have access to policy formulation they will be 
more inclined to follow government policy. However, clientelism can also 
erode the public responsibilities and tasks of civil servants. This happens, for 
example, when American regulatory agencies are ultimately controlled by the 
industries that they are supposed to regulate. When group interests coincide 
with those of the bureaucracy a policy power block may arise that could be 
difficult for democratic politicians to dismantle (Heywood 1997:346). 
3.6.4 Role of Bureaucracies in Maintaining Political Stability and 
Progress 
The role of the bureaucracy to promote stability and progress in a country, in 
some instances without the necessary political initiative, is dearly evident from 
cases in France and Italy during the years immediately after World War II. The 
promotion of stability is valuable, particularly where it is characterised by a 
slower-paced advance in living standards. The ways in which this can be 
achieved, as well as the result of such achievement, may not be sacrificed at 
the whim of impatient entrepreneurs on the altar of so-called free enterprise 
and the free-market mechanism for the sake of short-term advantages. 
Gaining a further political mandate to govern depends largely on whether the 
government of the day is sensitive to the community's needs- that is to say, 
on whether it is farsighted enough to react and act timeously in certain 
situations (Heywood 1997:347). 
It goes without saying that the bureaucracy is obliged to assist the 
government of the day in this matter, not only in the implementation of policy 
as formulated in legislation, but also in identifying problems in the life of the 
community, trying to gauge the national repercussions of such problems, and 
initiating policy with a view to allaying the problems. Samuel Beer sketches 
the role of the American bureaucracy in this regard as follows: "I would remark 
how rarely additions to the public sector have been initiated by demands of 
voters or the advocacy of pressure groups or the platforms of political parties. 
On the contrary, in the field of health, housing, urban renewal, transportation, 
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welfare, education, poverty and energy it has been, in very great measure, 
people in government service, or closely related with it, acting on the basis of 
their specialised and technical knowledge, who first perceived the problem, 
conceived the program, initially urged it on president and Congress, went on 
to help lobby it through to enactment, and then saw to its administration." 
(Mosher in Dyman 1982:10) Kinsley (Aibrow 1970:112), who made a study of 
the British civil service, concurs by observing that the civil servant has 
become a permanent politician and that his/her opinions on policy have 
become indispensable in modern times. 
The bureaucratic function of securing stability and continuity in political 
systems is regarded in some quarters as particularly important in developing 
countries where the existence of a group of trained career officials is at times 
the only guarantee that the government function will be carried out in an 
orderly and dependable way. This stability is extremely sensitive to the status 
of bureaucrats as permanent and professional civil servants; ministers and 
governments may come and go, but the bureaucracy remains a permanent 
fixture. The Northcote Trevelyan reforms of 1879 which gave rise to the 
modern British civil service, are based on the principles of impartial selection, 
political neutrality, permanence and anonymity. Even in the USA, where top-
level officials are political appointments, the majority of federal bureaucrats 
are career officials (Auria com be 1999: 136). 
Continuity can also have negative effects, however. Failing effective public 
selection and accountability, it can certainly lead to corruption, a problem that 
occurs in many developing countries, and that is exacerbated by poverty and 
deprivation. In other cases permanence can lead to arrogance and exclusivity, 
or a tendency towards conservatism. Career officials may believe that they 
are better qualified than elected politicians to determine the best interest of 
the public. Consequently they may feel that their resistance to radical political 
tendencies or reforms are justified, particularly in the light of their role as 
guardians of State interests. 
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3. 7 Organisation of Bureaucracies 
Public services are delivered in the context of the tripartite division of 
government authority. Furthermore, it appears that this is the primary 
responsibility of the executive authority. 
The division of authority within the executive authority in the broad sense, or 
more specifically in the public service, can be done territorially or 
hierarchically. Territorial concentration refers to the division of authority over 
areas (e.g. regions) while hierarchic concentration refers to how much is left to 
the discretion of subordinate individuals in the execution of their duties in the 
public service. 
Institutions in the public sector include government departments, control 
boards, public corporations, institutions of the provincial authorities as well as 
those of local authorities. There is a distinction between the departments 
forming the stable core of the central government on the one hand, and other 
institutions, such as parastatal institutions (or agencies, to use the term that is 
current in comparative studies). 
This section also explores the organisation of government activities in order, 
metaphorically speaking, to see how the "gears of the administrative machine 
mesh". This section deals with the principles of bureaucratic organisation and 
the organisation of government departments to deliver public services. 
The information given in this section merely outlines the different related 
aspects of the organisation of public bureaucracies as background to the 
study. However, in doing so numerous underlying questions are raised. 
3. 7.1 Principles on which Bureaucracies are Organised 
The principles of bureaucratic organisation vary from one _country to another. 
The four main organisational principles are briefly outlined below. 
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The most common and categorical form of organisation is organisation by 
objectives or functions. Most state departments exist in order to pursue 
specific objectives, such as tax collection, transport, education, health, 
defence and so on. An ambiguity arising from the definition of the actual 
objectives of a functional bureaucracy can be identified in terms of the 
following questions. Are government departments the objective of the 
originator of the relevant state department? Or of the politicians (ministers) 
who are commonly perceived to be in control of government departments? Or 
of the officials who staff the departments? The objectives of these groups may 
be wholly irreconcilable, which would make the idea of the objective of the 
organisation as an integral whole completely untenable. 
A British television series, "Yes, Minister" gave comical insight into how 
bureaucracies can counteract objectives that do not accord with their own. 
The series gave a comical portrayal of the relationships between politicians 
and government officials in a fictional government department, "the 
Department of Administrative Affairs". The minister would like to better his 
career prospects while the officials want to preserve their influence and 
protect the minister's interests against the depredations or encroachments of 
other departments. The interests of government departments are often in 
conflict with those of other departments and rarely coincide with those of the 
government as a whole. The popularity of the series on British politicians 
(particularly Margaret Thatcher) was an indication of how close the fiction 
came to fact in this case (Hague et a/1993:347). 
The other three types of bureaucratic organisations considered can be 
more specifically categorised as functional organisations. 
• Organisation by area consists in the responsibility of a separate 
department for all the policies pursued by a central government in a 
particular area. The prefectoral systems of France, Italy and Japan are 
cases in point. Bureaucratic organisations of this kind are embodied in 
the system of British colonial rule under which a local commissioner 
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was responsible for all the activities of the colonial government in a 
specific district (Hague 1993:348). 
Organisation by area can coexist with organisation by objectives, 
although this system of dual control often causes major co-ordination 
problems. The decentralised system applied (at times) in China is a 
good example of dual control in action. Because China is such a vast 
country it is impossible to govern the entire country from one particular 
centre. For example, the province of Sichuan alone has a population of 
150 million. Each provincial government has its own administrative 
system, but each government department in the capital, Beijing, also 
has a branch office in the provincial capital. This branch office is 
therefore answerable to two authorities. It reports vertically to the 
central government department in Beijing, and at the same time 
horizontally to the provincial government. By deferring to the provincial 
authority it might upset the central government department, and vice 
versa (Hague et a/1993:349). 
• Organisation by clientele is often instituted to co-ordinate the delivery of 
services to groups that make extensive use of state programmes (e.g. 
disabled war veterans in the USA) or disadvantaged minorities (such 
as the aborigines in Australia) (Hague et a/1993:349). 
• The last organisational principle is organisation by process. This type of 
organisation is typically designed to achieve large-scale economies in 
the administrative system. It centralises such functions as data 
processing, auditing and bookkeeping (Hague et a/1993:349). 
3.7.2 The Organisation of Government Departments 
The core of modern democracies consists of about twelve government 
departments (or ministries). The USA has fourteen departments with a 
secretary of state appointed by the president at the head of each department. 
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The Netherlands has thirteen and Canada, with its tendency to political 
inflation, has twenty (Hague et a/1998:223). 
DIAGRAM 4: The Organisation of Government Departments, Divisions 
and Agencies 
Government department (ministry) 
An administrative unit over which a minister exercises direct executive control. 
Usually structured as a formal hierarchy and established by statue. 
Division, section or bureau 
A functional unit in a department that reports to the minister, but in practice 
has considerable autonomy (particularly in the USA). 
Agency (Parastatal institution) 
Functions "once or twice removed" from the government to promote flexible 
management and political independence. The term is rather confusing. It 
usually refers to any institution that performs government functions and is 
staffed by the way of formal appointments. Staff are part of the "arms-length" 
government because their non-governmental status means that they are part 
of the "non-elected state". Advisory, regulatory, research and developmental 
institutions are examples of agencies. 
According to Weber's principles government departments are administrative 
units usually organised in clearly defined hierarchies. A single minister is 
responsible for the department as a whole, but in the case of large 
departments he/she may be assisted by a number of junior ministers 
responsible for specific sections. A top-level official, often designated 
Secretary or Director-General, is responsible for the administration and for 
establishing a critical link between political and bureaucratic levels (in Japan 
108 
this person is called the deputy minister, a title indicating the high status of 
top-level bureaucrats). The extensive structure of German ministries is a good 
example of Weber's quasi-military chain of command. It is not correct, 
however, to expect that work practices coincide exactly with such 
organigrams, particularly where the image of information flowing smoothly up 
and down the administrative pyramid is concerned. The 2 000 sections in the 
German federal ministries possess a concentrated pool of expertise that 
enables them to block or at least evade changes coming from above (Hague 
et a/ 1998:224). The minister can also evade the public administration by 
soliciting advice from political advisers, such as the French cabinet system 
(Auriacombe 1996). 
Public bureaucracies are traditionally partitioned according to objectives or 
functions, hence their division into departments, divisions or agencies. The 
internal level of centralisation or decentralisation differs considerably from one 
country to another, and even from one department to another. The modern 
tendency, however, is to separate policy determination from policy application, 
and to include private-sector management techniques, or to privatise 
interests. 
3.8 Provincial Sphere of Government 
Due to the size and magnitude of activities that need to be performed by 
government, it is essential to use provincial spheres of government in 
assisting national government in executing its activities. As has previously 
been mentioned in Chapter One there are nine provinces in South Africa, all 
aimed at enhancing the quality of life of the citizenry in each specific province. 
The functional areas of con-current national and provincial legislative 
competence are listed in Schedule 4 and the functional areas of exclusive 
provincial legislative competence are listed in Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
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3.8.1 Provincial Legislative Authority 
Among many other stipulations contained in Section 104 of the Constitution, 
provincial legislatures have the authority to pass legislation in their respective 
provinces with regard to: 
• Any matter with a functional area listed in Schedule 4 of the 
Constitution. 
• Any matter with a functional area listed in Schedule 5 of the 
Constitution. 
• Any matter that has been expressly assigned to the province by 
national legislation. 
• Any matter for which a provision of the Constitution envisages the 
enactment of provincial legislation. 
A provincial legislature may recommend to the National Assembly legislation 
concerning any matter outside the authority of that legislature. Section 105 
deals with the composition and election of a provincial legislature and states 
that it consists of persons elected as members in terms of an electoral system 
that: 
• Is prescribed by national legislation. 
• Is based on that province's segment of the national common voter's 
roll. 
• Provides for a minimum voting age of eighteen years. 
• Results, in general, in proportional representation. 
A provincial legislature consists of between thirty and eighty members. The 
number of members, which may differ among the provinces, must be 
determined in terms of a formula prescribed by national legislation. The 
requirements for membership of a provincial legislature is very similar to those 
of the national legislative authority and are dealt with in detail in Section 106 
of the Constitution. In terms of Section 108 of the Constitution a provincial 
legislature is elected for a term of five years. 
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In exercising its legislative power, a provincial legislature may consider, pass, 
amend, or reject any bill before the legislature and initiate or prepare 
legislation, with the exception of money bills. A provincial legislature must 
provide for mechanisms to ensure that all provincial executive organs of state 
in the province are accountable to it, and to maintain oversight of the 
exercising of provincial executive authority in the province, including the 
implementation of legislation, and any provincial organ of state (Section 114). 
Section 116 of the Constitution deals with the internal arrangements, 
proceedings, and procedures of provincial legislatures and makes provision 
for a provincial legislatures to determine and control its internal arrangements, 
proceedings, and procedures and make rules and orders concerning its 
business. Due regard, however, must be given to ensuring representative and 
participatory democracy, accountability, transparency, and public involvement. 
Section 119 stipulates that only members of the executive council of a 
province or a committee or member of a provincial legislature may introduce a 
bill in the legislature. Only the member of the executive council who is 
responsible for financial matters in the province may introduce a money bill in 
the legislature. Section 120 stipulates that a bill that appropriates money or 
imposes taxes, levies, or duties is a money bill. A money bill may not deal with 
any other matter except a subordinate matter incidental to the appropriation of 
money or the imposition of taxes, levies, or duties. A provincial act must 
provide for a procedure by which the province's legislature may amend a 
money bill. 
The premier of a province must either assent to and sign a bill passed by the 
provincial legislature in terms of the conditions of this chapter of the 
Constitution, or, if the premier has reservations about the consitutionality of a 
bill, refer it back to the legislature for reconsideration. 
It is clear that the Constitution provides certain parameters within which the 
provincial legislative authority can execute its activities and functions. The 
manner in which provincial legislatures are expected to function, is clearly 
defined within the Constitution. This ensures answerability and accountability 
in the hierarchy of government. 
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3.8.2 Provincial Executive Authority 
The executive authority of a province is vested in the premier of the province. 
The premier exercises the executive authority, together with other members of 
the executive council by (Section 125). 
• Implementing provincial legislation in the province. 
• Implementing all national legislation within the functional areas listed in 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution, except where the Constitution or 
an act of Parliament provides otherwise. 
• Administering in the province national legislation outside the functional 
areas of Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. 
• Developing and implementing provincial policy. 
• Co-ordinating the functions of the provincial administration and its 
departments. 
• Preparing and initiating provincial legislation. 
• Performing any other function assigned to the provincial executive in 
terms of the Constitution or an act of Parliament. 
Furthermore, a province has executive authority only to the extent that the 
province has the administrative capacity to assume effective responsibility. 
The national government, by legislative and other measures, must assist 
provinces to develop the administrative capacity required for the efficient and 
effective exercising of their powers and performance of their functions. The 
provincial executive must, however, act in accordance with the Constitution 
and the provincial constitution, if one has been passed by the province. In 
terms of Section 127 the premier of a province has the following powers and 
functions to perform: 
• Assenting to and assigning bills. 
• Referring a bill back to the provincial legislature for reconsideration of 
the bill's constitutionality. 
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• Referring a bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on the bill's 
constitutionality. 
• Summoning the legislature to an extraordinary sitting to conduct special 
business. 
• Appointing commissions of inquiry. 
• Calling a referendum in the province in accordance with national 
legislation. 
The executive council of a province consists of the premier, as head of the 
council, and no fewer than five and no more than ten members, appointed by 
the premier from among the members of the provincial legislature. The 
premier of a province appoints the members of the executive council, assigns 
their powers and functions, and also reserves the right to dismiss them 
(Section 132). 
Section 133 states that members of the executive council of a province are 
responsible for the functions of the executive assigned to them by the 
premier. Members of the executive council of a province are accountable 
collectively and individually to the legislature for the exercise of their powers 
and the performance of their functions. Members of the executive council of a 
province must act in accordance with the Constitution and, if a provincial 
constitution has been passed for the province, also comply with the 
requirements of such a constitution. 
Members of the executive council of a province must also provide the 
legislature with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control 
(Section 133). Section 139 provides a detailed description of the 
circumstances under which provincial supervision of local government can 
occur. When a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in 
terms of legislation, the relevant provincial executive may intervene by taking 
any appropriate steps to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation. 
A decision by the premier of a province must be in writing if it is taken in 
terms of legislation or has legal consequences. A written decision by the 
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premier must be countersigned by another executive council member. If that 
decision concerns a function assigned to that other member. Proclamations, 
regulations, and other instruments of subordinate legislation of a province 
must be accessible to the public (Section 140). 
The roles, responsibilities, and powers of provincial executive authorities and 
powers of provincial executive authorities are dealt with in Sections 125-141 
of the Constitution. 
3.8.3 Nature and Size of the Northern Province Bureaucracy 
The bureaucracy of the Northern Province is composed of a conglomeration 
of four administrative structures, that is, the former Gazankulu, Venda, 
Lebowa and Northern Transvaal Administrations, which were trained and 
nurtured in a particular ideology and socialisation milieu, that is, their training 
was more focussed on the preservation of separate development. 
The above mentioned structures were serving different ethnic groups with 
vastly varying ethical standards, values and norms as far as public 
administration and management are concerned. Although the characteristics 
of the bureaucracy should depict similar characteristics despite their location 
or ethnic origins, these groups are not homogeneous at all. Their working 
doctrine was different. They portrayed faltering feeling for peculiar 
responsibility towards the South African civil society, that is, the former 
Northern Transvaal Administration for instance, like all others, view the same 
society differently. 
The civil service of the Northern Province, like other public service institutions 
in the various provinces, was established by the Public Service Act, Act 1 03 
of 1994. This Act gives effect to the provisions of the Constitution of South 
Africa. The Public Service Act stipulates in detail the service conditions of 
public servants. 
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The conditions include the establishment of departments; conditions for 
heads of department; qualifications for appointments; appointments; and the 
filling of posts; transfers, promotions, secondments and retirements; 
discharge of officers; inefficiency; disciplinary procedures; the obligations, 
rights and privileges of officers and employees; and the Public Service Code. 
The Act replaces both the Public Service Act of 1984 and the Public Service 
Acts of the former independent homelands and the self-governing territories. 
As indicated above, the said Act places obligations on public officials for the 
effective management and administration of departments or other public 
institutions. For example, in terms of section 7 (3)(b) of said Act, heads of 
department are responsible for the efficient management and administration 
of their departments, the maintenance of discipline, the promotion of sound 
labour relations and the proper use and care of state property. 
The nature of a portion of bureaucracy in the Northern Province has over a 
short period of time become concerned with a pattern-maintenance and 
tension-management, integrative, and adaptive as well as goal-attainment 
functions. There are within the departments some individuals who are 
pessimistic as well as optimistic. 
One of the questions raised in this regard during interviewing revealed that 
some senior officials accept the above as an established norm which cannot 
be carried out in practice, the major cause being that officials have developed 
different attitudes towards the new dispensation: Some want to maintain the 
status quo, while others see the need to adapt to the new situation. 
The Public Service Act of 1994 was only a general framework within which 
the administration should base its function but most senior civil servants 
viewed it with scepticism. They could not adapt at the same pace as the 
executive office-bearers. This fact is supported by the observations of the 
Public Service Commission. In its report, it distinctly highlighted that the 
grievances and misconduct of staff emanated from the fact that they 
continued to operate within the repealed prescripts, which were applicable to 
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the public services of the former RSA, the TBVC states and the self-
governing territories (Public Service Commission 1995:21). 
Perhaps it would be appropriate to point out that the term conglomeration of 
administrative structures is used to depict the fact that these structures or 
bureaucracies could not be fused together with ease to produce one 
responsible and accountable bureaucracy. The problem that persists-
although there is an indication that they are beginning to gel, albeit slowly is 
how they perceive one another. 
It emanated from the responses that most of the former Gazankulu public 
service officials view those from former Lebowa public service as 
irresponsible, due to the fact that the latter homeland at a certain stage had 
serious financial problems because of mismanagement and alleged 
corruption. The former Venda public service officials are viewed in the same 
way, and the former Northern Transvaal Provincial Administration, too, has a 
fair share of its own baggage. 
According to Hanekom et a/, (1993:20) a bureaucracy should be 
characterised inter alia by the following: 
• honesty and probity 
• fairness and justice towards every citizen, irrespective of political views 
• diligence and the willingness to make sacrifices 
• endeavour for efficiency. 
With the advent of the new dispensation, particularly after the first democratic 
general elections of 27 April 1994, a major feeling of uncertainty had 
manifested itself among public service officials. This uncertainty emanated 
from the fact that the objectives of the new government were in no way 
similar to those of the previous government. Hanekom et a/ (1993:22) 
stresses the fact that public officials in a changing community are expected to 
adjust continually. As corroborated by the responses, this is not easy to 
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achieve. Things were also made more difficult because there was a 
realignment of political beliefs and correctness at the same time. 
It is worth noting, nonetheless, that even before the dawning of the new 
dispensation, the bureaucracy in those various territories did not meet all the 
requirements of the effective civil service, in the sense that it was not geared 
to needs fulfilment and efficiency. This came out in most of the respondents' 
answers to the question as to why they had taken up employment in the civil 
service of the various homelands. 
The answer given most often was that in terms of the availability of jobs, the 
civil service was the first option. Other reasons were that the homelands 
offered bursaries and people had to pay these back in one form or another -
which meant that future employment was virtually assured. Therefore, one of 
the conspicuous characteristics of the homelands bureaucracy is that it was 
groomed to serve or service its political master, rather than to focus on civil 
society at large. According to Bayat and Meyer (1994:129) the combined 
colonial era and apartheid social engineering created a civil service caste 
which was subjectively Nationalist Party supporting. 
Upon the introduction of the new dispensation, that is, from May 1994, the 
following characteristics were very eminent, because the old order had 
crumbled with the former governments: 
• There was no organised and clearly defined hierarchy of offices; 
• Offices had no clearly defined sphere of competence; 
• There was no strict systematic discipline and control in the conduct of 
the offices and officials; and 
• There was no compliance with rules and regulations. 
To overcome the situation described above Government had to hastily 
proclaim the said Act in order to fill the vacuum that the new order had created 
in the interim period. The major motivating factor was that there was an urgent 
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need to establish one united public service encompassing all the various 
bureaucratic structures from former homelands and the former white areas of 
South Africa. 
It is therefore understandable that the behaviour of the public service in the 
Northern Province was due to the influence of political office-bearers in the 
former homelands, who had a semblance of bureaucratic practices, that is, 
they were administrative bodies rather than policy formulation bodies. The 
public service therefore could not continue with what ought to be their 
professional responsibility. This was reflected in the practice of the public 
service in the following fashion: 
• services were orientated both to political office-bearers and major 
strata in society, and greater emphasis of service delivery was directed 
to political office-bearers; 
• public officials in most cases were merely passive actors controlled by 
the political heads; 
• service goals were displaced towards the 'high class' people who in 
most cases were political office-bearers themselves or friends; and 
• service goals were geared towards the maintenance of the political 
power of various homeland leaders. 
According to Hanekom (1993:123) the exposition set out above, that is, in a 
situation where service delivery was orientated towards the political office-
bearers, the bureaucracy can become a negative force in efforts to promote 
the general welfare of society. These attitudes were inherited by the Northern 
Province Provincial Government. 
The public service administration in the Northern Province was therefore 
faced with a challenge of democracy. The newly appointed political office-
bearers were in a hurry to democratise the bureaucracy, while at the same 
time the bureaucracy was not yet geared to the new manner of doing things. 
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This was characterised by perceptions within the administration as well as of 
political office-bearers in to one another. 
The year 1995 passed with very little progress in terms of the repositioning 
and reasserting of government structures. The slow pace and significance of 
the establishment of accountable structures or government institutions will be 
dealt with under political control. 
It is, however, important to indicate the size of the Northern Province civil 
service as it began to take shape in 1996. The diagram below shows the size 
of the bureaucracy as composed of the ten departments mentioned earlier. 
Both the abolished posts and surplus staff are included in an effort to clarify 
the vastness of the bureaucracy as it existed in the Northern Province before 
the democratic dispensation which began after the 1994 elections. The 
information in the table below was obtained from the Provincial Service 
Commission Report of 1996 which sought to highlight the progress as far as 
integration was concerned. 
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DIAGRAM 5: Size of the Northern Province Provincial Bureaucracy 
Department/Institution Posts Posts Posts Vacant Surplus 
abolished created filled Staff 
Office of the Premier 949 660 625 35 415 
Provincial Service 1230 298 153 145 2 
Commission 
Education, Culture , Arts & 5118 10806 9602 1204 4 
Sports 
Health & Welfare 10637 35019 24963 10056 0 
Public Works 13517 12502 10938 1564 4 
Public Transport 1413 3605 2403 1202 0 
Agriculture & Environment 11349 11239 9716 1523 1798 
Economic Affairs & 255 337 243 94 0 
Tourism 
Local Govt & Traditional 828 1679 1190 489 3314 
Affairs 
Housing & Water Affairs 0 28 9 19 0 
Safety & Security 0 28 9 19 0 
Finance & Expenditure 749 516 362 154 3 
TOTAL 45775 76893 60276 16617 5340 
3.8.4 Factors that Lead to an Increase in Political Influence Exerted by 
Top Level Civil Servants (Northern Province) 
The political structure of the Province is determined by the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. There is a provincial legislature at 
the helm, followed by the executive, which in this instance is the Executive 
Council. 
Bureaucratic structures interact as a matter of daily activity with political 
structures, particularly the executive. The interaction which will be scrutinised 
here has to do mostly with the functioning of the bureaucracy as observed 
and anticipated within the provincial departments, and the control thereof as 
exercised by political institutions. 
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As mentioned in chapter one, the target group of this study is senior 
management and its political office-bearers. Diagram 5 depicts the 
Distribution of Management Posts and diagram 6 depicts the organisational 
structure to compliment diagram 5. This diagram is meant to indicate the 
scope of responsibility of each political office-bearer concerned, particularly 
on the human resource point of view. 
The office of the Premier according to the provincial set-up is considered as a 
department and the Director-General of the province is located in this office 
which implies that the premier is a super political head of all departments, 
while the MEG's are responsible for each department. 
DIAGRAM 6: Distribution of Management Posts 
Department/Institution DG SG DOG CD D TOTAL 
Premier 1 0 1 3 11 16 
Education, Culture, Arts & Sports 0 1 2 5 22 30 
Health & Welfare 0 1 2 4 14 21 
Finance & Expenditure 0 0 1 2 7 10 
Local Government & Traditional 0 0 1 2 7 10 
Affairs 
Agriculture & Environment 0 0 1 1 4 6 
Economic Affairs & Tourism 0 0 1 2 6 9 
Public Works 0 0 1 2 10 13 
Provincial Service Commission 0 0 0 1 4 5 
Safety & Security 0 0 1 1 3 5 
Housing & Water Affairs 0 0 1 1 3 5 
Public Transport 0 0 1 2 4 7 
TOTAL 1 2 13 27 97 140 
DG =Director General SG = Superintendent General DOG = Deputy Director 
General CD = Chief Director D = Director 
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DIAGRAM 7: Organisational Structure of the Northern Province 
PREMIER 
HEAD OF PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENT 
MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
POLITICAL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS 
DURECTOR-GENERAL 
HEADS OF DEPARTMENT 
I I I I I I 
Department Department Department Department Department Department Department Department Department Department 
Education Health & Finance & Public Agriculture Trade & Housing& Public Works Sports & Safety & 
Welfare Expenditure Transport Industry Local Welfare Security 
Government 
I I I I 
Superinten- Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy Commissioner 
dent General Director Director Director Director Director Director Director Director of Police 
General General General General General General General General 
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3.9 Functions of the Bureaucracy in the Northern Province 
As already indicated bureaucracy refers to the structure of government which 
is subordinate to the executive authority which according to Page (1985:6) is 
dominated by public officials. According to Heywood (1997:344) bureaucracy 
performs a vital function within government, that is, to execute and enforce the 
laws enacted by the legislature and the policies decided by the political office-
bearers. This vital function could be dissected into four broad functions, 
discharge administrative function, to offer policy advice, express and 
aggregate interests and to maintain political stability. 
In this research the above broad functions will be condensed into two major 
functions and be made the area of focus within the Northern Province 
provincial government, so as to enable the researcher to focus precisely on 
the controlling aspect. Thus, the function of the bureaucracy in the Northern 
Province is viewed, in this instance, as public management and the promotion 
of political interaction. Political interaction in this instance manifests itself from 
the aggregation of interests and the maintenance of stability which is the 
responsibility of any bureaucratic service. 
3.9.1 Public Management 
Public management can be defined as distinctive activity which takes place in 
public sector. Public management as an activity takes place within a political 
environment, and societal values are more essential. Public management 
functions are used to delineate the tasks of the bureaucrats (Fox, Schwella & 
Wissink 1991:3). 
The major function of any bureaucracy is public management. So is the 
bureaucracy of the Northern Province. Public management, according to 
Schwella, Burger, Fox and Muller (1996:5) is an intrinsic element of public 
administration systems. Public management deals with those core aspects of 
public administration which are performed by top public officials, such as 
policy making, planning, organising, control and evaluation. Public 
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management, therefore, should be understood as the system of structures 
and processes found within the environment of bureaucratic systems, which 
focus on specific areas of service delivery and the determination of public 
goods. 
Public management entails the professional and practical aspects of 
bureaucracy and, therefore, emphasises efficiency and effectiveness within 
public administration as a function. For example, a public manager would be a 
person who is competent and possesses certain skills in decision-making 
aimed at improving public welfare of the politically aware community, 
controlling applying the stipulations of the law, organising, et cetera. Public 
administrators are entrusted with public management. The functions outlined 
above reflect the responsibilities of the Northern Province bureaucracy. 
Constitutionally, the scope of the provincial government in terms of 
administration is set out under section 114 (2) of Act 108 of 1996, which 
directs that the provincial legislature must provide for mechanisms to ensure 
that the executive organ is accountable, and must maintain and exercise 
control over any organ of State. This responsibility rests on two organs of 
state, that is, the executive authority and civil service while the legislature acts 
as an overseer. 
In order to ensure that people at all levels of society receive at all times the 
public goods and services due to them, the Northern Province Provincial 
Government has established bureaucratic and public management structures 
as the mechanisms to fulfil the responsibilities enunciated in the Constitution 
of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
The organisational structure of the province is outlined diagrammatically on 
page 122. (Diagram 7). This structure depicts both the political and the 
administrative set up from the office of the Premier to the level of the deputy 
directors-general or any position of that level with different nomenclature. On 
page . . (Diagram 5) refers specifically to the scope covered by the 
departments as structured and organised in the Province. 
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DIAGRAM 8: Departments of the Northern Province 
CLUSTER DEPARTMENTS 
Social Services Safety and Security 
Health and Welfare 
Education, Sports and Culture 
Infrastructure Development Public Works 
Housing and Water Affairs· 
Local Government and 
Traditional Affairs 
Economic Development Trade, Industry and Tourism 
Finance and Expenditure 
Agriculture, Land and Environment 
Public Transport 
The size and scope as depicted in diagram 8 reveals the administration which 
is divided into three clusters or significant groups of area of concentration in 
terms of service delivery. These clusters are: 
• Social Services 
• Infrastructure Development and 
• Economic Development 
The clusters fall within different provincial departments in order to promote 
proper allocation of functions and to exercise effective control and 
administration. The Northern Province Provincial Government Administration 
consists of ten Departments. At the head of each department is a Member of 
the Executive Council commonly known as MEC, who may be viewed as a 
provincial minister. 
The member of the Executive Council is a political office-bearer of that 
particular department, that is, the political control in relation to administrative 
accountability rests with that person. Members of the Executive Council as 
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well as senior public officials have the responsibility of promoting healthy 
political interaction and good governance. 
3.9.2 Promotion of Interaction and Good Governance in a Political 
Milieu 
Political interaction occurs in most cases at higher level, that is, between top 
public officials and ministers. At the provincial level this occurs between top 
public servants and members of the Executive Council. The roles and 
responsibilities of these state officials are distinct but their convergence in 
purpose is important for the government to discharge its responsibilities. 
It is of cardinal importance to make distinction between executive and 
administrative authorities. The distinction can be made from the tenure, 
selection and functional point of view. For emphasis, the distinction in this 
instance will be made in terms of functions, because functions distinctly bring 
out the controlling aspect of bureaucracy. 
3.9.2.1 Executive Authority 
As already mentioned, the executive authority at the provincial level refers to 
the Executive Council as contemplated in the Constitution of South Africa, Act 
1 08 of 1996. The executive member, as a political office-bearer, refers to the 
Member of the Executive Council (commonly known as the MEC), who is 
responsible for the administration and functions of the department. 
The Member of the Executive Council, by the virtue of being an administrative 
head of department, holds both executive and administrative authority. The 
Member of the Executive Council controls and commands the major functions 
of the department as his or her major functional responsibility. Because of this 
situation, he or she belongs to both the executive and administrative 
institutions. 
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Accordingly, Ranney (1987:263) defines executives as political heads of 
department who are elected or appointed for a limited term, and whose official 
responsibilities are to initiate policies and control the work of the 
administrators. Administrators, on the other hand, are persons appointed to 
departments whose tenure and promotion depend on professional merit rather 
than political affiliation, and their major responsibilities are to enforce laws and 
carry out public policies. Therefore, political interaction both within and outside 
the department is promoted by both the executive body and senior public 
service officials. 
Promotion of political interaction as a function takes place at various levels 
within government and society at large. The interaction with society affords 
the government an opportunity to make policy choices from an informed 
position. Thus, one major function of the political office-bearer is to act as 
policy initiator within government. Therefore, political office-bearers must, as a 
matter of principle, have constant engagement with both the bureaucracy and 
the electorate, so as to maintain their control over the bureaucracy. 
3.9.2.2 Administrative Authority 
Administrative authority refers to government departments. The executive 
body interacts regularly with administrative bodies. This is because politics 
and administration cannot easily be separated into watertight compartments. 
The two functions are interrelated hence the need for continuous interaction 
between political office-bearers and appointed public officials, if government is 
to function properly and effectively. 
Hanekom et a/ (1994:124) indicate that the complexity of public affairs 
demands that decisions affecting the life of a community cannot be taken by 
politicians alone - their reliance on the expertise of appointed officials can 
therefore not be underestimated. This is also significant as far as the political 
office-bearers of the Northern Province are concerned. The response from 
some of the members of the executive council (in relation to the complexity 
observed by Hanekom) is that said complex nature was further complicated 
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by the fact that as office-bearers they were new in a completely new situation. 
The situation was so demanding that one member remarked that the 
consultation between top-level members of the public service themselves was 
fraught with suspicion. 
Although due regard of bureaucratic independence should be taken into 
account, political office-bearers have tremendous influence on public officials 
or the bureaucracy at large. This can be considered as one of the 
responsibilities and functions of politicians, because if they do not do that, 
their mandates as given by the electorate might not be realised in terms of 
implementation. 
Through this political interaction, the people of the province, together with the 
bureaucracy, are given an opportunity to make choices and input from an 
informed point of view in relation to the prerequisite of public goods and 
services. Furthermore, it is through this interaction that political control can be 
exercised in a manner that could influence people positively, particularly in 
relation to the exercising of control, because the flow and sharing of 
information can be effectively promoted. 
According to Chazan, et a/ (1999:23) available options are determined and 
defined by the changing conditions, in which politicians mostly play a 
significant role. The functions of the political office-bearers in the Northern 
Province are in line with this notion. The ushering in of the new dispensation 
was a total shift from apartheid and Bantustan administration, which means 
that the conditions and orientation had changed drastically, and the 
bureaucracy of the province had to adapt to new conditions. 
To a greater extent, it is through interaction with the bureaucracy and the 
public at large that political control over social and economic activities, formal 
institutions, and prevalent values of both government and society can best be 
appreciated. As indicated, these were as a result of changed conditions and 
the new orientation of the public service. 
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The promotion of political interaction through public administrators could give 
political office-bearers an opportunity to easily discover multiple factors at 
play, so that in their exercise of political control as a function, all diverse 
factors are taken into account, and more importantly that public administrators 
would always be in constant contact with the people they serve, whether 
directly or indirectly. 
The consequences of vigorous political interaction which are prevalent in the 
provincial leadership of the Northern Province, particularly after the 1999 
general elections, add impetus to service delivery, since proper, effective and 
efficient bureaucratic structures have been created in line with the identified 
needs of the province as indicated in diagram 8. 
The organisation and the nature of functions of the executive branch of the 
government in the province demand that there must be effective and efficient 
bureaucracy to carry out the responsibilities of government. The propelling 
force in this instance was the cry from the opposition and the dire need from 
the public for effective service delivery. Lane (1990:209) indicates that the 
growth and the nature of the functions of political office-bearers can be either 
reduced or expanded through proper understanding or a recognition of 
people's needs (or a lack thereof). 
The research revealed that there is significant evidence that after the elections 
of 1994 and the subsequent installation of the new Northern Province 
Provincial Government, there was political as well as administrative interaction 
in various forms. Nonetheless, the positive impact of such interaction was 
minimal, precisely because the bureaucracy from the former dispensation was 
vulnerable and very uncertain as far as its future role was concerned. This, 
therefore, could be understood to mean that the new political dispensation 
and the prevailing conditions had impacted negatively on the bureaucracy. 
Nonetheless, the available information, in this instance, is that during the 
change over there was enough interaction and consultation between the 
administration and the political office-bearers. Meetings in various forms took 
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place. All the new departments had established what was called Strategic 
Management Teams. All civil servants at various levels participated in these 
through representation of one form or another. 
However, what came out clearly was the fact that with the change of physical 
environment came a considerable number of uncertainties and problems, 
such as the adjustment to and understanding of new managerial roles and 
processes within the new system. Another aspect was the conversion of the 
character and purposes of the Government; that is, the focus of the 
Government in terms of the administrative functions had moved from the 
maintenance of the apartheid system and structures to the non-partisan civil 
service and the subsequent Batho Pele (people first) orientation. 
Peele (1995:65) states that there is always tension between political office-
bearers and administrators because administrative officials want to maintain 
their independence. As Hanekom et a/ (1994:122) observed, public 
administration is a struggle for power. It is, therefore, understandable that 
bureaucracy as a means of carrying out community actions and the fulfilment 
of expectations, could be used as a powerful instrument for control. It is this 
notion that made the bureaucracy of the Northern Province Government move 
at a snail's pace as far as change is concerned, because the previous 
bureaucracy, composed of four former civil service administrations, was 
imbued in the past political ideology. 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the environment of a bureaucracy. The chapter 
addressed the political and administrative significance of a bureaucracy for 
society. Different conceptions of the meaning of the term "bureaucracy", and 
the typifing characteristics of a public bureaucracy were identified. The need 
for specific characteristics or conditions to which an organisation must 
conform in order to be recognised as a bureaucracy is emphasised by 
outlining the implications of Weber's and Albrow's views as well as the 
characteristics and prerequisites of Weber's ideal bureaucracy. The views of 
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these two authors were also applied to the South African civil service. The 
chapter accordingly dealt with the provincial sphere of government with 
reference to organisational applications in the Northern Province. 
The increasing political influence exercised by civil servants in the upper 
echelons, particularly in Western democracies, is explained by outlining the 
decline of parliamentary power, the phenomenon of the administrative State, 
as well as other factors that lead to an increase in the political influence of top 
government officials. It is clear from the preceding chapter that top-level 
bureaucrats are important role players in the process of determining policy. 
This power derives from their ties with other State departments and interest 
groups, from their permanence, from their involvement with the 
implementation of policy and above all from their close association with 
ministers. 
It is also clear from the preceding chapter that Weber's model, which 
perceives bureaucracies as rational and objective "machinery", clearly 
separates the administrative from the political world. In this context 
bureaucrats are regarded as mere "cogs in a big wheel", as reliable and 
effective administrators who function within a fixed hierarchy and according to 
clearly defined rules. The real state of affairs looks completely different, 
however. In spite of their formally subordinate and impartial status, 
bureaucrats exercise considerable influence over the process of policy 
determination, thus fulfilling a number of key functions in any political system. 
In the view of the researcher the role played by bureaucracies pertains to the 
execution of the administrative function, offers policy advice, helps to express 
interests, in some instances brings interests together, and promotes stability 
and progress in a country. An attempt was made to examine the structure in 
terms of the executive and administrative authority of the Northern Province. 
The functions and principles of organisation of the Northern Province were 
also stated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY AS EXTERNAL VARIABLES 
INFLUENCING CONTROL OVER THE BUREAUCRACY 
4.1 Introduction 
Political office-bearers and civil servants now operate in an environment that is 
markedly different from that of the past. Two of the most important factors 
contributing to this change are the financial constraints under which modern 
government operates and the changing expectations that the public and 
politicians have of the civil service. Value for money has become a primary 
concern. In addition, the machinery of public administration has become much 
more complex, leading to an increased recognition of the importance of (and 
necessity of putting in place) adequate accountability mechanisms. Accountability 
and responsibility are closely related and may be regarded as two dimensions of 
the same relationship. 
Although accountability and financial accounting are frequently equated, financial 
accounting is just one dimension of the control framework within which a civil 
servant operates. Senior civil servants can be held accountable in a variety of 
ways. There are at least two constituencies to which they may be accountable: 
- to the internal administrative system 
- to the Parliamentary system, affected directly through ministers and the Public 
Expenditure Committees and indirectly through the Office of the Auditor-
General. 
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In this chapter the meaning and classification of control are analysed in order to 
establish a framework upon which political control can be based. Consequently, 
the objectives of public institutions in exercising control will be briefly considered. 
Attention is paid to the normative requirements for control over the bureaucracy. 
This is followed by an explanation of accountability. Thereafter, particular 
attention is paid to types of control. This indicates that control and accountability 
are comprehensive and demanding processes, yet nevertheless prerequisites for 
the joint action of political office-bearers and public officials to achieve common 
goals. 
4.2 Meaning of Control 
Control can be defined as the power or authority to direct, order or restrain and 
as a standard of comparison for the results of an experiment (Hornby 1987:187). 
Expressed in the context of public administration, control is a process of 
monitoring activities to determine whether individual units and the institution itself 
are obtaining and utilising resources effectively and efficiently so as to 
accomplish objectives and, where this is not being achieved, implementing 
corrective action (Robbins, in Hanekom & Thornhill 1988:178). In other words, 
control exists to ensure, or try to ensure, that a goal is realised as envisaged 
(Hatttingh 1989:227). 
To many people however, control has unfortunate connotations and, when 
misused, can cause a serious loss of morale and can lessen accomplishments. 
The causes of misconception on control have been outlined by Dimock and 
Dimock (1969: 511). Firstly, people tend to think of control as an external force 
imposed on them against their will. Secondly, the temper of the modern age is 
such that the mere mention of control sets up resistance. Finally, the use of the 
term tends to imply censoriousness, such as when an accountant becomes 
chiefly interested in mistakes. 
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To ensure that the exercise of control achieves the desired objectives, the 
concept should not be exercised in isolation as an end in itself, but rather as one 
generic to the process of public administration which are a prerequisite for the 
joint action required to achieve common goals (Stroh 1989: 38). 
Control methods should be established to ensure that the various control 
mechanisms are not misused. Controls in this case may relate to how judicious 
controls are applied to the following (Stroh 1989:52): 
(i) Control over sources of revenue; 
(ii) control over expenditure; and 
(iii) control over the purposes for which funds were employed. 
It may be added that, for control to assume a further positive connotation, the 
control function should not be viewed mainly as consisting of the process of 
checking individual actions of every public employee. Rather, control must be 
aimed at ensuring compliance of steps through which account is rendered for 
actions or in-actions to determine whether the Legislature's directives are 
adhered to. In this sense, control is considered a function, " ... the very essence of 
which is to be independent of executive authority, of decision ... , a function of 
discovering, of criticism, and the very existence is associated with the 
imperfections of other perfect" (Hanekom & Thornhi111988:179). 
Control may be classified into various kinds. For purposes of this study, the 
following classifications would be examined. 
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4.3 Classification of Control 
Control in the public sector may be classified into two aspects, namely (Cioete 
1991 :188): 
(a) Internal control which is exercised by the executive functionaries 
themselves; and 
(b) External control by which account must be rendered to the legislature 
which in turn reports to the voters (Stroh 1989:39) on measurements of 
results and the progress of government programs, although the interest 
here is often largely centred around overall results and adherence to 
statutory authority (Dimock & Dimock 1969:513). 
4.3.1 Internal Control 
Internal control involves, in the most parts, the work of all political office-bearers 
in charge of executive institutions and the officials attached to public institutions 
(Cioete 1991: 188). In this context, control means: 
(a) The demarcation of work environments, physical environments or other 
environments within which the functionaries have to operate (Cioete 
991: 189). With reference to political control over the Northern Province 
bureaucracy the demarcations referred to would relate to two broad 
aspects namely, the form of the organisation of the provincial 
administration, the specialised sections on staff matters, accounting 
transactions and stores administration; 
(b) pointing the way by the exercise of authority, by example and by 
leadership so that the functionaries will individually and collectively pursue 
their respective goals. 
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The exercise of authority for purposes of internal control requires that there 
should be a supervising accounting officer. The supervisor, for that matter should 
not only establish control mechanisms . for the bureaucracy but should also 
determine what approach must be followed in ensuring that personnel 
responsible for implementing policies comply with control prescriptions. 
The kind of internal controls explained in paragraphs (a) and (b) above constitute 
respectively (Cioete 1991: 189): 
(i) Formal control; and 
(ii) informal control 
4.3.1.1 Formal Control 
Control is exercised in the institutional situation by the use of formal control 
mechanisms which ensure that everything which the functionaries do is, in fact, 
aimed at achieving the set objective (Cioete 1991 :189). The following paragraphs 
outline formal control mechanisms: 
(a) Inspection and Reporting 
Inspection and Reporting both serve as aids to internal control as a means of 
ascertaining what progress is being made with the implementation of work 
programmes (Stroh 1989:61). Regular inspection and reporting would, especially 
be conducted by functionaries in charge for that purpose. These functionaries 
would be formally required to ensure how: 
(i) accounting officials comply with procedures on collection, custody and 
spending of moneys; 
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(ii) stores controls are implemented in relation to purchases, records and 
issues and when stocks should be supplemented; 
(iii) vehicles are used in terms of authorised trips, servicing, logbooks 
operations and purchases and auctions; and 
(iv) progress is being made on ongoing capital projects and evaluation of 
these, if need be. 
Inspections and reporting are useful formal control mechanisms which may lead 
to investigations and inquiries to ensure that objectives were being realised as 
envisaged. 
(b) Internal auditing 
Internal auditing is an effective mechanism in that it helps to ensure at all times 
that money is being effectively accounted for and that financial transactions are 
conducted in a regular manner (Stroh 1989:60). The following advantages of in-
ternal auditing can be identified (Kotze, in Stroh 1989:60): 
(i) It can be of value to the accounting officer when, as part of his accounting 
function, he accounts for the income and expenditure transactions of his 
department. 
(ii) If any irregularities are suspected, the internal auditing section can 
conduct an investigation without delay. 
(iii) In financial matters, the internal auditor serves as a link between the 
accounting officer and other heads of directorates. 
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(iv) Internal audits promote financial responsibility in that measures can be 
taken to prevent or trace irregularities without activities being affected too 
much. 
(v) Daily internal audit investigations have a wholesome effect on the work of 
officials in that they are cautious about avoiding irregular action of any 
kind. 
In its use as a formal control mechanism, internal auditing not withstanding its 
advantages, have loop holes. Cloete (1991:191) identifies the following 
weaknesses in auditing generally: Firstly, auditing is usually done after transac-
tions have taken place, that is, a posteriori. Secondly, auditing is usually 
concerned only with the legal correctness of transactions. Cloete (1991 :191) 
however stresses that people are nevertheless, beginning to realise that an audit 
should indicate whether the authorities are getting good value for the money they 
spend, in other words, performance auditing must be undertaken. 
(c) Cost accounting, cost comparisons and cost analysis 
Cost accounting, comparison and analysis as formal control analysis have a 
positive correlation with efficiency in that they lead to the measurements of 
accomplishments for the benefit of all who seek to produce goods and services 
(Dimock & Dimock 1969:510). Further, these mechanisms are valuable aids for 
the rationalisation and compilation of the budget and therefore, control is 
exercised before the programme of work is approved and implemented (Cioete 
1991:191). 
With reference to the Northern Province Government where various goods and 
services are often procured and in varying quantities, cost accounting, cost 
comparison and cost analysis are particularly relevant in achieving efficiency 
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sense of using available resources sparingly or ensuring that stores and 
equipment are purchased economically. 
(d) Statistical returns 
When coupled with cost accounting, Statistical returns can serve as a useful 
internal control mechanism in the sense that they can measure productivity 
(Cioete 1991 :192). This is because figures that reflect costs can, together with 
other statistical returns, provide objective criteria for purposes of assessing 
results and for compiling work programmes which involve the allocation of 
personnel and resources. 
4.3.1.2 Informal Control 
Informal control is a direct product of human differences that are based 
essentially on value preferences and differences between individuals and groups, 
which are manifested in informal, voluntary association patterns within an 
authority or institution. Informal control therefore should aim at achieving the best 
results by inspiring or motivating each public functionary to heed some normative 
guidelines of administration, especially, of responsibility in every action of his. 
This way, each can be his own supervisor (Cioete 1991:193). 
With reference to control over the bureaucracy, informal control would be 
exercised through the influence which financial supervisors at all hierarchies 
would exercise over their subordinates, their continued, supervision, the example 
they set, and the leadership they give them (Cioete 1991: 189). 
4.3.1.3 External Control 
External control is concerned with the implementation of prescriptions by a 
control authority and its purpose is to call departments to account concerning the 
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application of these prescriptions (Stroh 1989:40). As indicated external control 
has the purpose of getting functionaries to account for their stewardship in public 
office to the legislature and for that matter, the voters. Accountability therefore 
forms the bedrock of external control. 
Public accountability is an important norm in public administration because the 
public, as well as the elected representatives need the assurance that public 
services are under control and are being carried out within the framework of the 
services laid down by the legislature (Hanekom and Thornhill 1988:184). By 
accountability is meant a personal obligation, liability or answerability of an official 
or employee to give his superior a desired report of the quantity and quality of 
actions and decisions in the performance of responsibilities specifically delegated 
(Banki, in Botha 1987:176). 
In the process of exercising control and accountability in the Northern Province 
through its Committee on Public Accounts, it is ensured among other things, to 
determine whether the heads of the departments as accounting officers and their 
accredited representatives did spend public funds as authorised and for the 
purposes for which the money were allocated. Determining these is important as 
the accounting officer is charged with the responsibility of accounting for all state 
moneys received and payments made by his department. 
In order to ensure efficient control of money for the Northern Province 
Government and to give a judicious account to the legislature and for that matter 
the voters, the accounting officers of the departments, like all accounting officers, 
has to ensure that the following control mechanisms do exist and are judiciously 
implemented by his subordinates (Hanekom and Thornhill 1988: 190). 
(a) Ensuring that sufficient legislative authority exists for the expenditure of 
money entrusted to his care; 
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(b) report fully to the Treasury and the Auditor-General of the Republic of 
South Africa, and for that matter of the Northern Province on any loss or 
misappropriation of public moneys and property; 
(c) replying honestly and diligently to all questions raised on the financial 
affairs of the department by the Auditor-General; and 
(d) furnishing estimates when required to do so, framing them as accurately 
as possible. 
The main institutions which serve as external control mechanisms would now be 
discussed. 
4.3.1.3.1 Legislative Control over the Bureaucracy 
Political control over bureaucracy at this level could be viewed as indirect control. 
Parliament makes laws and expects the executive authority to implement and 
monitor. Legislative control over the bureaucracy includes both the cabinet and 
the public service. Legislative assemblies have broad responsibilities and tasks 
besides formulating and enacting legislation. Jennings (1961 :472) states that the 
function of Parliament is not to govern but to criticise and sensitise government, 
and keep it in check. Criticism by the Parliament is aimed at building a strong and 
formidable government. It promotes a co-operative relationship and a sharing of 
responsibility between various structures of government, such as the executive, 
administrative and judiciary. 
Parliament can use various mechanisms and systems to control both political 
office-bearers and the administrative arm of government. According to Meehan, 
Roche and Stedman (1966:193) the major task of any Parliament is to control 
and supervise the administrative apparatus. This, in broader perspective, implies 
that the legislature has to assist the structures of government to maintain a 
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certain degree of accountability and responsibility. However, this does not mean 
that Parliament should involve itself in the day to day management of the 
government administration. The legislature should deal with the overall policy as 
well as the long-term accomplishments. 
Meehan et a/ (1966:193) further indicates that the legislature shares informal 
control over the administration with the cabinet. However, the executive has to 
deal with the formal control functions of the state apparatus. Parliamentary 
control is in most instances sporadic and uneven; various mechanisms are 
improvised in order to keep the government and its civil service within the 
prescribed limits. Mechanisms such as select committees, public hearings, 
committees of investigation, and independent government institutions such as 
auditors-general, and the public protector lend credence to the formal control 
over the bureaucracy. 
4.3.1.3.2 Control by Cabinet 
The accountability of ministers to the legislature and to the nation, is the 
theoretical basis of modern constitutions (Durell 1917:352). Accordingly, the 
cabinet is collectively responsible for the acts of its members, but the minister is 
individually responsible for the business of his office (Durell 1917:352). As a 
result of this individual and yet collective responsibility to the legislature, the 
Premier, through policies initiated by the Cabinet, controls financing by 
performing general cabinet control functions (Bradley 1985:262) namely: 
(a) Determination of policy; 
(b) Co-ordination of actions of the departments either at Cabinet meetings or 
through Cabinet Committees; and 
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(c) Ensuring financial control through the application of normative 
requirements of public administration. 
4.3.1.3.3 Control by the Minister of Finance 
The Minister of Finance exercises external control measures on financing in 
various ways for a detail analysis of his control functions. In brief, the Minister of 
Finance controls the budget proposals by ensuring that they conform to the 
requirements of the Northern Province's overall financial policy. 
Further external control functions of the Minister of Finance are exercised by the 
Department of Finance and its divisions and sections namely, the Inland 
Revenue, Inspectorate, Financial Control and more intensively, the Treasury. The 
control functions of the Treasury may be briefly outlined as following (Marais 
1989:50-51 ): 
(a) preparation and form of the budget must be submitted; 
(b) guidance to accounting officers on systems of bookkeeping and 
accounting to be followed; 
(c) restriction of expenditure on a given service or suspension of a service; 
and 
(d) authority functions relating to virtually all expenditures of the Northern 
Province Provincial Government. 
In a democratic political system, the legislature establishes committees 
consisting of members of Parliament from various political parties. According to 
Ranney (1996:240) such committees could be standing committees or select 
committees of Parliament. Standing committees are permanent committees 
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established according to the subject matter, for example, education, finance, or 
transport committees. 
Select committees are those committees which the legislature may establish to 
deal with specific or special aspects and make recommendations on particular 
aspects. Legislative committees, according to Truman (1964:369), are useful and 
efficient instruments of sifting projects of law before they are acted upon by the 
whole legislature. Ranney (1996:405) views legislative committees as control 
bodies which counter-balance the bureaucracy and in some instances give the 
legislative assembly the opportunity to match the expertise of the bureaucracy. 
Committees can assist Parliament in overcoming many problems. Peele 
(1995:170) states that the application of a committee system helps avoid 
circumstances where the executive may want to dominate the substance and the 
proceedings of Parliament, and gives political office-bearers the opportunity to 
deal directly with public officials. Therefore, the committee system may 
strengthen the Parliament and assist in enforcing control measures that may 
have been impossible if the committee had not been there. In fact, the committee 
is itself an effective control instrument. Committees have an ability to scrutinise 
government administration and oversee the application of executive power and 
authority. Political office-bearers are compelled to control their respective 
departments effectively. 
Ranney (1996:241) points out that committees have powers and the authority to 
investigate possible wrongdoings in the executive, administrative, or judicial 
structure or any other organ of state, and to report their findings to Parliament for 
its decision. The powers of such Parliamentary committees may vary; some are 
empowered by Parliament to make major decisions. 
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4.3.1.4 Audit Controls and the Establishment of the Office of the Auditor-
General 
Auditing, in general terms, may be defined as a process concerned with the 
collection and, thorough analysis of the underlying information or evidence 
designed to render an independent, informed and professional opinion about the 
representation and assertions made in management reports and supporting 
documents (McKinney 1986:277). Auditing is accordingly a control mechanism, 
as both internal and external, and as a means for independent verification and 
assurance of the completeness and creditability of financial and related records 
attesting to " ... the correctness of a calculation, the existence of an object, the 
accuracy of a statement, the reliability of a report, or the occurrence of an event" 
(Moak and Hillhouse, in McKinney 1986:277). 
In relation to overall financing in the Northern Province, auditing as an external 
control mechanism should be examined in terms of the degree of independence 
of the State Auditor and the impact auditor's control functions has on financial 
controls. The appointment and dismissal, service conditions, powers and 
functions and kinds of auditing that are made into bureaucracy, should be the 
major areas for probing into how these improve the financial systems of the 
provincial government. It is the report of the Auditor-General which forms the 
fundamental basis of inquiries by the Legislative Assembly's Committee on 
Public Accounts and which should be examined to assess audit-impact as an 
external control mechanism. 
Evaluation of performance in resource utilisation in the public service is based on 
fault finding, which may emanate from a failure either to acquire Parliamentary 
authorisation or to adhere to budgetary control systems (Keeling 1972: 115). The 
establishment of the office of Auditor-General by the legislature aims at dealing 
with such matters, whether deliberate, through negligence or by mistake. 
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Parliamentary control over government and the bureaucracy is furthered through 
the application of auditing mechanisms and an examination of the manner in 
which public funds have been disbursed (Meehan et al 1966:194). Control over 
appropriation is a significant weapon, and the need to justify expenditure and 
policies before the legislative assembly is an important limitation to and control 
over the administrative action. Fiscal control can be abused if there are not 
enough mechanisms to deal with a particular matter, for example, where 
government can succumb to the pressure of unions and other pressure groups. If 
provision were not made for such instances and approved by Parliament, the 
executive authority could not embark on any course of action without the 
approval of the legislature. It is the duty of the Auditor-General to provide 
Parliament with the audit account of the financial expenditure of the previous year 
so as to enable the legislative assembly to take decisions based on concrete 
information. 
The activities of select or standing committees are only one aspect of 
Parliament's traditional role of control over the cabinet. Controlling the cabinet 
means indirect control over the civil service. Government and the bureaucracy 
can be controlled by the influence of public hearings conducted by various select 
committees or commissions. Currently, both on central government level and 
provincial level, public hearings are conducted in such a way that the majority of 
the civil society structures are given access to the legislative process. Business, 
labour, religious organisations and other institutions of civil society are given an 
opportunity to make their voices heard. Truman (1964:372) views public hearings 
as a means of control and also as a means of transmitting and sharing 
information, both technical and political. 
According to Smith (1983:159) the work of the legislative assembly is organised 
around the contact between the Parliament and the civil society; public hearings 
committees afford, directly or indirectly, a form of legislative control over the 
administration. Besides public hearings conducted by various committees of 
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Parliament, the legislative assembly also has its question time, which is another 
legislative method of calling ministers to account on the activities of the 
bureaucracy (Meehan et a/1966:197). 
Truman (1964:375) equates public hearings with a safety valve that reduces 
conflict between the legislative assembly and the electorate and also assists in 
the facilitation of many legislative products, since everyone would have been 
afforded an opportunity to state his or her case. 
Most committee work includes a certain degree of investigation or inquiry. 
LaPalombara (1974:3 02) states that specialised legislative committee systems 
are one way in which Parliament could keep control over the bureaucracy. 
Committees of investigation may serve various purposes, such as to make 
available the information needed by Parliament to perform its task, and perhaps 
to create public awarenes.s for a particular interpretation of the matter to be 
investigated (Meehan eta/. 1966:195). Truman (1964:381) further indicates that 
committees of investigation may be used to inquire into the administrative 
institutions of government. This will have an impact on the control of the 
bureaucracy. 
It may happen that unethical conduct is covered up by public officials employing 
various methods and tactics of cover up. By establishing an office of an 
ombudsman or Public Protector members of public are able to seek proper 
redress where they feel aggrieved by the bureaucrats. The Public Protector acts 
as the private citizen's watchdog over and against executive institutions (Ranney 
1975:439). According to Botes, Brynard, Fourie and Roux (1992:365) public 
officials tend to use administrative red tape to hide inefficiency or to practice 
maladministration. The establishment of the Public Protector can be the proper 
body dealing with such tendencies. 
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Sometimes appointed officials may abuse their expertise to defeat the aims of 
elected representatives. According to Heywood (1997:343), bureaucracy 
contains a powerful inner dynamic which leads to the growth of government. This 
process is in the hands of public officials, who acquire enormous power, which 
necessarily needs to be kept in check. 
According to the Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, the Public 
Protector has the power to investigate any conduct in state affairs or in the public 
administration in any sphere of government. The Public Protector, like the 
Auditor-General, is required to report to the legislative assembly at least once a 
year. The Public Protector is an efficient control mechanism in as far as 
eradication of competition is concerned or abuse of power by public officials. 
4.3.1.5 Control by Voters 
One of the most formidable and influential external control mechanisms on the 
functioning of a public service is the control exerted by voters. Generally 
speaking, people show great interest in what affects them directly (Hanekom 
1987: 34). 
The voters will exercise control over the activities of a provincial government 
among other things, to determine how its policies promote the interests of the 
inhabitants (Stroh 1989:42). Voter control mechanisms may take the form of 
representation to political office-bearers and public officials on any matter which 
affects them directly, submission of petitions to the legislature, through voting in 
elections and in referenda and to band together and arrange public meetings and 
marches (Cioete 1991 :98-99). In democratic countries, the private individual has 
more opportunity to shape public policy, since as a voter, he can, in the 
aggregate, critically influence the activities and careers of politicians (Dror 
1968:91). 
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4.4 Normative Requirements for Control over the Bureaucracy 
In order to advance financing to the public goods, financial administrators of the 
budget should at all times function to advance what should be in the public 
interest. This means that the actions of the administrators should always be 
"good", "right" and "positive" (Hanekom 1987:151). In other words, those who 
practise public administration have to respect specific guidelines that govern their 
conduct when carrying out their work (Cioete 1991 :56). One of these guidelines 
is public accountability which has been dealt within a following section (4.5). The 
remaining guidelines will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
4.4.1 Deference to the Supremacy of the Constitution 
It has been noted that every political office-bearer and every public official 
should, when carrying out his duties, bear in mind that legislature has been 
granted authority (by constitutions) over his sphere of work. The Constitution 
accordingly exercises its supremacy and authority over administrative activities 
by utilising various means such as determining the activities to be undertaken, 
determining the bodies responsible for the executive functions, determining the 
personnel to be appointed, determining the rules and procedures and 
determining the amounts of money to be spent. 
4.4.2 Promotion of Efficiency 
As already defined before, efficiency in public service means the achievement of 
objectives by the use of minimum resources (Stroh 1989:46). Efficiency in 
government service accordingly denotes the ways in which functions and activi-
ties are carried out; the manner of putting it into effect in relation to factors such 
as cost effectiveness and the optimal use of manpower and skills (Rowland 
1987:212). Kotze (in Stroh 1989:47) identifies achievement of cost effectiveness 
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and optimal use of resources in terms of specific quantity of goods and services 
of a specific quality at the lowest possible cost. In other words efficiency refers to 
the economical use of money and other means of production to achieve the 
desired results (Stroh 1989:47). 
A popular misconception about public institutions is that their financial resources 
are unlimited and so also is their capacity to undertake new projects (Cioete 
1991 :72). If this were the case, a public institution could presumably employ an 
unlimited number of officials to do the work while there would also be an 
unending supply of materials to be wasted at will (Cioete 1991 :72). Efficiency in 
provincial governments should therefore have to be judged on the basis of 
necessity of expenditure; that priorities are set which determine what work has to 
be done and in what order, and by using the available resources in a way that 
optimal results can be obtained and each need satisfied according to its urgency. 
4.4.3 Requirements of Administrative Law 
Most governmental bodies maintain direct relations with virtually all members of a 
community and the manner in which governmental bodies and persons in 
authority should act towards the community, in order to pass the test of accounta-
bility for their activities, are regulated by specific fixed rules which are ethical 
requirements based on principles of administrative law specifically, these 
requirements include the following (Hattingh 1988:62): 
(a) Action must be authorised. This means that all actions are subject to the 
necessary official approval. 
(b) All actions must be within the law and performed strictly in accordance 
with the relevant legal requirements. 
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(c) All procedures required by law must be complied with in respect of any 
specific action. 
(d) The miscarriage of justice or judicial errors of interpretation should be 
avoided at all costs. 
(e) Should any official have the authority to use his discretion, such discretion 
may not be exercised for improper purposes or due to irrelevant 
considerations in any manner which is unfair or unjust. 
(f) Actions may be performed or decisions taken only after due consideration 
of sufficient relevant facts or satisfactory evidence. 
(g) Generally speaking, the actions of officials shall at all times comply with 
the requirements of reasonableness, integrity and unimpeachability. 
4.4.4 Respect for Community Values 
The word "values" refers to man's ideas on what is desirable or undesirable 
(Hanekom, 1988:10), and they provide standards and, norms for daily living 
which enable people who uphold these values to know that whatever they do and 
say will be acceptable in the eyes of their fellow man (Hattingh, 1988: 44). Values 
are therefore a manifestation of the importance the individual ascribes to specific 
activities, experiences, phenomena or events and which provide him with 
guidelines for his behaviour, and which can therefore be changed (Hanekom 
1988:1 0). These values/guidelines, for example, may determine how the voter 
exercises his option on election day, by voting for the candidate of his choice 
(Hattingh 1988:44), or, as pointed out by Hanekom, (1988:44), values may form 
part of the accumulated and conventional wisdom of a people or group, which 
may be expressed in an established habitual attitude towards the allocation of 
resources. 
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Governing may become a complex issue when policy makers have to confront an 
ethical norm such as respect for community values. This is because community 
values are of particular importance in politics which represents the interaction 
whereby values are authoritatively assigned to the community (Easton, in 
Hattingh 1988:44). A choice of values naturally comes into play when an official 
has to distinguish between desirable and undesirable in terms of community 
values. In exercising this choice, public officials who identify a problem in an 
existing situation must seriously consider whether an envisaged change, while 
satisfying one value, may prove detrimental to other values upheld by the 
community (Hattingh 1938:65). Respect for, community values as a norm has a 
strong influence in factors that are used to prioritise capital projects in particular, 
in the process of budget preparation for education financing in the Northern 
Province. 
4.5 Accountability 
As a preliminary, the concept of 'accountability' itself requires a brief analysis. 
'Accountability' is most simply elucidated by reference to the broader concept of 
'responsibility'. In literature, these two terms are commonly linked together, 
sometimes as virtually interchangeable synonyms (see Emy and Hughes 1991: 
350; Corbett 1992: 19) and sometimes, more accurately (see Thynne and 
Goldring 1987: Ch 11; Uhr 1993a: 3-5), as closely related but distinct terms. 
Responsibility has a number of connotations, including freedom to act, liability for 
praise or blame, and proper behaviour on the part of the person responsible. It 
may also, but need not, imply a relationship between two persons (or groups) 
where one has entrusted the other with the performance of certain duties or 
'responsibilities'. In such cases, the person (or group) responsible for 
performance may be said to be responsible to the person (or group) for whom the 
duty is performed. Such relationships, where one person is responsible to 
another, are found in all organisational hierarchies, not only in government 
departments, but also in private businesses and corporations, schools, hospitals, 
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armies, churches and so on. This aspect of relational responsibility, the 
responsibility of one person to another, is also referred to as accountability. In the 
words of Thynne and Goldring (1987:8): 
"officials are responsible within the system to some institution or to some person 
or persons for the discharge of the responsibilities which they have been 
allocated. This means that they act in the context of a relationship with an 
institution or person which or who is in a position to enforce their responsibility by 
calling them to account for what they (and/or their subordinates) have or have not 
done. Thus, this ... sense of responsibility requires that officials be accountable 
for the performance of their official tasks and therefore be subject to an 
institution's or person's oversight, direction or request that they provide 
information on their action or justify it before a review authority." 
Thus, accountability and relational responsibility are rebated as part to whole. 
Accountability refers to one aspect, the calling to account and acceptance of 
oversight, of one type of responsibility, where there is relational responsibility to 
someone else. 
Some analyses prefer to see accountability as distinct from, and contrasted with, 
responsibility. For instance, Uhr (1993a: 3-5), while identifying accountability with 
its root meaning of being called to account, confines responsibility to the free 
exercise of discretion. In this sense, the responsibility of public officials, their 
freedom to act, tends to he curbed by the requirements of accountability, their 
obligation to report and be audited. However, this narrowing of the concept of 
responsibility, especially in hierarchical contexts, to exclude the requirements of 
accountability seems somewhat paradoxical. Ordinary usage appears to accord 
more with the broader meaning given in the above quotation by Thynne and 
Goldring. At any rate, the difference, it should be noted, is over the scope of 
responsibility rather than the meaning of accountability itself. 
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Like relational responsibility, accountability involves a relationship of authority 
and therefore, normally, a relationship of inequality between two parties. Those 
who are accountable are in some sense subordinate to those who oversee their 
activities and to whom they must give account. Accountability is thus a common 
feature of asymmetric authority relationships, such as that of supervised and 
supervisor, agent and principal, representative and those represented. People of 
equal status, such as professional colleagues or partners, may be accountable to 
one another but only as part of a mutual authority relationship in which each 
accepts the authority of the other over certain matters. 
4.5.1 Public Accountability 
Since the inception of constitutional democracies in the free world, the debate 
has continued on the degree of freedom the public service should enjoy from 
public control, public participation and public scrutiny (Vocino & Rabini 1981 398). 
After World War II, the question of accountability became even more pronounced 
because governments became engaged in so many activities. (Vocino et a/1981: 
398). 
Hanekom and Thornhill (1983:184) identify public accountability as one of the 
prominent characteristics of 20th century public administration and points out that 
the public and elected representatives need assurance " ... that public services are 
under control and carried out within the framework of the policies laid down by 
Parliament." In the past, accountability mainly had a monetary connotation and 
" ... was in fact mainly concerned with finance" (Hanekom, et a/1983:185). 
The involvement of government in a great number of activities that increased 
public services resulted in the term accountability referring to more than only 
monetary dealings and thus used: " ... in a much wider sense and consists 
mainly in a statutory obligation to provide Parliament with any available 
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information to enable it to determine how executive actions have progressed." 
(Hanekom, et a/1983 : 185). 
Cloete (1981: 21-22) lists and explains measures which can be applied to uphold 
public accountability. These measures are the legislature, judicial institutions, 
organisational arrangements and work procedures. Because the Constitution 
enjoys supreme power, it will set the objectives to be pursued by the executive 
institution. Legislators in a democracy are elected representatives and if the 
objectives set by them are contrary to the values of the electorate, the 
representatives, can be replaced at the ballot box. Judicial institutions can be 
used to enforce public accountability because courts hear cases in public and 
judgements usually receive wide publicity. Organisational arrangements and 
proper work division promotes accountability because officials will always have a 
superior to give account to. Sound procedures are needed because the public 
service is usually large and necessitates orderly and correct action. Most 
executive institutions therefore compile own manuals and procedural instructions 
based on legislation which sets particular objectives. Although these measures 
put forward by Cloete are useful in ensuring public accountability, should there 
not be a means to test public accountability? 
In conclusion, positive answers to the following questions could be a means of 
testing public accountability in western democracies: 
• "How, regularly and efficiently are the views of the public sought by 
decision makers? 
• How easy is it for the ordinary citizen to participate in the decision-making 
process at national or local level if he or she wishes to do so? 
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• How regularly are elections held so that those in power make themselves 
accountable to the electorate and the electorate can replace them if 
dissatisfied with their performance? (Sallis 1982: 18) 
The need to improve the public accountability of governments is a major theme of 
recent public sector analysis. Advocates of the newly dominant paradigm, 
'corporate management' or 'managing for results', have consistently claimed 
enhanced accountability as one of their major objectives, along with greater 
efficiency and effectiveness (see Keating & Holmes 1990: 169). At the same 
time, the issue of effective political accountability has been at the centre of the 
constitutional debate arising out of revelations of political corruption. The focus 
on accountability has given rise to renewed academic interest in the possible 
means by which politicians and public officials may be held publicly accountable. 
In such discussions, the starting point has usually been the monolithic, 
hierarchical 'Westminster' model of accountability, in which formal public 
accountability is concentrated in ministers responsible to Parliament and in which 
public servants are accountable only to their immediate superiors in the chain of 
accountability without any 'short-cuts' to Parliament or to the public at large 
(Parker 1980). In contrast, most writers now emphasise the variety of channels of 
public accountability, particularly for public servants (see Uhr 1989a, 1989b, 
1993a; Waterford 1991; Corbett 1992: Ch 9; Wanna et a/ 1992: Ch 17: Finn 
1993; Jackson 1995). Departmental officials are said to be accountable not only 
to their immediate superiors and ultimately to the minister but also to a range of 
external institutions, such as Parliament and its committees, reviewing officers 
such as the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman and the courts (see also Reid 
1984: 9-11 ). Public servants are also accountable directly to members of the 
public themselves and, indeed, on occasion to their own professional 
consciences. 
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The new pluralism has not been universally accepted, particularly by those with 
an interest in maintaining their former authority and discretion. The leadership of 
the Commonwealth public service, for instance, faced with the implication that 
public servants might be free to bypass their bureaucratic and political superiors 
in the name of being accountable to the public has vigorously reasserted the 
traditional hierarchical model in which clear priority is given to the duty of public 
servants to their immediate superiors (see Reid 1984). 
Nonetheless, the new, diversified approach provides a more fruitful basis for 
understanding public accountability. In a modern pluralist society, both the 
'government' and the 'people' are themselves complex concepts. The 
government includes a wide variety of different institutions, cabinet, individual 
ministers, government departments and statutory bodies, all of which interact 
with the public and with each other in many different ways. Similarly, the 'public' 
itself includes a range of different groups and individuals with differing values and 
interests and different organisational means, of interrelating with government. In 
such a political system, the accountability of government to the people sensibly 
requires a range of alternative channels rather than the unrealistic single channel 
implied by the theory of a single chain of ministerial responsibility. 
A general acceptance of pluralism, however, leaves further questions still to be 
answered. In the first place, there is no consensus over whether all processes 
which make public servants responsive to public needs, are properly to be seen 
as avenues of public accountability. For instance, is the relationship between 
government business enterprises and their consumers in a competitive market a 
relationship of accountability? Or is the treatment of members of the public as 
consumers rather than citizens an alternative to accountability? 
Second, what are the various processes involved in accountability? While due 
recognition is now given to the variety of agencies of accountability, such as 
ministers, Parliament, parliamentary officers, the courts, freedom of information 
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legislation and so on there is still a tendency to look on accountability itself as a 
single process which each agency should be expected to perform in its entirety 
(though see Uhr 1993a: 10-11). The contribution which each agency makes to 
the overall accountability of the public service can be more realistically assessed 
if accountability is seen to involve a number of different functions or processes. In 
particular, the respective roles of ministers and Parliament in ensuring 
accountability can be better understood. While each may be defective if looked 
on as an agent of the total accountability process, each has complementary 
strengths in different aspects of accountability which, to a certain extent at least, 
offset the other's weaknesses. 
4.5.2 Administrative Accountability 
Administrative accountability '... refers to devising control mechanisms to keep 
the bureaucracy under surveillance and in check" (Khan 1983: 683), and is 
clearly linked with control mechanisms. Other than in the case of a private 
undertaking where control is solely an internal matter, control in the public sector 
is an external one (Cioete 1977:308). This implies that although internal control 
mechanisms must be provided for, accountability in the form of external control 
measures are essential to the public sector. Cloete (1977: 309) points out that 
the control measures have to be directed at the future and not applied ex post 
facto. 
The activities of the public sector should always be undertaken in public. This 
implies that every activity and every transaction of the public service must be 
accountable (Cioete 1977:69). Appleby explains the nature of administrative work 
in the public sector as " ... the way it is subject to public scrutiny and outcry" (in 
Cloete 1977: 69). He continues by saying that: 
"An administrator coming into government is struck at once, and continually 
thereafter, by the press and public interest in every detail of his life, personality 
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and conduct" (in Cloete 1977 69-70). Appleby rightly states that every activity and 
action by a public employee " ... has to be thought about in terms of possible 
public agitation, investigation, or judgement" (in Cloete 1977:70). It should also 
be pointed out that the task of the public official is difficult in the sense that he 
has to account to a complex society and that total satisfaction from society can 
hardly be achieved. 
Another aspect complicating accountability is that " ... the hierarchy allows the 
'buck' to be passed" (Robbins 1980:232) and where groups or committee 
decisions are taken "... it is difficult to identify who is accountable. The result, 
therefore, is that responsibility is clouded by the effort of individuals to protect 
themselves against the risk of being held accountable for faulty decisions" 
(Robbins 1980: 232). 
4.6 Control as a Function of Management 
All activities of the public sector must be directed at realising policy objectives, 
and this necessitates proper and stringent controls over such activities. The aim 
of control in the public sector is to make it possible for members of the 
community to determine what action has been taken to promote and protect their 
interests. Control in the public sector is therefore aimed at ensuring public 
accountability for utilising financial resources. The voting public should be able to 
establish whether the purposes for which the available resources have been 
used have contributed to government objectives. Public managers play an 
important role in control. 
Control may also be explained as the management task which is aimed at 
ensuring that stated objectives are pursued and realised. In essence it means 
that public managers will compare results with predetermined standards and will 
issue directives for remedial measures to ensure that the anticipated results are 
achieved. Control may be used to determine whether objectives have been 
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realised by checking whether the available resources have been used a 
prudently as possible, whether officials have identified alternative solutions and 
whether such solutions were considered in order to perform operations 
effectively. 
Public managers should be aware that control may have a positive or a negative 
effect on government activities. Control is positive when it is seen as a means for 
assessing whether anticipated results have been achieved. In a negative sense, 
control may be regarded as an external means of forcing officials into certain 
actions. Control should be used, not "as a set of dictatorial devices to manage 
employees, but as an approach that helps those responsible for implementation 
of a plan to stay on the right track" (Dimock et a/ 1983: 229). Moreover, control 
should be regarded "as consisting not of checking the individual actions of every 
public employee, but of steps through which account is rendered for actions or in-
actions to determine whether Parliament's directives are adhered to" (Hanekom 
& Thornhill1993:144). 
4.6.1 Types of Control 
Public managers may perform the function of control at various stages in the 
development of public institution activities. Control may be exercised before the 
activities take place, while they are taking place or after they have been 
completed. 
• Control prior to execution is future-orientated because it allows for the 
elimination of activities that may create discrepancies. Successful control 
prior to execution is the particular responsibility of top management and 
may be carried out by means of changes in policy, procedures and 
methods. An example of a control measure prior to execution of activities 
is where top management insists on more stringent criteria for personnel 
selection. 
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• Control during execution takes place while the work is being done and is 
the particular responsibility of middle management and junior 
management. Such control monitors the performance of subordinate 
workers and always requires immediate remedies. Public managers may 
use personal observation, for example, to determine whether subordinate 
workers are following the stated policies, procedures and methods and to 
identify any departures. 
• Control after execution takes place once public activities have been 
completed, and in some types of work this may be the only control 
possible. For instance, departures from the budget are often rectified only 
once such activities are subjected to the control of institutions such as 
Parliament, Treasury, and the Office of the Auditor-General. 
Public managers should guard against arbitrary control. They are expected to be 
skilled so that the control they exercise will ensure that clearly identified 
objectives are realised. Some of these objectives are considered such as: 
4.6.1.1 Control to Promote Responsibility 
Control aimed at promoting responsibility takes place mostly at operational level 
where officials are held responsible for specific activities. It is essential that public 
managers ensure that subordinate officials fulfil their responsibilities and make 
those decisions for which they have the authority. Officials at operational level 
sometimes tend to avoid responsibility, leaving management to carry the burden. 
Public managers can exercise control to eliminate this practice by guiding their 
subordinates to make decisions independently and to assume responsibility. To 
achieve this, public managers may emphasise participative management, 
delegate tasks with more responsibility to officials, and encourage officials to 
develop the self-confidence to assume more responsibility (see Stroh 1989:44). 
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4.6.1.2 Control to Promote Regularity 
To pass the test of accountability, regularity in government activities is essential. 
Regularity in this sense means combating and eliminating irregular expenditure, 
dishonest actions, poor bookkeeping practices, unauthorised spending and any 
transactions that are contrary to the will and wishes of the executive political 
functionaries. Control may be used to promote regularity by ensuring that 
financial transactions are accurately recorded and that financial statements are a 
true reflection of all accounting activities. An effective internal system of control 
will contribute significantly to preventing theft of money and supplies. Consistent 
compliance with directives for collecting, safeguarding and spending public 
moneys will allow public managers to account to a higher authority for their 
management of public funds. 
Control aimed solely at promoting regularity may have a negative effect because 
it will focus the attention on irregularities. Excessive emphasis on abiding by the 
rules to promote regularity and regulations may stifle any attempts at reform, 
rationalisation and improvement of work methods and procedures. Merely 
abiding by the rules and regulations is not enough to ensure effective public 
administration. Although it is necessary to check that expenditure has been 
recorded accurately, that the necessary authorisation for such expenditure was 
obtained, and that there is adequate documentary proof that goods have been 
delivered and received, investigations into irregularities cannot ensure that the 
actions that were taken will offer maximum benefit to the community. Therefore 
control to promote regularity is not enough to ensure public accountability. To 
succeed in realising government objectives, control also needs to promote 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy (see Stroh 1989:45). 
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4.6.1.3 Control to Promote Effectiveness 
Effectiveness refers to the extent to which government objectives have been 
realised, the degree to which needs aye being met and to the quality of service. 
We can therefore say that 
• effectiveness is directed at the standard of service 
• the extent to which the needs of the community are being met is a crucial 
requirement for effectiveness 
• there need to be clearly defined objectives that can serve as a measure of 
the effectiveness of service and the degree to which needs are met 
Effectiveness is therefore essential to determine whether service of an 
acceptable standard (quality) is being provided, to determine the extent to which 
community needs are being met, and to determine the extent to which stated 
objectives are being realised (see Stroh 1989:46). 
4.6.1.4 Control to Promote Efficiency 
Efficiency relates to realising an objective with the minimum resources. Efficiency 
means that a certain quantity of goods and services of a particular quality have 
been supplied at the least possible cost. Efficiency therefore always refers to 
judicious expenditure and prudent use of the means of production in order to 
achieve the desired outcome. 
Public managers should note that activities, in terms of input and output, may be 
carried out efficiently and yet not be effective because they have not satisfied the 
particular community's needs. Similarly, services that have been provided and 
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that meet the needs may be effective, but resources may have been spent so 
recklessly that there is little evidence of efficiency. 
Control to ensure efficiency is of utmost importance because community needs 
are unlimited and such needs have to be met by means of limited resources. To 
be able to account to the community, it is essential to exercise control to ensure 
that resources are being used prudently. 
To evaluate efficiency, it is essential to set certain standards against which 
performance may be measured. In this regard, public managers may use work 
study divisions to good advantage for advice on how to increase efficiency in the 
provision of services. Advice on improving work methods and procedures, and on 
optimising utilisation of personnel, will enable public managers to increase 
efficiency through improved service or reduced costs, or both (see Stroh 
1989:47). 
4.6.1.5 Control to Promote Economy 
Economy is aimed at ensuring that money is spent in accordance with approved 
prescriptions, and that such expenditure will be appropriate and useful. Control is 
therefore necessary to ensure that available resources are used in the interest of 
the public institution and the community and are not wasted on uneconomical 
goods and services. 
In view of rapid technological advances, control to ensure economy has become 
even more important. Public institutions will need to ensure, for example, when 
purchasing technological aids such as microcomputers, that the purpose for 
which they are being purchased, their use and the functions that they will perform 
will in fact be of benefit to the institution and the community, and that they will in 
fact contribute to improved services. 
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4.6.2 Control and Supervision in the Hierarchy of a Buraeucracy 
Control and supervision in an organisational unit usually take place mainly along 
the lines of authority. These are basically the same as the lines of 
communication. 
Instructions run along the lines of authority from the leadership to the 
subordinates who carry out the instructions. Reporting takes place in the same 
way, in other words subordinates report to their immediate supervisors, who 
report to their immediate supervisors, up to the chief executive officer. The more 
closely woven and formalistic the organisational structure, the stricter the control. 
Where the organisational structure is looser or less tight, control will also be less 
stringent. Central government generally has a fairly rigid organisational structure, 
with the result that control is comparatively strict. 
Because there can be only one central source of supreme authority in a particular 
community, and since such central authority remains accountable for all the 
actions of its executive, provision has to be made for control and supervision in 
organising the State's activities. Supervision and control simply mean that steps 
are taken to ensure that subordinates who receive instructions or to whom 
authority has been delegated will follow such instructions or keep within their 
jurisdiction and will comply with the usual norms or principles. 
4. 7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there are various facets of control and 
accountability. For instance, the classification, normative requirements and types 
of control indicates that control and accountability are both comprehensive and 
demanding processes. 
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The primary task of public officials is the promotion of the welfare of the 
community, a task that should be performed in such a way that the public official 
is able to account in public for his actions. The public official needs to remember 
at all times that public money is being used and that both the public official and 
political office-bearers are in service of the public and not in the service of the 
government. 
Through experience, fixed techniques for control and supervision have been 
developed, and these play an important role in institutions today. The following 
are a few examples of such techniques described in this dissertation: 
• Personal inspections are undertaken by the responsible central authority. 
Think of the inspectors in our own public service and departments. In a 
large complex of institutions, however, "policing" is not the only task of 
these units. They do have to ensure that actions remain within the limits 
imposed by the higher authority, but it is also their task to look out for 
possible organisational or other improvements in the institution. For this 
reason, our own public service and departmental inspectors have been 
trained for some years in the latest techniques, so that they will see when 
improvements can be made by changing obsolete methods. 
• Auditing by officials who have had special training in this function is a 
familiar technique of control, especially in respect of monetary and supply 
issues. 
• Subordinates may be required to submit accounts. For example, officials 
are often required to submit reports on progress made in a specific matter. 
• Institutions or officials may be arranged according to a hierarchical pattern, 
so that the one is positioned above the other in a supervisory role. One 
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example is the divisional head who occupies a supervisory position over 
all the workers in some division or another. 
• Responsible officials may be requested to give evidence before or to 
answer the questions of the controlling or supervisory officials. 
Control and supervision should not be viewed from the perspective of forced 
labour. They are indeed a tool to compel subordinates to keep within the limits of 
their authority and to work according to the prescriptions, but if control and 
supervision are applied realistically, the best results will be obtained through 
constructive leadership and guidance. Control is a prescriptive intervention 
aimed, among others, at correcting wrongs and addressing unacceptable 
behaviour. Political control of the bureaucracy is an attempt to create a stable 
environment, a prerequisite for policy implementation and monitoring. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POLITICAL CONTROL OVER BUREAUCRACIES 
5.1 Introduction 
As indicated in Chapter Two, an authority is an institution of the citizens of a 
State and as such constitutes an implement for the achievement of community 
objectives. The right of an authority to exist resides in its obligation to act in 
accordance with the directives of those whom it is supposed to serve. For 
practical reasons, however, the citizenry cannot inform all public institutions 
about matters that require handling and they cannot prescribe how such matters 
should be handled. This is why the policymaking (legislative) institution of a 
government is responsible for all the activities of the government's component 
parts. The government must in fact justify its actions. 
In view of the problems encountered with the interaction of the political and 
administrative systems, it appears that the prospects of political control over the 
bureaucracy could be found through: the difference between elected and 
appointed officials, the relationship between the government and the 
bureaucracy, the various ministerial styles, the influence of bureaucrats on 
political decision-making, the neutrality of bureaucrats, the political role of the 
bureaucracy, the balance in relations between ministers and high ranking 
officials, and the transferral of ministerial power to bureaucrats. 
The chapter also explores the different ways in which ministers exercise control 
over the bureaucracy. In this chapter a general overview is given of the 
objectives, the necessity for political control and the appropriateness of the 
control measures, with reference to the Northern Provincial Government. 
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It is said that government institutions exist to satisfy the intellectual and material 
needs of the community, but community needs usually exceed the resources 
available for their satisfaction. Effective, efficient and economical action is 
therefore expected of legislative and executive institutions. A major proportion of 
the responsibility for ensuring that optimum results are obtained with the 
expenditure of resources therefore rests with the bureaucracy. 
There is concern, however, about bureaucratic power in terms of the threat it 
poses to democratic accountability. As indicated in Chapter Three, the main 
sources of bureaucratic power include the ability of bureaucrats to control the 
flow of information and thereby determine what their political masters know, the 
benefits they enjoy as permanent and full-time officials, and their status as 
specialists and guardians of public interest. It is even more important that, 
according to Andrew Heywood "... unchecked bureaucratic power spells the 
demise of representative and responsible government. For political democracy to 
be meaningful, appointed officials must in some way be accountable to politicians 
who, in turn, are accountable to the general public. Indeed, one of the 
longstanding criticisms of liberal democracies is that behind the fac;ade of party 
competition and public accountability lies the entrenched power of bureaucrats 
who are responsible to no one. Guarantees against corruption, maladministration 
and the arbitrary exercise of government power must therefore be established" 
(1997:182). 
The above quotation makes clear beyond doubt that control must be exercised 
over the bureaucracy. 
5.2 The Difference between Elected and Appointed Officials 
As indicated, people in the public sector work for, but are not part of, government. 
The difference between elected office-bearers (political) and appointed officials 
(apolitical) is important in this regard. Political office-bearers and subordinate civil 
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servants must keep the basic reason for the existence of the public sector in 
mind at all times in the performance of their routine duties. The individual official 
must remember that by performing his/her daily duties he/she not only satisfies 
his or her social needs, but is in the employ of a political legislative institution that 
has to pursue certain objectives in accordance with an electoral mandate and is 
under an obligation to furnish parliament with information so that the progress of 
executive actions can be determined (Theunissen, in Venter 1998:133). 
5.2.1 Elected Political Office-Bearers 
Elected office-bearers are chosen to occupy their positions by means of a 
democratic election process. Such office-bearers, regardless of whether they 
have been elected directly or indirectly, are naturally political creatures with 
political agendas. Their positions in a democratic society depend on the support 
of voters and they can therefore also be discharged from office by virtue of 
elections. Cabinet members are usually elected political office-bearers to whom 
the responsibility of a ministerial portfolio has been allocated for certain 
government functions, such as education, safety and security, and defence. 
These portfolios usually correspond with the names of state departments and 
therefore have such designations as Minister of Education, Minister of Defence 
and so on. The political mandate given to a political party or parties by the 
electorate in an election that has been won by the party or parties concerned (the 
election may also have been won in concert by several parties who formed a 
coalition), must be carried out. The implementation of the political mandate is the 
responsibility of the President and the cabinet ministers at national level, and by 
the premiers and executive council members at the provincial level. The 
instrument used by the President and cabinet members to implement the political 
mandate they receive from the electorate is the public administration 
(Theunissen, in Venter 1998:134). 
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5.2.2 Appointed Officials 
Appointed officials are not elected but are functionaries (bureaucrats) who are 
responsible in a professional capacity for the daily functioning of government. 
Their task is to uphold the Constitution. They also act as agents for the 
implementation of government policy regardless of their own personal political 
convictions. These persons keep their positions even if the governing party 
changes after an election. It follows, therefore, that during the course of his/her 
term of service the appointed official must serve under the leadership of a 
succession of different ministers who do not necessarily champion the same 
policy. Public officials must therefore carry out their responsibilities, regardless of 
their personal political views or values. The public official is a public servant who 
has to respect the wishes of the voters as expressed and formulated by the 
government of the day. A public official has the right and responsibility, however, 
to refuse to carry out an instruction that is illegal or unconstitutional (Theunissen 
1998:134). 
Government departments experience staff turnovers when a new government is 
inaugurated. What can change is the nature and procedure of departments' 
performance of their line or primary functions (i.e. the main task which is the 
essential reason for their existence). Changes or adjustments in such functions 
will be made in accordance with the new political approach propagated by the 
new government. 
As an afterthought we can mention that the normative guidelines applied to 
appointed officials are an important constant. These guidelines are applicable to 
the ethical behaviour and values to which public officials have to conform. These 
include honesty and probity, thoroughness, impartiality, integrity, legitimacy and 
obedience to administrative law in all actions. The normative guidelines serve as 
a model to which the public official can aspire in order to live up to the high ideals 
and traditions of public service and sacrifice in adequate measure. 
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5.3 The Relationship between Government and the Bureaucracy 
As indicated above, people in the public sector work for the government although 
they are not part of it. The difference between elected office-bearers (political) 
and appointed officials (apolitical) is significant here. 
Under the Constitution ministers are appointed to administer government 
departments, so they have a constitutional task. The political office-bearer also 
has other functions, however. In order to place the function of head of a 
government department in perspective it is also important to take stock of his or 
her other functions. 
The political office-bearer as party politician or party leader 
All action aimed at winning and retaining a seat in Parliament falls under this 
heading. Although this function is outside the ambit of the administration, 
functionaries should act in sympathy with this cause. For the privilege of 
participating in an election under the banner of a particular political party the 
politician voluntarily submits to party policy and accepts the discipline maintained 
by the caucus (Viljoen 1987:91 ). A Canadian minister, McKeough, expressed the 
following view in this regard: 
"The cynic would say that it is obviously the ability to survive politically that 
determines the extent of services rendered by a government. I do not say that I 
would stoop, as the cynics claim, to any end to guarantee re-election but I do 
point out to you that, in many decisions, the desire for re-election is of course an 
important factor" (McKeough in Viljoen 1987:91 ). 
Furthermore, politics command greater prestige and interest than the adminis-
tration. The decorum that creates atmosphere for the political scene is colourful 
and stimulating, while the mere vestige of decorum that is visible of the 
administration usually creates an impression of uniformly grey drabness. 
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Besides, political office-bearers certainly do not share the appointed official's 
perception of the administration and its administrative role. In the final analysis 
the minister remains a politician. His or her decisions are invariably taken with a 
view to the possible political consequences. 
The political office-bearer as representative 
With very few exceptions politicians reach executive political positions by way of 
representation. As a representative the politician must take due account of the 
interests of a constituency - which comprises several thousand members. In 
his/her capacity as minister the representational function is probably less 
demanding than that of a junior backbencher. At the same time membership of 
the cabinet on the one hand, and expressing voters' needs on the other, are 
precisely grounds for possible conflict that may be difficult to resolve. Strictly 
speaking this function falls outside the narrower meaning of administration 
(Viljoen 1987:92). 
British minister Edward Boyle analyses the decision-making issue in minute detail 
in the following passage: 
"Ministers can do things which are unpopular in the country: they can do things 
which are unpopular with their own supporters: but they cannot introduce some 
measure or take some decision which requires a vote of the House of Commons 
if their supporters will not vote for it" (Boyle in Viljoen 1976:171 ). 
Consequently, even when they engage in decision making about "administrative" 
matters, political office-bearers may not lose sight of political considerations. 
It is clear from Boyle's words as quoted above that a distinction should be made 
between the politician as representative on the one hand, and as representative/ 
office-bearer on the other hand. In common parlance the minister is referred to 
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both in his capacity as a Member of Parliament and as a politician. Boyle strongly 
opposes this. He maintains that it does not take ministers long to discover that: 
"the most important distinction in our whole national political system is the 
distinction between the Government and the non-Government ... As soon as one 
becomes a member of the Government one has to measure one's words and 
actions and think in terms of reality, in a way that one does not have to do when 
the executive machine is not at one's disposal" (Boyle in Viljoen 1976:171 ). 
It can be taken on trust that the South African situation will not differ significantly 
from that in Britain. The minister's use of the "administrative machinery" accounts 
for the bulk of his administrative task. For the first time in his political career the 
minister can now experience a conflict between his role as representative, where 
he has to take account of his supporters, and his administrative role, where he 
has to take account of rules and procedures. Visible proof of such tasks in 
conflict is often apparent at congresses (Viljoen 1976:171). 
The political office-bearer as participant in government 
As cabinet member a minister is co-responsible for the government of the 
country. Here the function includes government, final decision-making (policy 
determination), conflict resolution, enforcement of authority and asserting power. 
The government function is in fact pivotal to furthering the general welfare of the 
nation (Viljoen 1987:92). 
Interwoven with the above-mentioned three functions a minister has, in virtue of 
his office, a multitude of ceremonial, ad hoc, diplomatic and benefit public 
appearances to take care of (Viljoen 1987:92). 
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The political office-bearer as administrator 
If administrative functions are taken as a yardstick it seems indisputable that the 
political office-bearer is involved with these functions to varying degrees, ranging 
from specific legal commissions such as appointing or promoting personnel in the 
civil service, to the way in which, for example, control is exercised by means of 
submissions and memoranda. The extent and depth to which ministers become 
involved with administration vary from one person to another and even from time 
to time. In contrast to a decade or so ago, the public not only seem to judge a 
minister according to his or her leadership, but also expect the person to be 
demonstrably conversant with administrative matters (Viljoen 1987:92-93). 
An analysis of the various functions of a political office-bearer reveals that it is an 
enormous task that makes stringent demands on physical and psychic resources. 
Viljoen (1987:93) notes that this has the following implications for the appointed 
official: 
(1) As a result of the sheer diversity of the minister's functions he can only 
spend a limited amount of time on any one of them. 
(2) The minister should spend the bulk of his time on the function of 
government. 
(3) Where party-political leadership and representation are concerned the 
official should not directly assist the executive office-bearer. 
The highest ranking official has a duty and a responsibility to assist the political 
office-bearer as a partner - albeit a "junior" partner - in the performance of the 
government and administrative functions. In the government functions he acts in 
an advisory capacity while in the administrative function he acts as the political 
office-bearer's trustee. 
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5.4 The Minister's Role in a Democratic System 
The bureaucracy is a force to be reckoned with in government. Political office-
bearers are in control of the bureaucracy, however, and it is therefore at their 
disposal. As indicated, they form the upper tier of command of the bureaucratic 
institution and can therefore use it to realise government objectives. 
In South Africa the political office-bearer at central government level is held 
legally responsible to administer the government department assigned to him or 
her. In view of the many other functions performed by the person, namely 
representation, legislation and government, he or she delegates the bulk of the 
administrative functions to the administrative head of the department. A minister 
usually confines him/herself to those administrative matters that may have a 
direct impact on the implementation of government policy (Viljoen 1976:176). 
Although the minister's actions can be superficially classified as administrative, 
these actions usually have a strong political flavour and are rooted in politics. 
Consequently it is hardly possible to speak of the polarisation of political and 
administrative actions with any justification; according to Viljoen (1976:176) it is 
rather a matter of political-administrative osmosis. 
In most Western democracies ministers usually bear the responsibility for their 
government departments. They are expected to formulate government policy for 
the portfolio entrusted to them, and for overseeing the implementation of such 
policy. With this in view they have to answer to the executive authority for their 
decisions and actions. Public officials in the upper tiers of state departments 
usually have to assist ministers in this process. They are mainly responsible, 
under the minister's supervision, for the implementation of such government 
policy with the aid of various teams of subordinate officials. 
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For the purposes of the present analysis the main responsibilities of the minister 
towards the relevant government department are to: 
(1) provide political direction, leadership and motivation to departmental 
officials as well as the electorate on policy matters; 
(2) assume overall political control over the government department and the 
execution of various statutory functions and duties required for the 
ministerial office; to manage; and 
(3) to bear political responsibility and liability towards the legislative and 
executive authority as well as the public for his/her personal conduct as 
well as that of the government department concerned (Cioete in Thornhill 
& Hanekom 1995:28). 
If the actions of the minister accord with legislation he/she is legally obliged to 
record this fact in a document signed by him/her in order to validate the actions 
concerned. Most of these documents are drawn up by officials in the relevant 
government departments and are submitted only for the minister's approval. 
Depending on the person concerned, the minister's signature may be a mere 
formality, or he/she may choose to consider the matter more seriously before a 
decision is taken (Cioete in Thornhill & Hanekom 1995:28). 
In view of the heavy workloads that government departments often have to cope 
with, ministers are authorised to delegate certain decision-making functions or 
actions to a high-ranking official in the government department concerned. Such 
delegated powers can be revoked at any time at the minister's discretion. The 
delegated powers can considerably enhance the influence of functionaries on 
policy determination and implementation, and they also have a determining 
influence on the relationship between politicians and officials in the relevant 
government departments (Cioete in Thornhill & Hanekom 1995:28). 
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5.5 The Various Ministerial Styles 
Headey (in Auriacombe 1996:88) describes five different kinds of ministerial 
styles: 
(1) executive or interventionist ministers who become involved with every 
aspect of the daily management and administration of their government 
departments; 
(2) political initiators, who prefer to merely take the initiative with respect to 
macro-aspects of the political process while their functionaries have to 
handle the micro-aspects of the political process in an entirely reactive 
manner; 
(3) political selectors, to whom the functionary makes active proposals while 
the minister then acts reactively by merely approving macro-policy 
decisions, where after the implementation of the relevant decisions is 
again left to functionaries, which amounts to an inverted relationship of 
roles; 
(4) ambassadorial or public relations ministers, who prefer to play a public 
relations role in the main in order to defend and "sell" the policy of their 
particular state departments; and 
(5) minimalist ministers, who maintain the lowest possible political profile in an 
effort to avoid situations in which they might have to take controversial 
decisions. They leave almost all decisions and actions to the functionaries, 
but they also do not accept responsibility for any action taken by state 
departments. 
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A minister's individual work style (diligent, energetic or lazy), personal 
characteristics (any minor psychological aberration, (e.g. an authoritarian, 
paranoid or well-balanced personality) and personal preferences also determine 
his/her role in a government department (Self 1977:142). 
All the above work styles influence and are influenced by the abilities or 
preferences of the person concerned to delegate authority to others or to keep it 
to him/herself. Often, too, the ministerial styles correlate with the degree of the 
person's expertise in the activity or field for which he/she is responsible. Ministers 
who are well-versed in their particular domains or are specialists in the relevant 
fields are usually intensely involved as executive ministers ("hands on'?, while 
politicians who are not particularly familiar with the activities of their respective 
state departments often decide to leave a good deal of discretion to departmental 
officials and mainly focus their attention on other political activities (Greenwood & 
Wilson quoted by Cloete in Thornhill & Hanekom 1995:29). 
An executive minister who is addicted to work and does not delegate authority is 
the nightmare of any civil servant. Such persons interfere with the daily 
management of the government department to an inordinate extent, whereas the 
responsibility for such management is usually borne by the high-ranking 
administrative officials of the government department concerned, regardless of 
where the statutory responsibility is placed. On the other hand an "ambassadorial 
minister" who leaves much of the discretion as regards policy determination and 
implementation to his/her functionaries is any civil servant's fondest dream, 
because such a person is usually not interested in the finer detail or minutiae of 
policy determination and implementation, and tends to- often unconditionally-
accept the proposals of his/her high-ranking officials (Cioete in Thornhill & 
Hanekom 1995:29). 
Minimalist individuals find it difficult to take decisions of any kind. If the minister 
has a minimalistic mindset, it may have positive or negative consequences for 
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departmental activities: it may either enhance the status of high-ranking officials 
in the government department, which means that they may become influential 
policymakers or counsellors, or it may result in delays in policymaking and action, 
and even in stagnation because no decisions are taken when they are required 
and because the government department does not have the support required for 
action initiated by functionaries (Cioete in Thornhill & Hanekom 1995:29). 
The relationship between ministers and high-ranking officials in the government 
department largely depends on who has the strongest or the weakest personality 
(Headey 1974:63). A "strong" high-ranking official coupled with a "weak" minister 
can exert a considerable influence on policy determination and implementation in 
his/her government department because the minister may feel uncertain and 
therefore allow the functionaries to take the initiative, particularly if the minister is 
not sufficiently familiar with the portfolio assigned to him/her. On the other hand a 
"weak" high-ranking functionary operating in tandem with a "strong", well-
informed minister will have no influence on the policy of the government 
department in question because "strong" ministerial personalities also tend to be 
"hands-on" ministers (Self 1977:142). 
Other important political factors that influence the minister's role directly or 
indirectly in this regard are the following: 
(1) the ideologies of the government of the day or of the minister concerned, 
which can seriously inhibit the degree of discretion of a policymaker as 
regards micro-policy determination and implementation; 
(2) the prevailing political climate; and 
(3) the personal or political relationship between the minister concerned, 
his/her cabinet (government) and the head of government who appointed 
him/her (Cioete in Thornhill & Hanekom 1995:29). 
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5.6 The Influence of Bureaucrats on Political Decision-Making 
Decision-making is the primary political activity, so the question is whether the 
bureaucracy can influence political decision making. According to Strauss 
(1961 :82-83) this is certainly the case. 
Strauss (1961 :82-83) observes that this situation inevitably generates tension 
between politicians and functionaries. The specialists may already have a low 
opinion of politicians in positions of power, and it will not be improved by the self-
righteous criticism they have to endure from that quarter. They would have to be 
exceptionally kind-hearted not to see this dependency as an unwelcome 
hindrance to the efficient performance of their duties since they feel that they are 
best qualified to assess the situation. In most settled institutions the influence of 
political leadership wanes over time while that of functionaries grows. This 
change in the balance of power is most pronounced in the strictly administrative 
sphere where the professional bureaucracy usually have their way and reject 
interference from outside, on condition that certain minimum standards of 
efficiency can be maintained. 
The process will not necessarily stop there, however, because the precise 
distinction between "administration" as the sphere of the bureaucracy and "policy" 
as the sphere of politicians is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in 
practice. The reason for this is that policy cannot be formulated without elaborate 
preparatory work done by top functionaries and their personnel. 
The political leadership can retain the right to final decision making, but it has to 
choose between alternatives that are usually provided by experts. This choice is 
therefore often more of a formality than a reality, because the facts are selected 
in such a way that they can only provide one answer to the questions put to the 
advisers. In practice functionaries do not restrict themselves to preparation of the 
material, but also give advice on conclusions that can be drawn from the material 
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- an extremely important development in modern politics, although in some 
instances, for example the British Foreign Service, it is remarkably recent. By 
preparing policy decisions and giving expert advice on it, top functionaries 
exercise a strong and often irresistible influence over the political leadership. 
Once policy decisions have been taken the heads of the administration have 
considerable flexibility in implementing the decisions because it is impossible to 
determine implementation strategies in advance, except in the broadest sense. 
The main implementers must be allowed to choose the right moment to introduce 
the policy decided on, to concentrate on ways and means that take account of 
the prevailing circumstances, and to grant extensions to others for whom the 
circumstances are less favourable (which in practice sometimes means that the 
policy concerned will never be carried out). 
Such functions have a strong political flavour, although they form a justifiable part 
of the administrative sphere, and the line of distinction between policymakers and 
implementers is usually vague for the latter: it is the cumulative force of 
administrative actions that lies at the heart of the modern state. The motivation 
for such actions naturally remains of the greatest importance (Strauss 1961 :82-
83). 
Jacob shares this view. The reason why the bureaucracy is so important, is that it 
occupies a significant leadership position in the process of policy determination. 
This new role is assumed so conspicuously that it has given rise to the 
descriptive term "administrative state" which was discussed in the preceding 
theme (see Jacob 1966:49). 
As public policy finds its way through the ramifications of the bureaucracy it gains 
structure and is refined before being implemented. Every agency, bureau and 
section stakes its claim in the process. The role of the executive authority that is 
being deployed in contemporary technological societies endows the leadership 
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with extraordinary powers, just as sub-bureaucracies leave their mark on policy 
that is being carried out (Simmons 1972:11 ). 
Strauss (in Jacob 1966:281) sees great danger in this tendency and expresses 
himself strongly against it. "Bureaucratic rule is an evil which, once established is 
almost in-eradicable: It distorts the play of social forces by suppressing its 
enemies and stimulating its sycophants. Either way it makes gradual reform 
difficult or even impossible and invites violent revolution as a rule at a high cost of 
human lives and material resources." 
5. 7 Should Bureaucrats be Politically Neutral? 
Much has been said about the necessity of the political neutrality of functionaries. 
Such a perception surely has merit, but it is not always consistent with reality. 
The official who has to carry out policy in practice is forced to use his discretion in 
the interpretation of policy. Moreover it is usually the official who is approached 
because of his/her expertise in advising political leaders on complex technical 
matters. The highest ranking officer will naturally influence political decision 
making from such a position. It should therefore be taken for granted that any 
public functionaries who is given the task of collecting, analysing, presenting and 
evaluating factual information will use his/her own judgement with the necessary 
respect for the views of those in control of politics. If his/her decisions and advice 
then objectively correspond with those of the political leaders it means that the 
task has been well done and not that the functionary has become the instrument 
of the political party. 
5.8 The Political Role of the Bureaucracy 
It has been shown that the bureaucracy and, in fact, every functionary, is a 
sounding board for public opinion and has to apply the insight he/she obtains in 
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this way to the performance of his daily duties as either an executive or an 
advisory official (Appleby 1949:51, Jacob 1966:201 ). 
The bureaucracy is also used to achieve political aims, however. The 
government endeavours to achieve certain aims as effectively as possible, and 
like a private organisation, is compelled to rely on specialists and a group of 
functionaries with the requisite authority (Jacob 1966:104). 
Or as Mulder (1977:98) puts it: "In the first place the minister must trust the 
bureaucracy implicitly, particularly his/her chief executive functionaries. It is 
physically impossible for a minister to be aware of everything that goes on in his/ 
her department every day, or to take all decisions on his/her own. Consequently 
considerable decision making authority is delegated to functionaries. The 
functionary therefore effectively acts on behalf of the minister. In taking action the 
functionary must be careful not to cause embarrassment for his/her minister, who 
bears final responsibility for his/her department. Embarrassment can be 
prevented only by means of constant dialogue and consultation between minister 
and secretary. Secondly the official is expected to be resourceful. Politics has 
been described on more than one occasion as the art of the possible. It is largely 
incumbent on the chief executive functionaries, however, to translate policy 
decisions taken at Cabinet level into practicable working programmes. They must 
therefore make possible what seems impossible." (own translation) 
5.9 The Balance in Relations Between Ministers and High Ranking 
Officials 
The observation that effective management of the civil service depends on the 
extent to which politicians and officials can work together as a team implies that 
both categories have a place in the process: politicians are mainly responsible for 
providing legitimacy and political direction and supervision, while the whole-
hearted support of bureaucrats is required in this process of policy determination 
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and implementation because they can contribute continuity and experience in 
certain areas. 
If officials are reluctant to carry out changes in policy, or if they derail or delay the 
implementation of new policy, or if they find it difficult to work together in new 
teams with politicians whose principles differ from theirs, then there is naturally a 
real need for more interventionistic political strategies. Explicit new political 
appointments may be useful in the process, depending on circumstances. 
However, care must be taken not to politicise the new civil service excessively, 
because that would impact negatively on its activities in the long run. Effectively 
there will have to be a compromise between political demands for dramatic policy 
changes and management demands for maximal administrative stability in the 
delivery of services and facilities (Cioete in Thornhill & Hanekom 1998:36). 
Both parties (minister and top official) must pursue the same goal of achieving 
general well are at the least cost. Both parties must ensure that public 
administration promotes civilised conditions or standards of living, in other words 
that the doctrines and values on which civilised society depends remain intact. 
Advice to politicians 
To ensure a balanced relationship between politics and public administration 
politicians at all levels of government need the insight required to handle public 
affairs. The politicians need to maintain the approach of a balanced layperson in 
their relations with public administration. Nowadays exceptional insight into 
communal life and even into the international environment is required to be a 
balanced or well-informed layperson. Politicians should therefore be well 
informed in order to apply the necessary insight in decision making. 
Decisions taken with a view to realising government objectives are going to 
become increasingly complex owing to the institution of a new democratic 
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executive authority in South Africa, with its own plan of action that is focused on 
meeting the needs of South African society. On the one hand there are bound to 
be more administrative implications. With respect to the administrative activities 
in the civil service, the function of political control should expand. 
A single step in the wrong direction, or a political mistake, can be costly in terms 
of politics. A minister is obliged to achieve his objectives with the aid of 
experienced and knowledgeable officials. Ministers can no longer act individually, 
too, because economic and social factors are becoming increasingly interwoven. 
It requires close and accurate co-ordination among state departments, as well as 
complex and restrictive activities. The implementation of the new government 
policy is only one of the objectives of the South African government that requires 
considerable sacrifice and co-operation from all sectors in the public administra-
tion. 
The stimulation of economic growth in South Africa and the more equitable 
distribution of income to eliminate backlogs, which could take a long time yet, 
may cause complicated conflicts of interest between pressure groups who will not 
have their privileges questioned and strive to secure their standard of living. 
These groups will launch attacks on ministers at an increasing rate, and the 
ministers will have to act as arbiters in political conflict situations. The need for 
teamwork between ministers. and top officials may be increased by these 
circumstances. 
Training the bureaucracy 
As indicated, it is the duty and responsibility of the highest-ranking official to 
assist the minister in the performance of the government and administrative 
functions. It is therefore clear that functionaries have to be much more than 
balanced laypersons. They must be able to handle matters, propose decisions, 
act with care, have a sense of certainty about the future, and be able to take 
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decisions and face the consequences of implementing such decisions. They 
must be trained to analyse political situations with insight and skill and to present 
issues to politicians so that they can understand the political implications and 
take decisions accordingly. Functionaries must be sensitive to the political 
implications of their work so that they can warn politicians if administrative 
procedures could worsen rather than alleviate conflict situations. 
The highest-ranking official must also act as mediator. As the chief executive 
officer of a government department he/she must therefore be able to co-ordinate 
the various sections of the department; act as arbiter where necessary; reconcile 
the views of officialdom with those of political institutions; and reduce the gap 
between the specific interests of pressure groups and public interest (not always 
expressed by the functionaries). 
5.1 0 Why can Ministers' Power Leak to Bureaucrats? 
To understand how political control over the bureaucracy can be guaranteed the 
sources of bureaucratic influence need to be considered. Why is there a danger 
of power leaking from ministers to civil servants? The answer lies in five 
characteristics of the bureaucracy: its expertise, permanence, inveterate habits, 
control over implementation and special interests. 
Expertise 
A government department is a large, multifaceted organisation that embodies an 
enormous amount of knowledge and expertise in the area of its specialisation. 
Since ministers - at least to some extent - have to rely on the advice and 
information furnished by their government officials, the bureaucracy has potential 
agenda-determining power. It can decide what information should be offered and 
what should be withheld. 
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Permanence 
The position of public servants is safer than that of politicians who are the heads 
of government departments. Top-level civil servants will therefore have more 
experience of their field than their ministers do. Especially in parliamentary 
governments, ministers are regularly moved upwards, sideways or out. This 
encourages bureaucrats to resist change; they simply dig in until the minister 
leaves. Further, when a vacuum occurs at the top end, power tends to go to the 
permanent bureaucracy. Then, if the politicians will not or cannot govern, whether 
as a result of a political crisis or simply weak leadership, the civil servants can, 
want to and must govern in their stead. 
Inveterate (fixed) habits 
Departments develop their own procedures, their own priorities and their own 
internal approach (organisational culture). They forge links with other 
departments and interest groups, with whom they share ties of tradition, informal 
agreements and personal relationships. These inveterate habits can be difficult 
for ministers to overcome - let alone penetrate. 
Control over implementation 
Because bureaucrats implement political decisions, they can "bend" policy, not 
only to suit the circumstances of operational implementation, but also to favour 
their personal concerns. This is unavoidable, because civil servants need 
discretionary powers in order to carry out their policies effectively. 
Special interests 
Bureaucracies are often seen as expansionist organisations with a desire to 
extend their size, staff complement and the scope of their activities. Top-level 
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civil servants in particular are often represented as persons who want to 
maximise their department's budget, which is regarded as the equivalent of the 
entrepreneur's goal, namely to optimise profits. Ministers do not necessarily 
share these special interests. They could be part of a conservative administration 
that wishes to curb government spending by putting a stop to departmental 
empire building. 
5.11 How do Ministers Exercise Control over the Bureaucracy? 
The different ways in which the bureaucracy can be controlled can be classified 
into formal and informal categories. Informal control measures can be either 
internal or external to the bureaucracy. The main formal control over the 
bureaucracy in liberal democracies is the political executive authority under the 
leadership of the president or a premier. 
Liberal democracies have developed a range of counteract bureaucratic power. 
Hierarchic control by a minister is the Weberian solution, but the extent and 
effectiveness of the political control are influenced by three other factors: the 
scope of political appointments, norms of ministerial accountability and 
responsibility, and making use of ministerial advisers. 
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DIAGRAM 9: Modes of Control over Bureaucracies 
Formal Informal 
Political guidance by ministers EXTERNAL 
Critical scrutiny by mass-media 
Critical scrutiny by national assembly Public opinion 
Critical scrutiny by the judiciary Critical scrutiny by interest groups 
Ombudsmen 
Performance standards INTERNAL 
Ministerial control Professional standards 
Anticipated reactions 
Peer pressure 
Conscience 
Competition among departments 
(Adapted from Nadel & Rourke 1975, Table 1) 
5.11.1 The Scope of Political Appointments 
The extent to which political appointments infiltrate the bureaucracy varies 
considerably. On the whole one can say that the greater the extent of infiltration 
and the more political appointments are made in a government department, the 
easier it becomes to guarantee political control. An American president appoints 
about 3 000 people, and a career civil servant finds that his access to the cabinet 
secretary is blocked by several people lower down the political hierarchy who 
have been appointed for political reasons. In Britain only ministers who are heads 
of State Departments are elected officials who are appointed politically; the rest 
are appointed as permanent professional civil servants. In Germany even fewer 
political appointments are made. This lack of infiltration in Germany is 
neutralised, however, by a system in which state officials who are sympathetic to 
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the governing party are appointed in sensitive administrative positions. The 
financial cost of this approach is fairly high: government officials who lose their 
positions for political reasons retire early- on full pay (Hague et a/1998:227). 
This tendency to staff important departments with loyal and sympathetic 
government officials is even more prominent in Finland. Vartola (1989:126) notes 
that the Finnish civil service has become even more politicised since World War 
II. He even goes so far as to suggest that: "it has been very difficult for quite 
some time for non-aligned civil servants to gain appointments in important posts 
in the administration". 
Yet it is by no means self-evident that this has the consequence of less 
ministerial control. As a matter of fact, top-level state officials welcome political 
guidance; they recognise the unique authority of the minister as a member of an 
elected government. More political appointments therefore do not necessarily 
mean more political control. 
5.11.2 Norms of Ministerial Accountability 
Political control over the bureaucracy also depends on the prevailing perceptions 
of ministerial accountability. (Hague et at 1998:228). 
The more accountable government officials are for their actions, the more their 
influence can be identified, if not actually controlled. Bureaucrats can easily 
evade the spotlight of political as well as social scrutiny when, as in Britain, 
ministers only have to account formally for the actions of their officials. This 
system occurs in its most extreme form in Britain. "The buck stops" with the 
minister, but in practice ministers are rarely dismissed from office for 
incompetence or wrongful actions within their departments (Hague et a/ 
1998:227). In this way civil servants can effectively exercise power without the 
risk of being held externally accountable. Fortunately (perhaps), in other liberal 
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democracies less emphasis is placed on the anonymity of civil servants in high 
office than in Britain. In the USA it is much more likely that bureaucrats will be 
brought before congressional committees than that the British civil servants will 
be questioned by a committee of the Lower House. American public officials 
would probably also answer more openly than their inhibited British counterparts 
who make a virtue of "being economical with the truth" (Hague et a/1998:228). It 
is paradoxical that it may actually be easier to curb bureaucratic power where 
bureaucratic influence is readily acknowledged, for example in the USA. 
5.11.3 Making use of Political Advisers 
Political control over the bureaucracy can be reinforced by providing ministers 
with personal advisory staff. These advisers serve as alternative sources of 
information and guidance to the formal bureaucracy. Although - or rather, 
because - such gurus are not part of the department's permanent staff, they can 
serve as the eyes and ears of the minister or president, and thus provide 
alternative and politically attained advice. The Executive Office of the President 
and the White House staff of the American Presidency are a good example of 
this approach. They almost represent a counter-bureaucracy within the political 
system - one that will probably be much more ideologically or politically 
orientated than the formal bureaucracy and is bound to the president by personal 
loyalty. 
Such advisers may help to exercise control over the administrative personnel, 
but, as political scandals in the United States revealed in the seventies and 
eighties, exercising control over them is itself a problem. Advisers are not 
dependent on elections for the tenure of their positions, nor are they hampered 
by bureaucratic inhibitions where political actions are concerned. Their private 
extramural interests and personal contacts are not subject to such close scrutiny 
as those of politicians and government officials. The political views of advisers 
are often very dose - perhaps too dose - to those of the persons whom they 
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advise. Politicians do not appoint advisers to tell them that everything they do is 
wrong. The danger is that they are too dependent on their protectors, with the 
result that they tend to present matters through rose-coloured spectacles rather 
than as the unvarnished truth. The French cabinet is conceivably a good advisory 
system. (Cabinets are not to be confused with the cabinets forming the pivotal 
element of government in parliamentary systems.) A French cabinet is a group of 
about 15 to 20 people who form the minister's personal advisory staff and are 
under his/her direct control. Cabinets furnish the minister with ideas and facilitate 
liaison between him/her and the department, the other ministries, the party and 
the electoral district. In contrast with the USA, however, most members of the 
cabinets come from the civil service and return to it after serving in the minister's 
cabinet for a few years (Auria com be 1996). 
5.12 Other Ways of Exercising Control over Bureaucracies 
Internal control is based on the assumption that civil servants can be held in 
check by virtue of professional norms and methods. The proponents of this view 
argue that government officials' sense of duty sensitises them to public and 
political interests. State officials' internalisation of these professional standards 
can be achieved by way of recruitment, training, promotional and similar 
processes. In the modern bureaucracy the appointment and promotional process 
is the principal means of exercising control over civil servants. In contrast with 
earlier times when favouritism and privilege were the predominant if not exclusive 
grounds on which government officials were appointed, in First World states 
today they are usually appointed on the strength of competitive examinations and 
an objective merit assessment. This competitive system is hierarchically 
structured to promote a career-orientated civil service (Jackson & Jackson 
1997:280). 
The professional ethics required in the bureaucracy include values such as 
honesty and diligence. It may also inspire a sense of duty to civil servants in that 
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they have an obligation to defer to political authority rather than their personal 
wishes. In this sense professionalism in the civil service includes submission to 
political control. In a democracy civil servants must retain a measure of objectivity 
towards political parties and ideologies. When a new party comes to power civil 
servants must be able to serve their new masters effectively and faithfully 
(Jackson & Jackson 1997:280). 
Another means of controlling bureaucracy can be achieved by instituting formal 
performance standards, for example by specifying a time limit within which letters 
from members of the public must be answered. This is the approach adopted in 
Britain with the Citizen's Charter. The Charter is quite harmless in itself, but the 
mere thought of earning a tarnished reputation by being labelled "substandard" is 
probably sufficient to inspire most departments to render a better service (Hague 
et a/1998:228). 
Some critics of the bureaucracy contend that effective control over the 
bureaucracy can only be achieved by ensuring that it is representative of society 
as a whole. They hold that the composition of the civil service must not depend 
on merit alone, because that would mean that the bureaucracy is actually not 
representative of society as a whole, failing which, so they maintain, it would 
become insensitive to the needs and interests of those to whom representation is 
denied. In democracies this perception has led, amongst others, to a campaign to 
have more women appointed in top positions in the civil service, and to more 
concerted demands for equality in extending employment opportunities to 
persons representing certain minorities, and besides to the disabled and regional 
representatives. 
The insistence that civil servants should be "representative" of the population at 
large and should display exceptional professionalism is based on the assumption 
that they must obey their political masters, and thereby the wishes of the public. 
Unfortunately these two principles can be contradictory and, even when they are 
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applied successfully, it would seem that neither of the two can eliminate 
bureaucratic autonomy. For this reason it is often asserted that external control is 
necessary to keep civil servants in check (Jackson & Jackson 1997:282). 
In most political systems a hierarchic chain of accountability is set up in which 
responsibility flows from the highest elected officer, president or prime minister 
through secretaries or ministers and their highest state officials right down to the 
bottom of the bureaucracy. The extent to which the chain of command, that is the 
hierarchy of authority along which responsibility flows from top to bottom, will in 
fact ensure the accountability of civil servants (Roskin et a/1997:304). 
Although ministers are an essential source of impetus and cohesion to 
departments, bureaucrats oversee things in other formal ways that are aimed at 
making civil servants more sympathetic towards both politicians and the public. 
These methods include the courts and legislative investigations, both of which 
are in prominent use in the USA. The courts are regularly used to appeal 
bureaucratic decisions, while congressional committees subject their agencies to 
searching scrutiny (albeit selectively). 
A more recent addition to the arsenal is the ombudsman, a watchdog who was 
appointed for the first time in Sweden, then emulated in New Zealand, and later 
also in other European countries and in South Africa. Ombudsmen are appointed 
to investigate complaints and must therefore have good investigative capabilities 
if they are to succeed. So far governments outside Scandinavia have been 
reluctant to allow this facility into their ranks, with the result that the standard 
letter of an ombudsman reads as follows: "Regrettably I do not have the authority 
to investigate your complaint." (Hague et a/ 1998:228) The South African 
Constitution of 1996 provides for the appointment of a Public Protector who is 
invested with the authority to investigate any action (except court decisions) in 
government affairs that is suspected of being conducted improperly, and to report 
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on such actions and take suitable corrective measures. Anybody can lodge 
complaints with the Public Protector. 
The bureaucracy can also be subjected to informal pressure. Public opinion, 
particularly when mobilised by organised interest groups, can effectively serve as 
an informal ombudsman within the system. Alert mass media can also be a 
control measure with respect to the bureaucracy; regular television programmes, 
for example, are currently specialising in the exposure of public scandals and 
bureaucratic incompetence. These exposes seldom lead to structural reforms, 
however. The specific case may be resolved, but often the complacency of the 
bureaucracy remains unruffled. In France " ... the image of the governmental 
administration remains one of remoteness, convolution and opaque procedures 
in spite of a legislative framework that purports to impose open government to an 
impressive degree, and in. spite of sustained efforts throughout the past decade 
to make the administration less repellent." (Stevens 1996: 150). 
One form of external control occurs in parliamentary systems of the British type, 
Where ministers are regularly expected to report to the legislative authority on 
their own and their departments' activities. In Britain, South Africa, Canada and 
Australia, as well as many other states, question time is accommodated in the 
parliamentary schedule so that the opposition can scrutinise and question the 
activities of the government and its functionaries. 
Other informal control measures are inherent in the bureaucracy. One of these is 
the competition among departments, where state departments with powers of 
expenditure have to compete with each other for money, while the Department of 
Finance keeps a tight hold on the purse strings. Liberal democracies also rely on 
the internalised professional norms - the conscience - of civil servants. If too 
much political pressure is brought to bear on them they may complain to their 
trade union (if they belong to a trade union), or they may leak stories to the news 
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media (if they dare), or they may submit a complaint to an official but anonymous 
informing system (if such a thing exists) 
Control is a prescriptive intervention of correcting wrongs and certain 
unacceptable behaviour. Political control of the bureaucracy is an attempt to 
create a stable environment which is a prerequisite for policy implementation and 
monitoring. The objectives of political control of the bureaucracy is associated 
particularly with matters of compliance or responsiveness. Political control of the 
bureaucracy arises from the fact that governments are supposed to be 
responsive to the needs of society and to ensure that accountability is maintained 
in all administrative instructions. In short, political representatives should control 
government activities, within a governmental environment to ensure that the 
political objectives set by the government are pursued and attained. 
This section will focus on the objectives of and the necessity for political control, 
as well as on how Parliament and the executive exercise control over 
bureaucracy. The methods of control used by public officials will also be 
considered. 
5.13 Objectives of and Necessity for Political Control 
Public officials cannot ensure that public goals are achieved efficiently without 
specific measures for this purpose. Thornhill eta/ (1995: 245) indicate that it is 
necessary for political officials to ensure that effective control measures are put in 
place in order to guarantee that all objectives remain aimed at the stated goal. 
The public sector usually employs a huge portion of the labour force. The 
Provincial Government of the Northern Province likewise employs a large portion 
of the economically active labour force. It is therefore necessary for the executive 
to take control of the bureaucracy to ensure that one of the most expensive 
resources that the government has at its disposal is utilised effectively. 
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Between May 1994 and May 1999 the Northern Province Provincial Legislature 
consisted of forty (40) members. The African National Congress had a majority of 
38 members. The National Party and the Freedom Front had one (1) member 
each. The responsibility of exercising political control over the bureaucracy rested 
with this group. There were ten (10) Members of the Executive Council (known 
as MECs). 
In the previous chapter it was shown that public officials have considerable 
influence on both political office-bearers and the community. They have the 
advantage of firsthand information on government policy matters, and also 
considerable access to information on the needs and aspirations of society as a 
result of their daily interaction with the community. Most importantly, they are 
members of the community themselves. 
Public officials are best situated and empowered in many ways to deal with public 
affairs. Their strengths rest on the fact that, in most cases, they have been 
permanently appointed in government institutions. This permanence could be 
misconstrued as representing a legitimate mandate and responsibility for public 
affairs, whereas the mandate is actually entrusted to the legislature and political 
office-bearers by the electorate. 
As mentioned earlier, public service officials derive their authority, and to a 
certain extent their power, from their expert knowledge and the ability to apply 
such knowledge. According to Hanekom et a/ (1994:78) bureaucratic authority 
means the application of control measures based on knowledge. Heywood 
(1997:351) ascribes bureaucratic power to three sources: 
• the strategic position occupy in relation the policy process; 
• the logistic relationship between public officials and their ministers; and 
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• the status and expertise officials have acquired through training. 
Bureaucratic power poses a serious threat both to the legislature and to 
executive institutions, especially with regard to issues of accountability. 
Bureaucratic control aims at ensuring accountability towards parliament and 
executive institutions. Public officials control the flow of information in a multi-
directional fashion as they supply information to political office-bearers as well as 
to their subordinates. Control mechanisms aimed at maintaining a proper balance 
are therefore a necessity. 
Because public officials provide information to politicians, they have the ability to 
determine what information should or should not be available to such politicians. 
They are therefore also unlawfully the guardians of public interests. It should be 
borne in mind that an uncontrolled bureaucracy could lead to the disintegration of 
government and its elected officials. 
The bureaucracy can be controlled in various ways. According to Heywood 
(1997:353), the major forms of control can be classified as follows: 
• the creation of mechanisms of political control and accountability; 
• the politicisation of the civil service; and 
• the construction of counter-bureaucracies. 
It is of paramount importance to understand fully the differences between the 
roles of elected office-bearers and those of appointed officials within the realms 
of political control and accountability. Over and above these roles, specific 
administrative mechanisms should be applied to control the bureaucracy, such as 
professional norms and standards, including minimal standards of ethics. 
According to Alb row ( 1970: 18), the concept of control unifies the issues of 
authority, accountability, information, compliance, co-ordination and all other 
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related aspects. Control processes are necessary to complement 
implementation processes. 
Fox, Schwella and Wissink (1991:123) state that the enactment of legislation 
does not necessarily imply that its execution will be in accordance with the 
intention of the legislators. Control mechanisms are therefore indeed 
indispensable. It is imperative that, when legislation is passed, minimum control 
mechanisms are also put in place. This will guarantee that public officials attain 
the objectives as set by the legislators. 
Control and accountability demand from politicians that a maximum supervision 
of the public service be in place. In this instance, members of the executive 
council or ministers can use both formal and informal control measures to guard 
against irregularities in the various departments. Such control mechanisms as 
mentioned in the previous chapter could be looked at from the levels of legislative 
executive control. 
5.14 Appropriateness of the Control Measures 
Control has been defined in Chapter Four as a prescriptive intervention aimed at 
correcting wrongs. Control and evaluation are the final links in the functional 
chain of bureaucracy. They complete the process of monitoring the activities of 
the bureaucracy and government institutions in order to determine whether those 
institutions are utilising resources effectively and efficiently to accomplish their 
objectives, and where this is not the case, there has to be intervention. This 
chapter, however, will not focus on evaluation. 
The period covered by this dissertation began, as already indicated, with the 
ushering in of the new democratic order in South Africa. The nature of the 
political control exercised over the bureaucracy in the Northern Province 
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Provincial Government has, as a matter of principle, to fall within the accepted 
democratic principles of democratic government. 
5.14.11mplementation of Political Control Measures 
Implementation can be defined as putting into effect what has been decided 
upon. Hanekom (1987:55) defines implementation as a practical activity involving 
the conscious following of laid down rules. By following laid down rules it is, 
therefore, feasible to monitor the actions of public servants by political office-
bearers in order to intervene if necessary. According to Alb row (1970: 18), control 
processes are the necessary complement of implementation processes; 
accordingly, political control measures must be appropriate. 
5.14.1.1 Adequacy of Mechanisms Employed to Exercise Control 
There are legislative as well as bureaucratic control measures in place in the 
province. In Chapter Three legislative as well as administrative control 
mechanisms have been discussed at length. All the legislative standing 
committees are in place and functional. The effectiveness of these committees 
varies from one committee to the next, depending on their responsibilities. Other 
necessary bureaucratic institutions beyond the departments, such as the Auditor-
General and the Provincial Service Commission, are also in place. 
Taking into account the powers and functions of the Provincial Public Service 
Commission, the existence of personnel regulations as enunciated in the Public 
Service Act of 1994, the Provincial Exchequer Act of 1994, and the Rules and 
Regulations of the Provincial Tender Board, it is fairly reasonable to conclude 
that there were appropriate control mechanisms in place during the period under 
review. These control mechanisms gave both political bodies, that is, the office-
bearers and the legislature, enough leverage to exercise control over the 
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bureaucracy. Other counter-bureaucratic institutions such as the Tender Board 
and its committees are in existence. 
5.14.1.2 Efficiency of Political Control in the Northern Province 
The efficiency of political control could be gauged by analysing the findings of 
various reports of commissions and media reports. These reports also help to 
project the perception of the public and opposition parties about the efficiency 
and appropriateness of control exercised by political office-bearers over the 
bureaucracy in the province. 
It has been mentioned under paragraph 4.2.1 that all the necessary legislative as 
well as administrative control mechanisms have been established in the form of 
committees, bureaucratic institutions and rules and regulations. However, those 
institutions and committees at some stage seemed to have been incapacitated by 
the actions of the political office-bearers, especially between 1996 and 1997. 
Political office-bearers, according to the reports and newspapers studied, 
interfered with the functions of the said bodies. For example, in a procurement of 
government assets the political office-bearer of the Department of Public Works 
violated the Tender Board procedures (Commission of Inquiry Report, 1997:24). 
This non-adherence to rules and regulations had an adverse effect on the 
implementation of political control measures over the bureaucracy and the 
efficiency thereof. 
The appropriateness of the control measures in the province need to be viewed 
and assessed, taking into account how those measures were implemented within 
the prevailing conditions and the environment of that time, since the manner in 
which they were implemented was a cause for serious concern and led to 
complaints from various political organisations and civil society in general. The 
newspapers, including the Review of May 30, 1997, highlighted this. 
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What has emerged from this study, through the evaluation of information 
obtained also from senior staff members, provincial reports, and reports from 
certain commissions of enquiry especially the Semenya Commission of 1997 
mentioned in Chapter One, is that from 1994 to 1997, there was instability within 
the bureaucracy, which was caused by factors pertaining to the transition from 
the old order to the new democratic situation, and which had to a certain extent 
impacted negatively on the bureaucratic systems of the province as well as 
undermined the political control in certain instances. 
Besides the transitional implications and complications, political bodies 
themselves had internal problems of dysfunction. The Review (May 30, 1997) as 
well as the report of the Commission of Inquiry highlighted the problems of the 
implementation of policies. The Review also reported an intense "tug of war in 
the provincial cabinet and the legislature" and mentioned that at some point the 
provincial Speaker of the legislature had expressed concerns about the fact that 
the provincial cabinet had been involved in a "bending of rules". 
Assessing the above against the backdrop of such remarks, also those quoted in 
the report of the Commission of Enquiry, that the political difficulties and the 
apparent tensions needed to be resolved, shows that the measures of political 
control that political institutions and other bureaucratic bodies imposed on 
bureaucracy, made the policy implementation in the province less effective. 
During the transitional period, that is 1994 to 1997, both the political office 
bearers and civil servants, especially at a higher level, seem to have paid little 
attention to the rules and regulations that govern the control of public service. It is 
therefore important to assess the impediments of political control over the 
bureaucracy in general terms. This will also help to answer the question whether 
political control produce the desired outcomes in terms of the political promises 
made to the citizenry in the province. 
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5.14.1.3 Impediments to Political Control over the Bureaucracy in the 
Northern Province 
Various impediments have hampered the control over the bureaucracy in the 
province. Of most significant impact were the interference of political office 
bearers and non-compliance with rules and regulations, which according to some 
senior officials was caused by the fact that some of the new members of staff, 
who had joined the public service after April 1994, lacked the necessary 
education. This led to erosion of the authority of the traditional administrative 
structures, methods and other instruments of government. 
In addition, the Provincial Service Commission's report (1997:24) revealed that 
certain senior officers had not obtained Treasury approval for some 
procurements, which shows that there was indeed a lack of knowledge and or 
failure to adhere to the necessary processes and procedures. Because the 
provincial administration was still new, the interdependence and the necessary 
relationships had not yet been properly established. It was therefore impossible 
to sustain the smooth running of the administration in an efficient and 
professional manner. 
The above observation suggests that political control could not produce 
maximum desired outcomes in terms of the political promises that have been 
made to the citizenry in the province. 
5.14.1.4 Politicallnterference 
Before April 1994, the political system of the homelands was geared for the 
maintenance of the apartheid ideology and policies. The public sectors of the 
previous homelands formed part of the executive authority, that is, the public 
service had to fulfil the ambitions of its political masters rather than uphold public 
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interest. The control systems applicable at the time were not in line with a 
representative democracy or with a responsive government. 
No government structure can function effectively in isolation. Political office 
bearers are dependent on civil servants for the realisation of their policy goals. 
Civil servants are likewise dependent on office-bearers to deliver the goods and 
services expected by the general public. The roles and interdependence of these 
two groups should be acknowledged and upheld if effective and efficient service 
delivery is to become a reality. 
The Public Service Act of 1994 clearly indicates the responsibilities of public 
servants and serves as a basis for the implementation of political decisions. It 
also serves as a mechanism for differentiating (in terms of power relations) 
between office-bearers and civil servants. 
Political interference has had an adverse effect on civil servants. As mentioned in 
Chapter Two, there was a sense of fear during the transition; the members of the 
Executive Council were also sceptical of the inherited public service, and feared 
that the balance of power between them and the civil servants might be tipped in 
favour of the latter. Naturally, this caused serious administrative problems. 
The role of political office-bearers became more and more administrative and in 
the process alienated the public servants, who were supposed to give informed 
advice. The difference between the administrative and the political roles became 
an obstacle to proper and efficient political control: competition (who does what 
and when) became apparent, and office-bearers feared that the bureaucrats 
might bend government policies to suit their own circumstances. In such a 
situation political control can neither measure nor improve the performance of the 
bureaucracy in the province. 
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5.14.1.5 Inadequate Knowledge of Public Service 
Inadequate knowledge is one of the factors which has been highlighted as an 
impediment to the implementation of controls in the province. For example, it 
emerged that there was a perception that "trusted personnel" had been drawn 
from inexperienced and in some instances, underqualified staff who were seen 
as politically suitable. 
It could be argued, however, that since political office-bearers of the homeland 
administrations were drawn largely from the traditional leadership, there was no 
need for political understanding. The so-called prime ministers and presidents of 
former homelands were initially hand-picked and simply had to allocate portfolios 
to traditional leaders, because those were the most significant political figures of 
the time. The civil service was, therefore, contaminated. 
This situation led to actions and practices of public servants depicting what was 
happening at a political level, especially to show how much importance was 
attached to loyalty to chiefs and other traditional leaders and how much more 
involved political leaders were in the bureaucracy than in providing political 
leadership. 
The inadequate knowledge of some senior personnel resulted in a non-
adherence to civil service rules and regulations. Political office-bearers and 
members of the civil service alike had no understanding of their roles in the new 
democratic dispensation. The situation led to some senior civil servants 
withdrawing, causing political office-bearers to take even less informed decisions. 
Non-compliance with the rules and regulations is linked to the phenomenon of 
under qualified public service staff. It is important that the functionaries of various 
government departments should be well-qualified professionals, capable of 
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implementing government policies. Neglecting rules and regulations could not 
necessarily be viewed as acts of malice, but was born of ignorance. 
5.14.1.6 Divergent Perceptions 
Political office-bearers, civil servants, and to a certain extent, the legislature, did 
not view government processes from a common perspective. As mentioned in 
the section on the implementation of political control in paragraph 4.2, the 
legislature, through the Speaker, indicated that political office-bearers were 
"bending the rules" and regulations (Review, 30 May, 1997:1 ). 
Some senior public servants also pointed fingers towards the provincial cabinet, 
indicating that there were divergent perceptions within the provincial government 
which had a negative impact on the exercising of control at the political as well as 
the administrative level. This situation was aggravated by the fact that no one 
wanted to be seen as a civil servant from the old order. In actual fact, most senior 
officials dissociated themselves from the old order as much as possible. 
The dissociation is helpful, since it depicts how bad the administration in the 
previous homelands was. Certain conclusions could be drawn from the available 
information starting from the negative effects of political control over the 
bureaucracy, taking into account the functions of Parliament and the institutions 
referred to in previous paragraphs. 
The following quotation from Bayat and Meyer (1994:126) summarises the 
feelings of both the bureaucracy and the political office-bearers of the former 
homelands, the bulk of which is the focus of this study: 
"The actual content of the subject matter being put on the table in front of 
the five major CODESA sub-committees, served to raise the 
administrative spectre increasingly haunting the new South Africa. One 
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example is the question of the reintegration of the independent homelands 
into the governing structure of a united South Africa . . . . Striped of their 
ethnic mystique and bogus independence, the homeland governments 
suddenly began to look remarkably like regional bureaucracies in search 
of social sinecures." 
The problems indicated in this dissertation still manifest themselves in various 
ways within the provincial bureaucracies in South Africa. 
The major role of the legislative assembly, as far as control over bureaucracy is 
concerned, is to oversee and scrutinise the actions of political office-bearers and 
the civil service. This role would be more effective if Parliament were not 
dominated by one political party. Where one party dominates, questioning and 
answering becomes a mere routine task with little or no value. The perception of 
the opposition in such an instance is sceptical and leads to a belief that political 
office-bearers are failing to exercise the necessary political control over the 
bureaucracy. 
After the elections of 1994, the Northern Province Provincial Legislature was 
dominated by one political party, the African National Congress, which won 98% 
of the votes. The scrutiny exercise, which is one of the major roles of the 
legislature, was affected by the perceptions of both legislators and public 
servants. 
The bureaucracy, which has its own fears and is very vulnerable at times, was 
attuned to the practices of the previous government, and as such its co-operation 
was rendered ineffective by prevailing conditions. This situation compounded 
itself in such a way that members of the Executive Council of the province raised 
bureaucratic problems as an obstacle to government efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
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5.15 Executive Control over the Bureaucracies 
Ministers and members of executive councils formally control most civil servants. 
They appoint senior civil servants who are accountable to them. Public service 
officials are made accountable to the political office-bearers in various ways. 
According to Hague, Harrop and Breslin (1998:227) political office-bearers can 
easily exercise control over the bureaucracy, because they have closer working 
relationships with them. 
As already mentioned, political interaction involves, to a great extent, the civil 
service and political office-bearers. The executive authority plays a leading role in 
the administration of a country. It serves as an intermediary between the 
bureaucracy and the legislative authority. It is for this reason that political office-
bearers place certain responsibilities on public service officials. Such 
responsibilities, according to Ranney (1987:281 ), are two-fold: conforming to 
professional code, and accountability to elected officials. 
The former suggests that public officials are expected to adhere to certain 
administrative standards and norms, while the latter is an indication that at 
certain levels public administrators should be accountable to elected political 
office-bearers. Both responsibilities seek to promote democratic ethos. Political 
office-bearers have been elected by the electorate, hence public administrators 
should be controlled by, and be accountable to, such elected office-bearers. This 
demonstrates how elected political officials impact on public administrators. 
As indicated, the civil service was established by the Public Service Act, which 
set clear principles and requirements for public administration. The monitoring of 
the Acts of Parliament is in the hands of elected state officials - in this instance, 
the member of the executive council. The member of the executive council is 
responsible for overseeing the realisation of the objectives of executive 
institutions. It is significant that despite the presence of rules (in the form of the 
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Public Service Act), the bureaucracy is characterised by a deviation from the 
main objectives of the public service in favour of the ruler, and the enhancement 
of the status of civil service officials. 
A brief discussion of bureaucratic authority and the extension of bureaucratic 
power is of importance in gauging the influence of politics as set out above, and 
in appraising political control in perspective. Both bureaucratic authority and 
power are indications that politics and bureaucracy cannot easily be divided into 
watertight compartments. 
Elements that enable ministers or members of the executive council to exercise 
effective control are: 
• accessibility of bureaucrats; 
• political advisory system; 
• accountability and responsibility; 
• politicisation of civil service; and 
• construction of counter-bureaucracy. 
5.15.1 Accessibility of Bureaucrats 
Ostensibly ministers are political masters while public servants are the loyal 
servants of the State. According to Heywood (1997:352) most of the 
administrative exercises in relation to policy implementation and departmental 
operational matters are handled by the bureaucrats. Because of the vastness of 
administrative responsibilities, logically the number of public officials in any 
particular department will be greater. However, Hanekom et a/ (1994: 159) point 
out that a minister should not be viewed as a sort of antithesis to the 
bureaucracy, but rather as an integral part of the bureaucracy and the policy-
making process. 
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In order for political office-bearers to influence the bureaucrats, senior public 
officials should be those persons who would be most readily accessible to the 
political office-bearers. Directors-General and other heads of the department 
should work in close co-operation with the minister so as to enable him or her 
proper control and monitoring. Although according to Hague et a/ (1998:227) 
political appointments in the department do not necessarily mean that the officials 
appointed will show total loyalty to the minister, political appointees do welcome 
political direction; therefore, control could be enhanced. 
Hanekom et a/ (1994: 173) recognise the fact that in terms of administrative 
matters the minister could not have direct access to some of the departmental 
information, and would therefore have to rely on the faithfulness of public service 
officials. A cordial relationship between public officials and the minister or 
member of executive council is therefore imperative. Where there is trust, senior 
civil servants welcome and accept political direction. 
5.15.2 Political Advisory System 
Political advisory mechanisms can also enhance the control of the bureaucracy. 
Ministers or members of the executive council could be given a team of personal 
advisors, who in most cases are not permanent staff members, but experts in 
various fields, whose responsibility is to provide concrete information and 
possible alternatives. According to Hague et al (1998:227), political advisors 
could be the most helpful officials because they form a counter-bureaucracy 
within the department which could pose a challenge to permanent public officials 
and help curtail bureaucratic power. 
5.15.3 Accountability and Responsibility as a Control Measure 
In public administration, accountability is a characteristic control mechanism 
which is a statutory obligation residing within the scope of political office-bearer 
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(Fox et a/1991:124). It is, therefore, necessary to set norms and standards for 
the accountability and responsibility of public officials. According to Hague et a/ 
(1998:227), if norms and standards are absent, bureaucrats could escape both 
public and political accountability. 
According to Hanekom et a/ (1994:178), public service officials should be 
subjected to regular administrative accountability as a form of control. It is 
imperative that civil service officials be subjected to public scrutiny in order to 
exercise a degree of control over them. The legislative assembly, through such 
mechanisms, is given an opportunity to measure whether its directives have been 
executed accordingly. 
A public administrator should understand that the responsibility that the minister 
or member of the executive council has towards the department is a shared one, 
in spite of the fact that the minister's responsibility would be greater. Individual 
public service officials should understand that, as far as administrative 
responsibility is concerned, the liability for any wrong-doing rests squarely on the 
shoulders of the individual. 
According to Hague eta/ (1998:228), political office-bearers are rarely dismissed 
or held accountable for administrative wrong-doing. Bureaucrats should be aware 
that they are accountable for operational responsibility, despite the fact that the 
political office-bearer occupies centre stage in terms of representing the 
parliamentary supervision of administration. It is the minister who answers for 
and defends the actions of departmental officials; therefore, state officials should 
understand that they have equal responsibility. This should afford Parliament the 
opportunity to obtain firsthand knowledge of executive actions. 
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5.15.4 Politicisation of the Civil Service 
As already mentioned, bureaucratic organs are headed by public officials who 
possess a certain level of knowledge and expertise. It is imperative that the roles 
of politicians and of administrators should be reconcilable. The interaction 
between politicians and senior public officials makes it possible for public officers 
to assume indirectly certain political powers and responsibilities. Hanekom et a/ 
( 1994:124 ), argue that because of the complexity of public affairs, detailed 
decisions cannot be taken by politicians alone; they rely heavily on the expert 
advice of appointed public officials. Public administrators give advice to 
politicians and could be consulted by Members of Parliament. 
Political office-bearers attempt to politicise the bureaucracy under the guise of 
greater responsiveness and accountability. The bureaucracy may become 
politicised in order to become the true tool of policy implementation. Bureaucrats 
should, in this instance, share the ideological enthusiasm of the government in 
power. The politicisation of the bureaucracy usually occurs at party-political level. 
Senior public officials are identified and placed accordingly. 
Political penetration should at times go beyond the highest bureaucratic levels. 
Government seeks to achieve the maximum degree of loyalty and coherence in 
the bureaucracy in order to realise its objectives. According to Heywood (1997:3 
55}, politicisation is one of the methods of exercising political control over the 
bureaucracy. Senior civil service appointments are likewise influenced by political 
affiliation and ideology. 
Although interaction between public officials and political office-bearers cannot be 
avoided, a clear division and demarcation of public authority is necessary. 
Because public officials are not elected, they might distort political policies 
knowing full well that politicians will be responsible for whatever problems may 
arise. 
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Control over the bureaucracy, as already stated, is accomplished directly through 
political appointments. This ensures that most of the senior level bureaucrats are 
those loyal and committed to the government of the day. According to Ranney 
(1975:435), the civil service should be convinced by the government of the day 
that what they want is actually mutually inclusive with what the government wants 
or aims to achieve. Furthermore, there should be an understanding that it is what 
their appraisal of their responsibilities requires them to perform, in their own 
interest. 
In this form of control mechanism, there are as many advantages as there are 
disadvantages. For instance, it would be easier to implement government 
policies, because the public service officials would be loyal to the government. 
However, it is also possible that the implementation would not be perfect due to 
the lack of high-calibre personnel, since the loyalists would receive first 
preference. 
5.15.5 Construction of the Counter-Bureaucracy 
A counter-bureaucracy is formed to create alternative advisory services and to 
enhance the ability of both parliament and ministers to exercise control over 
public officials. Political advisors, as already discussed, are one of the control 
mechanisms that could be employed to counteract bureaucratic po~er. Advisors 
and other external human resources could serve as a counterweight to 
permanently employed public service officials. According to Heywood (1997:256), 
other organisations outside the State departments could be engaged to perform 
certain tasks which wou.ld normally be performed by those departments; for 
example, a team of consultants could be engaged to deliver certain services. 
Counter-bureaucratic structures consist, in most instances, of highly qualified 
personnel with vast knowledge, experience, and expertise in various fields. In 
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terms of policy formulation, such organisations could be much more helpful than 
ordinary government departments. According to Heywood (1997:256), counter-
bureaucracies compensate for the imbalance in the relationship between poorly 
qualified public service officials and outnumber highly qualified civil service 
officials who cannot perform certain tasks promptly. 
The construction of the counter-bureaucracy could also serve as a mechanism to 
maintain public accountability. The authority vested in them by political office-
bearers is given to them in trust. However, according to Hanekom et a/ 
(1994:171), the maintenance of control and accountability depends largely on the 
control exercised by Parliament over the actions of the department concerned. 
5.16 How Public Officials Evoke Compliance 
The more straightforward objective of administration is to effect the delivery of 
service. In order to meet this objective, political office-bearers devolve some of 
their authority and powers to administrative structures, mainly because such 
structures embody a vast store of knowledge and expertise. 
It is significant that politicians and civil service officials depend on one another in 
the process of administration and of service delivery. According to Hanekom eta/ 
(1994:76), bureaucracy should be seen as a strategic political instrument in the 
functioning of government. However, bureaucratic authority is dependent on 
political concurrence. (Political concurrence means, in this context, that there 
should be a certain level of agreement and understanding of how the work should 
be carried out. This brings in other administrative dimensions such as 
accountability, responsibility and ethical conduct). 
To sum up the basis for bureaucratic authority, one could mention that the 
weaknesses sometimes found within political institutions and political office-
bearers are often exploited by the bureaucracy due to the following factors: 
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• Resource allocation. The allocation of resources rests in the hands of the 
administration. It is the administration that compiles the budget and also 
provides alternatives. As such, the bureaucracy has authority over 
resource allocation. Accordingly, the bureaucracy has the ability to 
influence the daily lives of ordinary people. 
• Expertise. Public bureaucracy has unique expert knowledge, and 
occupations and professions which are indispensable, especially for 
quality delivery of service. According to Henry (1995:42), the pride of a 
public officer as a practitioner lies in the fact that the profession itself is 
worthwhile to society. 
According to Hanekom et a/ (1994:77), political leaders depend on their 
day to day activities, and on the loyalty and reliability of public servants. 
This includes various forms of quality performance as well as 
administrative accountability. 
• Discretionary powers. Because of the heavy schedules that political 
office-bearers are usually engaged in, a certain amount of power is 
devolved to bureaucratic structures and individuals. This is especially so 
where technical functions, routine work, and a smaller scope of political 
intervention are necessary. At times, political office-bearers could be 
reluctant to decide on a matter, in which case a public servant holding a 
senior position could carry out the responsibility. 
Discussion and research has revealed that the roles of political office-bearers 
and those of public officials are intertwined and cannot easily be divorced from 
each other. The political control of public officials is anchored in such roles, 
because they are pivotal in service delivery. 
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Control in one form or another is one of the fundamental requirements of public 
management. Political control over public management takes place strictly at 
managerial level where a certain minimum level of expertise is a prerequisite. It 
has been indicated that political office-bearers provide bureaucratic leadership; 
that is, the task of the minister or a member of the executive council is to oversee 
the implementation of policies. 
According to Heywood (1997:319), ministers form part and parcel of the "top 
management" of each department and have, as their major responsibility, the co-
ordination of policies, in order to ensure that political responsiveness is 
maintained and that the preferences of elected officials and government, as 
reflected in policy documents, weigh heavily in public personnel management. 
According to Heywood (1997: 11 ), the relationship in this situation will promote 
and maintain the interdependence between the organisational participants, as the 
activities of each actor will necessarily affect the operations or fortunes of 
another. 
Heywood (1997:5) states that political leadership stresses the importance of 
personnel administration as a vehicle used by elected office-bearers for 
maintaining responsiveness and accountability of the bureaucracy. Public 
management, therefore, serves as leverage over personnel administration that 
allows elected officials to govern effectively. In this instance, the elected officials 
strive to appoint, at senior level and in other strategically sensitive positions, 
capable officials who are loyal to themselves. 
In order to enhance their control over public personnel, political office-bearers 
place policy administration and monitoring in the hands of trusted management 
teams. Heywood (1997:8) stress the fact that the need for political office-bearers 
to control the bureaucracy is one of the requirements of democracy. This notion 
seeks to address the fact that government cannot assume that any individual, as 
long as he or she has been appointed by government, would necessarily respond 
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in accordance with the expectations of those who made the appointments. 
Intervention in the form of control should therefore be exercised within public 
management. 
In public management, control focuses mainly on formal internal controls as 
exercised by the ministers at national level or members of the executive council 
at provincial level. Cloete (1991: 188) stresses the fact that internal control is the 
responsibility of all executive office-bearers because of their attachment to 
various departments. 
Formal internal control seeks to attempt to reduce informal initiatives by the 
public officials which could lead to an "amendment" of rules that could have 
adverse effects on the operations of government. Formal internal control, 
according to Heywood (1997:8), reduces the risk of sabotage by those public 
officials who may be supporters of political parties other than the governing one. 
Senior public servants evoke compliance at middle and low levels of 
administration. 
The importance of the formal control of public management stems mainly from 
the essential element of managerial activity, which is the delegation of authority. 
Since political office-bearers and senior public officials are ultimately responsible 
for and accountable to Parliament, it is imperative that they should know whether 
or not the officials at lower levels are performing according to the rules and plans 
put forward by the politicians. According to Fox eta/ (1991: 118), formal control in 
public management gives an opportunity to an elected office-bearer to measure 
performance and determine adjustments. 
Formal internal control of public management is mostly monitored by senior 
public officials who, in turn, are under the watchful eye of political executive 
officials. Formal internal control could be regarded mainly as systems explored 
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from three broad perspectives, namely, control criteria, qualitative control, and 
contingency systems. 
5.16.1 Control Criteria 
Criteria could be understood to mean critical control points and standards. 
Control criteria are set to deal with measurable outputs. Standards are set to 
gauge whether the expected results have been attained or not. Criteria are 
usually defined both in qualitative or quantitative terms. Although criteria are used 
to measure performance, they also serve as motivating factors because they 
demand high levels of performance. According to Heywood (1997:123), it is 
imperative that control criteria should encompass all the necessary elements of 
performance. 
In criteria-based control, various elements are noticeable, such as written reports, 
auditing, cost accounting, cost comparisons and cost analysis. According to 
Cloete (1991:190), a criterion should satisfy certain requirements before it can be 
justified as an effective control mechanism. Criteria as critical control points and 
standards in public management include the following types: 
• physical standards 
• cost standards 
• capital standards 
• revenue standards 
• program standards 
• intangible standards and 
• strategic plans as control points for strategic control. 
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5.16.2 Qualitative Control 
Effective control systems have certain qualities. Fox eta/ (1991 :121) highlight six 
control prescriptions for effective control in public management, namely, 
timeliness, flexibility, economy, understandability, strategic placement and the 
ability to stress the exception. These elements will be discussed below. 
Timeliness emphasises the fact that infringements on organisational or 
departmental performance should be attended to in good time. Proper and 
effective controls call for attention to deviations in time to prevent serious 
infringements on institutional performance. Time is also considered a resource in 
any organisation. It therefore follows that time is also a criterion by which 
efficiency can be measured. 
Flexibility promotes effective control in terms of allowing necessary adjustments 
to be made at any given time. Public management should be able to adjust to 
new conditions so as to effect proper control which is in line with the needs of the 
institution. 
5.16.3 Contingency Systems 
Effective control over public management requires attention to some critical 
factors. The ability to choose those critical factors of public management control 
depends on the ability to understand contingency factors which should be applied 
at a particular instance. It is the responsibility of a senior public official to choose 
the appropriate contingency measure at appropriate time. 
5.17 Conclusion 
It was an objective of this study to find out what political control entails. In view of 
the problems encountered with the interaction of the political and administrative 
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systems, it appears that the prospects of political control over the bureaucracy 
could be found through: the difference between elected and appointed officials, 
the relationship between the government and the bureaucracy, the various 
ministerial styles, the influence of bureaucrats on political decision-making, the 
neutrality of bureaucrats, the political role of the bureaucracy, the balance in 
relations between ministers and high ranking officials, and the transferral of 
ministerial power to bureaucrats. 
The chapter explored the different ways in which ministers exercise control over 
the bureaucracy. An overview is also given of the objectives, the necessity for 
political control and the appropriateness of the control measures, with reference 
to the Northern Province Provincial Government. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this dissertation was mainly to describe and analyse the 
phenomenon of political control over the bureaucracy in the political and 
administrative system. The question of what the nature of political control over 
the bureaucracy entails and what practical actions could be taken at an 
institutional level to enable the South African government to promote political 
control over the management of public assets, policies, public sector 
performance and services, formed the core of the problem statement of the 
dissertation. 
To ensure that this study is also seen as an appraisal of a process and not only 
as a description of political control, it was necessary to consider the above 
problem statement and weigh it against the accumulated evidence and the 
results of conclusions drawn from the examination of the other aims of the study. 
This is also dealt with in the following sections, where the main issues of concern 
of this study are addressed. Though the requirements of the degree required a 
dissertation of limited scope the process of documentation of a field of study with 
so many variables influencing the actual process of control over the bureaucracy 
resulted in a full dissertation. 
6.2 Synthesis 
A focus of the research aims and objectives of the study was to determine the 
nature of the interaction between the variables of the political and the 
administrative system, state-related structures and institutions, and the 
ideological grounding of state-related concepts that influence the milieu of 
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political control over the bureaucracy. In Chapter Two consideration was given 
to various central concepts and core practice fields and institutions in which 
political control over the bureaucracy is situated. Attention was given to the 
conceptual clarification of concepts related to the State, including concepts 
related to government and governance. 
There are numerous factors that affect the political and administrative systems. 
Public administration, and more specifically the bureaucracy, must come to terms 
with, accept or resist these influences. Together the political and administrative 
systems form a highly complex system that does not exist for the sole purpose of 
delivering services. 
For many people public administration simply means the "administration" of 
extensive government programmes, a way of regulating the people's behaviour in 
society and the provision of certain public services, for example education, health 
and transport. This perception may be correct to some extent but it is limited. 
Given the rapid development of public administration, it would seem to have 
become an all-encompassing activity that is not limited to the traditional 
boundaries of state departments, the management and administration of 
government programmes or the daily activities in public sector institutions. Public 
administration relates to the cardinal objectives of society. Public administration 
is also concerned with the development, allocation and utilisation of resources 
with a view to achieving government objectives within the context of a rapidly 
changing political environment. 
As could be seen from this dissertation, there is a close association between 
public administration and the politics of a country. Although it is already a 
foregone conclusion that politics and public administration will always be bound 
together, developments are continually taking place to the effect that the political 
aspects of the bureaucracy are increasing and changing. This tendency can be 
called the politicisation of public administration. A spate of writings have been 
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published of late about the relationship between the elected political office-bearer 
or functionary and the appointed public official. The dissertation was concerned 
with this relationship. 
As regards the word use in this dissertation, there are two points to consider. 
Bureaucracy in Max Weber's sense of the ideal model for the organisation of the 
bureaucracy, or in the current sense in which the Americans use it, namely as a 
completely neutral reference to the civil service pure and simple. Given that the 
two domains are inseparable, how can they be distinguished from each other? 
The difference· that is generally accepted as decisive in South Africa is the 
transience of elected versus the permanence of appointed functionaries. The 
problem with this distinction is that top officials exert a greater influence on 
government policy that party members do in parliament. 
It stands to reason that none of the concepts that relate to the State and 
influence public administration can be applied in an absolute sense in a single 
chapter because the field of study of politics and administration is extensive and 
also because theories, processes and institutions in politics and public 
administration are constantly interacting. This chapter attempted to form a 
gradual and co.mprehensive background of the milieu in which the role of political 
control over the bureaucracy is situated. 
A further objective of the study was to determine the nature of the bureaucracy 
as well as to determine a clear and meaningful basis for interpretation and 
utilisation by both political as well as administrative aims and functions be 
established with regard to the role of political control. 
As discussed in Chapter One, a focus of the research aims and objectives of the 
study was to determine the nature of the bureaucracy and to establish a clear 
and meaningful basis for interpretation and utilisation by both political as well as 
administrative aims and functions with regard to the role of political control. 
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Chapter Three dealt with the environment of a bureaucracy. The chapter 
addressed the political and administrative significance of a bureaucracy for 
society. It was indicated that the key function of the bureaucracy is to implement 
laws and policies to administer a government's decisions. Civil servants also play 
an important role as policy advisors to ministers when they express interests and 
bring interests together (particularly through ties with client groups), and in the 
maintenance of political stability and continuity when a change of government 
occurs. 
Public bureaucracies are traditionally partitioned according to objectives or 
functions. hence their division into departments, divisions or agencies. The 
internal level of centralisation or decentralisation differs considerably from one 
country to another, and even from one department to another. The modern 
tendency, however is to separate policy determination from policy application, 
and to include private-sector management techniques, or to privatise interests. 
One can see from Chapter Two that numerous factors affect the political and 
administrative systems. Public administration, and more specifically the 
bureaucracy, must come to terms with, accept or resist these influences. How 
this is done will influence society. It is clear that together the political and 
administrative systems form a highly complex system that does not exist for the 
sole purpose of delivering services. Although the public sector is influenced by a 
variety of factors, these influences are not passively absorbed. The public 
bureaucracy makes adjustments under the pressure of certain influences, but it 
may also offer resistance against influence. Service delivery by the bureaucracy 
affects the personal life of every citizen in one way or another. Nevertheless the 
necessity of political control will always remain. Thus Strauss (1961 :85): "In 
broader terms, every important organisation is a nucleus of social power 
confronted by other powers; its aims and policy must be decided by its political 
leadership and cannot be left with impunity to its administrative servants." 
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A further objective of the study was to analyse and define control and 
accountability. Chapter Four dealt with the meaning and classification of control 
as well as the objectives of public institutions in exercising control. Attention is 
paid to the normative requirements for control over the bureaucracy. Particular 
attention is paid to types of control and accountability. If measures to promote 
political control are to have any success, it is essential that accountability start at 
the top, viz. with political office-bearers who should accept accountability for their 
own actions in order to send the right message to public officials. Unless it is 
made abundantly clear that accountability starts at the top, any campaign against 
corruption will be unsuccessful. 
Political office-bearers ad civil servants now operate in an environment that is 
markedly different from that of the past. Two of the most important factors 
contributing to this change are the financial constraints under which modern 
government operates and the changing expectations that the public and 
politicians have of the civil service. Value for money has become much more 
complex leading to an increased recognition of the importance of (and the 
necessity of putting in place) adequate accountability mechanisms. 
Accountability and responsibility are closely related and may be regarded as two 
dimensions of the same relationship. 
The primary task of public officials is the promotion of the welfare of the 
community, a task that should be performed in such a way that the public official 
is able to account in public for his actions. The public official needs to remember 
at all times that public money is being used and that both the public official and 
political-office bearers are in service of the public and not in the service of the 
government. 
Finally, it was also an objective of this study to find out what political control 
entails. Chapter Five explores the different ways in which political office-bearers 
exercise control over the bureaucracy. The traditional approach is that the 
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bureaucracy is merely the workhorse for the implementation of government 
policy. In other words, the only real purpose of the bureaucracy is to take 
executive action. Instructions come from the legislators and the functionaries 
must carry these instructions out without question. This perception can possibly 
be traced back to the days when a ruler with total executive powers still held 
sway in Britain: 
It was shown in Chapter Two that the government has to determine the policy 
objectives while the bureaucracy has to undertake the activities aimed at 
achieving those objectives. These statements may create the impression that the 
bureaucracy plays no role in policy determination. As indicated, though, this is no 
longer the case. The ideas: 
that functionaries are mere instruments for the implementation of policy 
and have no will of their own, and 
that there is an impenetrable partition between policy determination and 
policy implementation, were discarded long ago. 
It was explained in Chapter Three that functionaries are important providers of 
factual data and advice for the purposes of policy determination. The question of 
a separation between policymaking (which is supposedly the function of the 
politicians) and policy implementation is less relevant today than ever before 
because functionaries nowadays often have to take the initiative in policymaking. 
It is the functionaries who have to do the initial spadework even in cases where 
they have had no instruction to that effect from the politicians. Who knows better 
that the functionaries who are preparing the ground for new policy what 
shortcomings have to be overcome in the process of preparation? 
There is an unresolved question in this matter, however, which can be stated as 
follows: What are the limits within which functionaries must operate when they 
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participate in policymaking? To answer this question the role of the top-official, 
his/her political influence, and whether there is a connection between political 
control over the role of the top official and the influence of that role, must be 
determined. 
The organisation and administration of modern states is a complicated process 
that requires skill, experience and expertise. Bureaucracies has been playing an 
important role in the political and administrative system for centuries and rulers 
are constantly struggling with the problem of exercising effective control over 
their civil servants. The impact of the bureaucracy on policy making has 
increased over time, however, as the role of government has expanded. 
A modern state department is a large, multifaceted organisation that embodies a 
vast store of knowledge and experience of its area of specialisation. 
Departments, like all other organisations, develop their own procedures, their 
own set of priorities, and their own unique approach. They maintain a network of 
ties with other departments and interest groups with whom they are connected by 
way of tradition, agreements and personal relationships. All these things 
complicate the control task, which means that to steer a department in a new 
direction is a slow, complicated process requiring sustained effort from the 
minister concerned. 
Since politicians as well as government officials are involved in governing and 
managing the country, one of the main issues in studying the bureaucracy is 
whether these two roles are related and reconcilable. I many respects politicians 
and civil servants perform the same kind of functions, but there are three 
important differences between the executive authority's political role and civil 
servants' administrative functions. 
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• First there is a difference in the sense of the partisanship between the 
members of the executive authority and the supposed neutrality of the civil 
service. 
• Secondly their terms of service are different. On the whole political 
leaders' term of service is generally determined by elections, which makes 
their term of service relatively short, while civil servants traditionally have 
permanent appointments. 
• Thirdly civil servants are only expected to administer the execution of 
government policy, and not to determine such policy. The political masters 
are supposed to determine public policy and advise officialdom on its 
implementation. The civil servant's task is to find ways of making 
politicians plans feasible and to implement them. 
The tripartite division of state authority subscribed to in Western countries 
contrasts starkly with the realities of modern public administration. Multiple and 
complex functions that have to be performed by ministers on national and 
international levels have made it imperative to confer their administrative task 
almost, if not actually, as a whole on the bureaucracy. This evolution of public 
administration whereby an "administrative authority" has arisen, is also helped 
along by the actions of Parliament and the development of the administrative 
state. 
It is actually the government of the day (and not the legislators) who takes the 
most important decisions after factual data and advice have been gained from 
many quarters, but especially from the bureaucracy. 
The function of top-level functionaries in the bureaucracy is also more political 
that that of persons in lower ranks, since they are more involved with government 
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as a whole, and therefore have more relevance for more members of the public, 
more government institutions and more political processes. 
If public opinion is seen as part of the democratic political process, then the 
bureaucracy and the individual official are also involved because they are part of 
public opinion. Every expression of an opinion about public affairs-at the 
hairdresser or beauty salon, in a taxi, at a club meeting, a party, a trade union 
meeting, an agricultural union meeting or wherever-is a contribution to the 
climate in which the government acts all the time to achieve or maintain 
solidarity. Every opinion that is not expressed is a potential vote lost. Moreover 
the public official is in close contact with the desires of all kinds of interests-and 
pressure groups-all of which exercise a cumulative influence on his/her opinion. 
The official has a vocation to pass this knowledge on to the legislative authority. 
And besides, the bureaucracy as an informed organisation is also often the 
initiator of legislation and as such will of necessity exercise its influence in this 
regard. 
It transpires, therefore, that there is dynamic interaction between the political 
process (politics or legislative authority) and the administrative process 
(bureaucracy or executive authority). Although the distinction between these two 
processes is blurred and not clearly definable, it nevertheless exists. However, 
they cannot be categorically separated. 
6.3 Observations 
A central question runs through the conclusion of this study. Is political control 
adequate for the civil service and is the civil service becoming more 
accountable? There is no easy answer to this. It is certainly true that more formal 
procedures now exist for effecting accountability and that the controls exercised 
on the top civil servant from outside a department or provincial administration 
have increased. Thus, there is greater parliamentary scrutiny, through 
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committees, especially on public expenditure; there is greater internal review of 
efficiency and effectiveness and more attempts to specify individual objectives 
and monitor performance, largely as a result of the implementation of the White 
Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service as a system of accountable 
management; and there is an additional client appeal system in areas of direct 
service delivery, as a result of the Office of the Public Protector. It is difficult, to 
determine whether these significantly increased the accountability of the top-level 
civil service. Taking them individually the White Paper is likely to have the 
greatest influence on improving accountability because it has helped to set in 
place a system to account for performance and has provided a framework for 
formalising internal accountability. But since it was still in its early stages when 
this study was carried out, the full extent of its implementation and the degree of 
long-term commitment to it remain unknown, 
While this study was carried out in the late nineties and early 2000 and, therefore 
does not take account of consequent developments, it raises many issues that 
are of continuing importance in political control and public management. Six 
potential probl~m are highlighted: 
• The political/administrative interface 
Two main types of accountability, administrative and parliamentary, operate 
within the top-level civil service, each of which has given rise to quite distinct 
reporting procedures. This in turn has meant the existence of parallel priorities 
within departments and within the civil service as a whole: parliamentary and 
administrative. Apart from the inefficiency caused by duplicated reporting 
procedures, there is the more fundamental question of which assumes priority for 
top civil servants. In operational terms, the question becomes: who is the 
individual civil servant ultimately responsible to: the political office-bearer or the 
top official? This is not a clear-cut either/or question. Throughout the study, 
departmental heads and heads of sections or commissions spoke of the difficulty 
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of balancing parliamentary and administrative responsibilities. It seems to be 
difficult, if not nigh impossible, to legislate for this complex relationship, so 
dependent is it on the individual style of the political incumbent. The role of the 
departmental heads is to manage the political/administrative interface, which 
requires a delicate balancing of the two systems. The task of the departmental 
head is, therefore, considerably complex. 
• The necessary variation in the work performed by top-level civil 
servants. 
The difficulties of specifying objectives and developing monitoring systems are 
acute in certain parts of the civil service. Tasks involving policy formulation are a 
case in point. l.t is also difficult, however, to set targets and monitor progress in 
those areas of work that involve the servicing of the parliamentary system. This 
raises the question of whether it is either possible or desirable to treat the civil 
service as a unit. Certain tasks may require specific approaches, which differ 
from those required by others. 
• The existing legal basis for accountability. 
This was a recurring concern, especially among heads of departments. At 
present the only legal accountability they have is as the departmental accounting 
officer. The central question here is whether top-level civil servants are granted 
the authority or autonomy necessary to give full effect to their accountability. 
While they assume full responsibility for the operation and management of their 
departments, they are not legally accountable for these activities. There is a 
strong feeling among top-level civil servants that, if their accountability is to be 
formally extended, it must be based on appropriate legislative changes. 
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• The comprehensiveness of internal accountability systems within 
departments 
Some senior civil servants felt that they were not being held to account for their 
decisions and actions within the civil service at the time of study 
• Accountability without responsibility 
Some civil ser-Vants felt that they were being held accountable for decisions for 
which they were not responsible, i.e., those taken by a predecessor or the 
political office-bearer 
• The costs of accountability 
Increased accountability is not a costless exercise. Among the negative 
consequences of the measures studied is slower, more cautious decision-
making, more detailed record keeping, and lower staff morale 
6.4 The State of Political Control in the Northern Province 
It was interesting to note the Semenya Commission of Enquiry Report (1997:11) 
(see Chapter Five) which highlighted the fact that since the documents submitted 
to the Commission comprised many thousands of pages, it would not be possible 
to attend to each and every submission in the short time in which the 
Commission was supposed to complete its findings. The overwhelming response 
reflected the enthusiasm with which the public welcomed the establishment of 
the said Commission, and suggested that the public was not satisfied with the 
manner in which the affairs of government were being managed. The volume of 
submissions represented public opinion on the ineffectiveness of political control 
over the bureaucracy. 
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On the political front-that is, the perceptions of the opposition parties with regard 
to the control exercised by political office-bearers over the bureaucracy-the 
Commission indicated that submissions from other political structures had no 
bearing on the terms of reference, except to display 'political in-fighting and point 
scoring (Semenya Commission of Enquiry Report 1997:12). This reveals the 
dangers of political posturing. Despite the fact that other political parties 
constituted the minority in the Provincial Legislature, their moving out of line with 
the terms of reference of the Commission, depicted the ineffectiveness of the 
opposition within the Provincial Legislature and the influence it was supposed to 
have on the Executive. Legislative control over the bureaucracy was 
compromised, and the political supremacy in the Province was eroded. 
The Provincial Legislature has failed to exercise its constitutional powers as 
stipulated in Sections 133 (2) and (3) (b), where it is stated that members of the 
executive council are accountable, both collectively and individually, to the 
Legislature. However something went wrong, and there is no information that 
suggests that the Legislature was correctly informed and that corrective action 
was taken. This failure was exacerbated by the inefficiency of the opposition as 
mentioned above. 
The measures of political control over the provincial government bureaucracy as 
indicated in Chapter Five are adequate. However, there are serious pitfalls 
among the implementation agencies. For example, the failure of personnel to 
interpret statut~s and other rules and regulations is great cause for concern, 
since it is an indication that the human resources of the province is not properly 
equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to manage the affairs of 
government. Effective and efficient political control within this environment is 
therefore not possible. 
In the Northern Province the political office-bearers interfering in purely 
administrative activities eroded the maintenance of accountability. The loophole 
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for shifting blame from either side was created. The remarks by the Speaker of 
the Legislature reveals serious problems that are prevalent within the provincial 
administration. Whether or not executive institutions maintain public 
accountability depends to a large extent on the control exercised by the 
legislature over their actions, as well as on the reaction of the public to their 
actions, in this instance the Legislature did not effectively intervene until outcry 
breaks out. 
The political bias depicted by members of the Executive Council preferring some 
members of the civil service over others has a tremendous negative impact on 
the control over the bureaucracy. As indicated in Chapter Five, some members 
of the public service deliberately left members of the Executive Council to take 
decisions with out adequate information. In fact, the Commission of Enquiry was 
precipitated by such behaviour. 
6.5 In Conclusion 
In conclusion, all attempts at reform in the civil service must be set in context. To 
focus on one area is to ignore others. Accountability and political control is just 
two of many issues prevailing within the civil service. At the end of the day, 
accountability is not just a technical issue, such as better reporting systems. It is 
the content of the reports - the performance - that is critical. Better reporting 
procedures dO\ not automatically lead to better performance. The focus of 
accountability should be the need for continual improvement in performance, not 
simply procedures themselves. "Accountability for what?" should be the crucial 
question. 
In the end, improved performance and improved accountability and political 
control depend on the extent to which people accept them as legitimate goals, 
both within the administration and within the parliamentary system. The results of 
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this study indicate that specific and continued efforts may need to be made to 
generate and sustain such commitment. The recognition that both the 
administrative and parliamentary systems are linked by a common 
goal-improved· public sector performance and management-is the key to 
realising such commitment. 
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